Agencies handling federal tax information
How Identity and Access Management Supports IRS Publication 1075
IRS Publication 1075 sets the safeguards that agencies must apply to federal tax information (FTI). Section 4.0 of the Rev. 11-2021 edition is titled NIST 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls, and it adds IRS-defined values and requirements. This page quotes selected identity-relevant controls and enhancements in Access Control, Audit and Accountability, Identification and Authentication and Personnel Security. It is not exhaustive: for example, IA-5(1), the password-based authentication enhancement, is not included.
Publication 1075 sets its own parameter values for some controls. For example, AC-2(3) disables non-privileged accounts after 120 days of inactivity and privileged accounts after 60 days. PS-4 requires disabling system access within three (3) business days of termination.
Quotes are verbatim from Section 4.0. Where the PDF text layer split a word or displaced a list label, the text was restored to reading order, and no words were added.
This page is a mapping aid and practice opinion. The relevance classifications, descriptions of identity work and evidence examples are GCA's, not IRS text.
For CIOs and compliance leaders
- IRS-defined requirements in AC-3 and AC-6(2) limit administrator accounts. Administrator accounts may be used only from agency-owned or authorized contractor systems. Those accounts may not be used for web browsing or other Internet connections outside the local protected boundary, and are blocked from email, unless the agency's CISO accepts the risk in writing.
- AC-2(3) allows 60 days of inactivity before a privileged account is disabled, against 120 days for non-privileged accounts. Check your privileged account reports against the shorter window.
- AC-17 supplemental guidance requires multifactor authentication for remote access to FTI. The IA-2(1) and IA-2(2) supplemental guidance requires it for privileged and non-privileged accounts regardless of access type.
Reference material, not a compliance determination. This matrix reflects GCA's practice view as of . It does not certify, warrant or predict the outcome of any assessment, audit or examination. IRS Publication 1075, Rev. 11-2021, Section 4.0, controls. Read the full notice.
The matrix
- Primary
- Supporting
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Showing 49 of 49 requirements
| Requirement | Requirement text | Control enhancement / Carries IRS-Defined text | Identity relevance (GCA classification) | GCA approach | Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities | Evidence commonly examined |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AC-2 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Account Management a. Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system; b. Assign account managers; c. Require conditions for group and role membership; d. Specify: 1. Authorized users of the system; 2. Group and role membership; and 3. Access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes (as required) for each account. e. Require approvals by the system owner or designated representative for requests to create accounts; f. Create, enable, modify, disable and remove accounts in accordance with agency account management procedures prerequisites; g. Monitor the use of accounts; h. Notify account managers and designated agency official within: 1. 24 hours when accounts are no longer required; 2. 24 hours when users are terminated or transferred; and 3. 24 hours when system usage or need-to-know changes for an individual; i. Authorize access to the system based on: 1. A valid access authorization; 2. Intended system usage; and 3. Under the authority to re-disclosed FTI under the provisions of IRC § 6103; j. Review accounts for compliance with account management requirements annually for user account and semi-annually for privileged accounts; k. Establish and implement a process for changing shared or group account authenticators (if deployed) when individuals are removed from the group; and l. Align account management processes with personnel termination and transfer processes. In practice: Each account type is documented and has a named owner. Requests for group or role membership go through the access request workflow, and reviewers regularly confirm who still needs each account. |
None marked | Primary |
Identity governance work commonly contributes here: account types and approvals, group and role membership, lifecycle automation, and account review that distinguishes privileged accounts. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(1) AC-2 (CE-1) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Account Management | Automated System Account Management Support the management of system accounts using automated mechanisms. In practice: New, changed and departing staff trigger account changes automatically in the identity governance platform, and the account owner and the security team get a notification each time. |
|
Primary |
Automated provisioning and notification workflows commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(2) AC-2 (CE-2) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Account Management | Removal of Temporary and Emergency Accounts Automatically disable and remove temporary and emergency accounts after two (2) business days. In practice: A temporary or emergency account is created with an end date of two business days, and the platform disables and removes it when the date arrives, so nobody has to remember to clean it up. |
|
Primary |
Time-boxed access and expiry-driven removal of temporary and emergency accounts commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(3) AC-2 (CE-3) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Account Management | Disable Accounts Disable accounts within 120 days when the accounts: a. Have expired; b. Are no longer associated to a user or individual; c. Are in violation of organizational policy; or d. Have been inactive for 120 days for non-privileged accounts and 60 days for privileged accounts In practice: A report, often run weekly, lists expired, orphaned and inactive accounts. The help desk disables them within the stated window, and privileged accounts are flagged sooner because their inactivity limit is shorter. |
|
Primary |
Dormant-account detection, orphan correlation and disable workflows commonly contribute, including the shorter inactivity threshold for privileged accounts. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(4) AC-2 (CE-4) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Account Management | Automated Audit Actions Automatically audit account creation, modification, enabling, disabling and removal actions. In practice: Every account creation, change, disable and removal writes a log entry automatically, so an analyst can see who or what touched an account, and when, without asking an administrator. |
|
Primary |
