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21 CFR Part 11 | Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures

How Identity and Access Management Supports 21 CFR Part 11

21 CFR Part 11 sets FDA criteria for electronic records and electronic signatures. Its access, authority-check and credential-control provisions, and its electronic signature provisions on uniqueness and identity verification, are largely identity topics. This page quotes the Part 11 provisions in the matrix, from 11.10 through 11.300, and marks where identity and access management commonly contributes. That runs from limiting system access to authorized individuals in 11.10(d) to the identification code and password controls in 11.300.

The matrix has 29 rows. Of those, 12 are primary identity work, 9 are supporting, and 8 are outside identity scope (GCA classification). Section 11.10 applies to closed systems and 11.30 to open systems, as defined in 21 CFR 11.3(b)(4) and 11.3(b)(9). This page describes where identity work fits. It does not state whether any particular system is validated or acceptable to FDA.

For CIOs and compliance leaders

Information as of Last verified 21 CFR Part 11 as codified in the eCFR (point-in-time 2026-10-01; most recent amendment 88 FR 13018, Mar. 2, 2023) Version 1

Reference material, not a compliance determination. This matrix reflects GCA's practice view as of . It does not certify, warrant or predict the outcome of any assessment, audit or examination. 21 CFR Part 11, as published in the eCFR, controls. Read the full notice.

The matrix

  • Primary
  • Supporting
  • Outside identity scope (GCA classification)

FDA 21 CFR Part 11, Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures identity traceability matrix. 21 CFR Part 11 as codified in the eCFR (point-in-time 2026-10-01; most recent amendment 88 FR 13018, Mar. 2, 2023). Information as of October 16, 2026.
Requirement Requirement text System type Identity relevance (GCA classification) GCA approach Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities Evidence commonly examined
11.10(d) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Limiting system access to authorized individuals

Limiting system access to authorized individuals.

In practice: Access to a regulated system is granted by role after a manager's sign-off, removed when someone leaves, and reviewed periodically by the system owner.

  • System type Closed systems
Primary
Why this classification

Limits system access to authorized individuals. Identity and access management is typically the principal means of implementing it.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage
  • Role Mining Engine

Role-based provisioning, access request approval, leaver processing and periodic access review commonly contribute to limiting access to authorized individuals.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Access request and approval records
  • Access review campaign export with reviewer decisions
  • Leaver workflow configuration and sample run
11.10(g) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Use of authority checks to ensure that only authorized individuals can use the system, electronically sign a record, access the operation or computer system input or output device, alter a record, or perform the operation at hand.

In practice: Roles decide who may sign, edit or release a record, separation of duties keeps one person from doing every step, and signing roles go to named people.

  • System type Closed systems
Primary
Why this classification

Authority checks so only authorized individuals can use the system, sign a record, access input or output devices, alter a record or perform an operation. Role-based access control is typically the principal means of implementing it.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage
  • Role Mining Engine

Role and entitlement design, separation of duties and signing-authority roles commonly contribute to authority checks on use, signing, access and alteration.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Role catalog showing signing and approval roles
  • Separation of duties policy and violation report
  • Access review results for signing roles
11.100(a) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Each electronic signature shall be unique to one individual and shall not be reused by, or reassigned to, anyone else.

In practice: Every signer has their own identity, shared or recycled signing logins are not allowed, and an old identifier is not handed to a new person.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

Each electronic signature must be unique to one individual and not reused or reassigned. Identity management is typically the principal means of implementing it.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

A single identity per person, no shared or reassigned signing credentials, and controlled reuse of identifiers commonly contribute to uniqueness of each signature.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity uniqueness and correlation report
  • Identifier reuse and reassignment policy
11.100(b) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Before an organization establishes, assigns, certifies, or otherwise sanctions an individual's electronic signature, or any element of such electronic signature, the organization shall verify the identity of the individual.

In practice: A new signer is first confirmed against the HR record in the joiner workflow, and signing credentials are issued only after that confirmation.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

The organization verifies an individual's identity before establishing, assigning or sanctioning an electronic signature or any element of it. Joiner onboarding and credential issuance are typically where this is implemented.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Joiner workflows tied to an authoritative HR record and controlled credential issuance commonly contribute to verifying identity before signing credentials are issued.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Joiner onboarding procedure with identity verification step
  • Credential issuance records
11.200(a)(1) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

(a) Electronic signatures that are not based upon biometrics shall: (1) Employ at least two distinct identification components such as an identification code and password. (i) When an individual executes a series of signings during a single, continuous period of controlled system access, the first signing shall be executed using all electronic signature components; subsequent signings shall be executed using at least one electronic signature component that is only executable by, and designed to be used only by, the individual. (ii) When an individual executes one or more signings not performed during a single, continuous period of controlled system access, each signing shall be executed using all of the electronic signature components.

In practice: Signers use MFA to sign in, are asked to re-authenticate when they sign, and must enter both components again after a break in the session.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

Non-biometric electronic signatures use at least two distinct identification components such as an identification code and password, with rules for series of signings. Authentication services are typically the principal means of implementing it.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Authentication that uses two distinct components (the regulation's own example is an identification code and password; multi-factor authentication goes further), signing-time re-authentication and session policy commonly contribute, including re-entry of all components across non-continuous sessions.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authentication method and MFA policy export
  • Step-up or re-authentication policy for signing actions
11.200(a)(2) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

(a) Electronic signatures that are not based upon biometrics shall: [...] (2) Be used only by their genuine owners; and

In practice: Phishing-resistant authenticators, no shared accounts and alerts on sign-in risk events help keep a signature in the hands of its real owner.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

Non-biometric electronic signatures are used only by their genuine owners. Credential assurance and no-sharing controls are typically the principal means of implementing it. Paragraph (a) lead-in applies: this requirement is for electronic signatures not based upon biometrics.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Phishing-resistant authenticators, elimination of shared accounts and sign-in risk detection commonly contribute to use only by the genuine owner.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authenticator registration report
  • Shared account remediation record
  • Sign-in risk policy export
11.200(a)(3) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

(a) Electronic signatures that are not based upon biometrics shall: [...] (3) Be administered and executed to ensure that attempted use of an individual's electronic signature by anyone other than its genuine owner requires collaboration of two or more individuals.

In practice: Credential administrators and signers are different people, and any reset or reassignment of a signing credential needs a second person's sign-off in the workflow.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

Signatures are administered and executed so attempted use by anyone other than the genuine owner requires collaboration of two or more individuals. Administrative separation and approval controls are typically the principal means of implementing the administration side. Paragraph (a) lead-in applies: this requirement is for electronic signatures not based upon biometrics.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Separation of duties between credential administrators and signers, and approval workflows for credential resets or reassignments, commonly contribute to requiring more than one person to misuse a signature.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Administrator role separation design
  • Credential reset approval workflow configuration
  • Privileged activation approval records
11.300 C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Controls for identification codes/passwords

Persons who use electronic signatures based upon use of identification codes in combination with passwords shall employ controls to ensure their security and integrity. Such controls shall include:

In practice: Password rules, credential lifecycle steps and sign-in monitoring are set up as a set of controls around signing credentials, with each part owned and documented.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

Lead-in requiring controls for the security and integrity of signatures based on identification codes in combination with passwords. Identity and access management is typically the principal means of implementing paragraphs (a) through (e).

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Credential policy, lifecycle management and monitoring commonly contribute to the controls enumerated in paragraphs (a) through (e).

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Credential policy export
11.300(a) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Maintaining the uniqueness of each combined identification code and password, such that no two individuals have the same combination of identification code and password.

In practice: Each person has a distinct user ID, and shared credentials are prohibited, so no two people end up with the same ID and password pair.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

Maintaining uniqueness of each combined identification code and password so no two individuals share a combination. Directory and identity provider controls are typically the principal means of implementing it.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Unique identifiers per person and prohibition of shared credentials commonly contribute to uniqueness of each combination.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Duplicate and shared identifier detection report
11.300(b) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Ensuring that identification code and password issuances are periodically checked, recalled, or revised (e.g., to cover such events as password aging).

In practice: Credential issuances are checked on a schedule through access reviews, reports that flag dormant accounts, and password aging or compromised-password checks as the organization's policy sets.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

Identification code and password issuances are periodically checked, recalled or revised. Credential lifecycle and access review are commonly used to implement it.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Credential lifecycle policy, periodic access review and dormant account detection commonly contribute to checking, recalling or revising issuances.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Credential lifecycle policy export
  • Access review campaign export
  • Dormant account report
11.300(c) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Following loss management procedures to electronically deauthorize lost, stolen, missing, or otherwise potentially compromised tokens, cards, and other devices that bear or generate identification code or password information, and to issue temporary or permanent replacements using suitable, rigorous controls.

In practice: When a token or phone is lost, the help desk revokes it quickly, verifies the person's identity, and enrolls a replacement through a controlled process.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

Procedures to electronically deauthorize lost, stolen or potentially compromised tokens, cards and devices and to issue replacements with rigorous controls. Authenticator lifecycle management is typically the principal means of implementing it.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Authenticator revocation, controlled re-enrollment and identity verification for replacement commonly contribute to loss management.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Lost authenticator procedure
  • Authenticator revocation and re-enrollment audit records
11.300(d) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Use of transaction safeguards to prevent unauthorized use of passwords and/or identification codes, and to detect and report in an immediate and urgent manner any attempts at their unauthorized use to the system security unit, and, as appropriate, to organizational management.

In practice: Lockout rules block repeated guessing, sign-in risk detection spots attempts to misuse credentials, and alerts go straight to the security team.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Primary
Why this classification

Transaction safeguards to prevent unauthorized use of passwords and codes and to detect and report attempts at unauthorized use to the system security unit and management. Sign-in controls and detection are commonly the principal means of implementing it.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Lockout policy, sign-in risk detection and alerting to a security team commonly contribute to preventing, detecting and reporting attempted unauthorized use.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Lockout and risk policy export
  • Alert rules and sample alerts for repeated failed sign-ins
11.10 B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Controls for closed systems

Persons who use closed systems to create, modify, maintain, or transmit electronic records shall employ procedures and controls designed to ensure the authenticity, integrity, and, when appropriate, the confidentiality of electronic records, and to ensure that the signer cannot readily repudiate the signed record as not genuine. Such procedures and controls shall include the following:

In practice: The quality or IT team defines overall system controls; identity adds named individual accounts and controlled access so each action on a record traces to one person.

  • System type Closed systems
Supporting
Why this classification

Lead-in requiring procedures and controls for authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of electronic records and against repudiation of signed records. Primary ownership usually sits with system owners and quality functions. Paragraphs (d), (e) and (g) below are the most identity-specific.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Identity controls commonly contribute to the authenticity and non-repudiation goals the lead-in states, through attributable individual accounts and controlled access.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity and access management procedure for regulated systems
11.10(e) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Use of secure, computer-generated, time-stamped audit trails to independently record the date and time of operator entries and actions that create, modify, or delete electronic records. Record changes shall not obscure previously recorded information. Such audit trail documentation shall be retained for a period at least as long as that required for the subject electronic records and shall be available for agency review and copying.

In practice: The system owner configures time-stamped audit trails; identity supplies named accounts and logs so each recorded entry links to an individual.

  • System type Closed systems
Supporting
Why this classification

Computer-generated, time-stamped audit trails of operator entries and actions on records. Primary ownership usually sits with application owners. Identity attribution of each operator is a dependency.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Unique named accounts and identity audit logs commonly contribute to attributing each recorded entry or action to an individual.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity audit log configuration and retention settings
  • Shared and generic account inventory
11.10(h) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Use of device (e.g., terminal) checks to determine, as appropriate, the validity of the source of data input or operational instruction.

In practice: The system team decides when device checks matter; identity can add registered, health-checked devices as a condition for reaching the system.

  • System type Closed systems
Supporting
Why this classification

Device checks to determine validity of the source of data input or operational instruction. Primary ownership usually sits with application and infrastructure owners. Device identity is one contributor.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Device registration and compliance-aware access policy commonly contribute to determining the validity of the source device.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Device-based access policy export
11.10(j) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

The establishment of, and adherence to, written policies that hold individuals accountable and responsible for actions initiated under their electronic signatures, in order to deter record and signature falsification.

In practice: Individuals acknowledge a written policy about their e-signatures; identity helps by tying each acknowledgement to a unique account and removing shared logins.

  • System type Closed systems
Supporting
Why this classification

Written policies holding individuals accountable for actions under their electronic signatures. Primary ownership usually sits with quality and compliance. Individual, non-shared credentials support accountability.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Acceptable use acknowledgements tied to unique accounts and elimination of shared credentials commonly support individual accountability.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Signed accountability acknowledgement records linked to unique accounts
11.10(k) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Use of appropriate controls over systems documentation including: (1) Adequate controls over the distribution of, access to, and use of documentation for system operation and maintenance. (2) Revision and change control procedures to maintain an audit trail that documents time-sequenced development and modification of systems documentation.

In practice: Documentation owners control who may read or edit system manuals; identity limits those libraries by role and reviews that access from time to time.

  • System type Closed systems
Supporting
Why this classification

Controls over distribution of, access to and use of system documentation, and revision control. Primary ownership usually sits with quality and document control. Access to the documentation repository is an identity contribution.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Role-based access and periodic review of access to system documentation repositories commonly contribute to the access controls described.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Access review results for the documentation repository
11.30 B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Controls for open systems

Persons who use open systems to create, modify, maintain, or transmit electronic records shall employ procedures and controls designed to ensure the authenticity, integrity, and, as appropriate, the confidentiality of electronic records from the point of their creation to the point of their receipt. Such procedures and controls shall include those identified in ยง 11.10, as appropriate, and additional measures such as document encryption and use of appropriate digital signature standards to ensure, as necessary under the circumstances, record authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality.

In practice: The quality team governs records exchanged over open networks; identity adds federated sign-in and certificate-based identities to help establish who the sender is.

  • System type Open systemsClosed and open systems are defined at 21 CFR 11.3(b)(4) and 11.3(b)(9).
Supporting
Why this classification

Additional controls for open systems, including document encryption and digital signature standards. Primary ownership usually sits with application and security engineering. Certificate-based signing identity is one identity contribution.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Federated authentication commonly contributes to establishing who is using a system in open-system exchanges. Where records carry digital signatures, the signing certificates and their issuance are a PKI function that identity governance can track by owner.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Federation and certificate-based authentication configuration
11.50(a) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Signature manifestations

Signed electronic records shall contain information associated with the signing that clearly indicates all of the following: (1) The printed name of the signer; (2) The date and time when the signature was executed; and (3) The meaning (such as review, approval, responsibility, or authorship) associated with the signature.

In practice: The records system shows the signer's printed name beside each signature; identity keeps that name accurate by correlating it with the HR record.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Supporting
Why this classification

Signed records must show the signer's printed name, date and time, and signature meaning. Primary ownership usually sits with application design. Verified signer name attributes from identity are a dependency.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Authoritative, correlated display-name and identity attributes commonly feed the printed-name element shown with a signature.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity attribute source and mapping documentation
11.200(b) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Electronic signatures based upon biometrics shall be designed to ensure that they cannot be used by anyone other than their genuine owners.

In practice: The signature system owner handles any biometric signing; identity may enroll device-bound credentials where a fingerprint unlocks a device, without storing templates.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Supporting
Why this classification

Biometric-based signatures must be designed so they cannot be used by anyone other than their genuine owners. Primary ownership usually sits with the biometric system and application owners. Platform authenticators that use biometrics locally are one identity contribution.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Where platform authenticators use local biometrics as an unlock factor, device-bound credential enrollment and policy commonly contribute. In this pattern the biometric template stays on the device and is not handled by the identity platform.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authenticator type policy export
11.300(e) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Initial and periodic testing of devices, such as tokens or cards, that bear or generate identification code or password information to ensure that they function properly and have not been altered in an unauthorized manner.

In practice: The security team checks tokens and authenticators on a schedule; identity provides an authenticator inventory, attestation checks at enrollment and a restricted list of accepted authenticator models.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Supporting
Why this classification

Initial and periodic testing of devices that bear or generate identification code or password information. Primary ownership usually sits with device and authenticator administrators.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Authenticator inventory, attestation checks at enrollment and restriction of accepted authenticator models commonly contribute to initial and periodic testing.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authenticator inventory and status report
11.10(a) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Validation of systems

Validation of systems to ensure accuracy, reliability, consistent intended performance, and the ability to discern invalid or altered records.

  • System type Closed systems
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Computer system validation. Primary ownership usually sits with quality assurance and system owners.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
11.10(b) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

The ability to generate accurate and complete copies of records in both human readable and electronic form suitable for inspection, review, and copying by the agency. Persons should contact the agency if there are any questions regarding the ability of the agency to perform such review and copying of the electronic records.

  • System type Closed systems
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Record copying for inspection. Primary ownership usually sits with application owners and quality.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
11.10(c) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Protection of records

Protection of records to enable their accurate and ready retrieval throughout the records retention period.

  • System type Closed systems
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Record retention and retrieval. Primary ownership usually sits with application owners and records management.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
11.10(f) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Use of operational system checks to enforce permitted sequencing of steps and events, as appropriate.

  • System type Closed systems
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Enforcement of permitted sequencing of steps. Primary ownership usually sits with application design.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
11.10(i) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Determination that persons who develop, maintain, or use electronic record/electronic signature systems have the education, training, and experience to perform their assigned tasks.

  • System type Closed systems
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Personnel qualifications. Primary ownership usually sits with quality and HR.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
11.50(b) B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

The items identified in paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) of this section shall be subject to the same controls as for electronic records and shall be included as part of any human readable form of the electronic record (such as electronic display or printout).

  • System type Not limited by system type
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Same controls as for electronic records and inclusion in human readable form. Primary ownership usually sits with application design.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
11.70 B: Subpart B, Electronic Records (21 CFR 11.10 through 11.70)

Signature/record linking

Electronic signatures and handwritten signatures executed to electronic records shall be linked to their respective electronic records to ensure that the signatures cannot be excised, copied, or otherwise transferred to falsify an electronic record by ordinary means.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Linking of signatures to records so they cannot be excised, copied or transferred. Primary ownership usually sits with application design.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
11.100(c) C: Subpart C, Electronic Signatures (21 CFR 11.100 through 11.300)

Persons using electronic signatures shall, prior to or at the time of such use, certify to the agency that the electronic signatures in their system, used on or after August 20, 1997, are intended to be the legally binding equivalent of traditional handwritten signatures. (1) The certification shall be signed with a traditional handwritten signature and submitted in electronic or paper form. Information on where to submit the certification can be found on FDA's web page on Letters of Non-Repudiation Agreement. (2) Persons using electronic signatures shall, upon agency request, provide additional certification or testimony that a specific electronic signature is the legally binding equivalent of the signer's handwritten signature.

  • System type Not limited by system type
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

A submission to the agency stating that electronic signatures are intended to be the legally binding equivalent of handwritten signatures. Primary ownership usually sits with regulatory affairs and legal.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Summary

Primary
12
Identity platforms or processes are typically the principal means of implementing the requirement.
Supporting
9
Another discipline owns the requirement. Identity configuration or evidence contributes.
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
8
Listed for completeness, with a one-line note on what the requirement is.

How to read the matrix

System type
Under 21 CFR 11.3(b)(4) a closed system is an environment in which system access is controlled by persons who are responsible for the content of the electronic records on the system, and under 11.3(b)(9) an open system is one in which it is not. Section 11.10 applies to closed systems and 11.30 to open systems. Not limited by system type means the regulation text does not limit the paragraph to one system type.
Identity relevance

Identity relevance is a GCA classification of whether identity capabilities are typically the principal means of implementing a requirement (Primary), contribute to a requirement owned by another discipline (Supporting), or usually sit outside identity work (Outside identity scope (GCA classification)).

It describes where primary implementation ownership usually sits. It is not a statement about whether identity configuration could be relevant to a particular incident, finding or environment. Every "Outside identity scope (GCA classification)" classification carries a rationale, and other classifications show one where GCA has recorded it, under "Why this classification" beside the label.

Platform families
Product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped a platform family to the requirement. It does not mean a product lacks a capability.
Evidence
Examples of artifacts commonly examined. The list is not complete, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.

Important notice

Purpose. This 21 CFR Part 11 identity traceability matrix is general educational reference material, written by Robert Ivey and published by GCA Technology Services ("GCA") to help organizations plan identity and access management work. It is not legal, audit, accounting or compliance advice, and it is not a substitute for advice from qualified professionals who know your environment.

No compliance determination. Whether an organization meets a requirement is decided by the applicable assessor, auditor, certifying body or regulator, applying the governing requirements to that organization's actual systems, policies and evidence. Nothing in this matrix states or implies that any organization, product, service or configuration meets or complies with any requirement, or that any assessment, audit, examination or certification will have any particular outcome.

Classifications are practice opinion. Relevance classifications, offering mappings, platform mappings and evidence examples are the author's professional judgment as of the date shown. They are not regulatory classifications and are not statements of the standard of care. Other qualified practitioners may reasonably classify requirements differently, and the right answer for a given environment depends on its facts.

Evidence examples are illustrative. Evidence listed is an example of artifacts commonly examined. It is not a complete list, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.

Source text controls. Requirement text and references come from the sources listed on this page. Where this matrix differs from a source, the source controls. Regulations, guidance and assessment methods change, so confirm current requirements with the issuing authority before relying on them.

Products and services. Platform names identify product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped that platform family to the requirement. It does not mean the product lacks a capability. GCA makes no representation about any third party's products, features, roadmaps or government authorization status, including FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels and similar programs. Confirm capabilities with the vendor and authorization status with the authorizing program.

GCA services. Offering descriptions identify the type of GCA service that addresses an area. The scope, deliverables, terms and outcomes of any GCA engagement are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work, and this page does not change those terms.

No relationship; no reliance. Reading or using this matrix does not create a client, advisory or other relationship with GCA or the author. To the fullest extent permitted by law, this material is provided "as is," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and GCA is not liable for any decision made or action taken in reliance on it.

No client data. This matrix contains no client data. Any example organization is fictitious.

Version 1 · Prepared · Last reviewed · Reviewed every 90 days · View changelog

Microsoft and Microsoft Entra are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. SailPoint, IdentityIQ and Identity Security Cloud are trademarks or product names of SailPoint Technologies, Inc. or its affiliates. Netwrix is a trademark of Netwrix Corporation. Okta is a trademark of Okta, Inc. Ping Identity is a trademark of Ping Identity Corporation. CyberArk is a trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. or its affiliates. BeyondTrust is a trademark of BeyondTrust Corporation. Delinea is a trademark of Delinea Inc. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration does not endorse this page. All other trademarks belong to their respective owners. These names identify products and programs only and do not imply endorsement by, sponsorship by or affiliation with any of these companies or programs, except where a GCA partnership is expressly stated elsewhere on gca.net.

Changelog

  1. Version 1: First publication.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does identity management decide whether a system meets Part 11?

No. Section 11.10 places its procedures and controls on persons who use closed systems to create, modify, maintain or transmit electronic records. Identity and access management commonly contributes to some of those controls, and the matrix marks the rest as supporting or outside identity scope (GCA classification).

What does closed system mean in this matrix?

Under 21 CFR 11.3(b)(4), a closed system is one in which system access is controlled by persons who are responsible for the content of the electronic records on the system. Section 11.10 applies to closed systems, and 11.30 applies to open systems.

Which version of Part 11 does this page quote?

The text is quoted from the eCFR at point-in-time 2026-10-01. The most recent amendment is 88 FR 13018, dated March 2, 2023.

Does FDA enforce every Part 11 provision the same way?

No. FDA's 2003 guidance, Part 11 Scope and Application, describes a narrow interpretation of Part 11 and enforcement discretion for some provisions, including validation, audit trails, record retention and record copying, and for certain legacy systems. Predicate rule requirements still apply. The guidance says FDA intends to enforce other Part 11 provisions, including limiting system access to authorized individuals, authority checks and the electronic signature provisions (11.50, 11.70, 11.100, 11.200 and 11.300). It also says Part 11 remains in effect and that the guidance does not create legally enforceable responsibilities. Read the guidance for the exact terms.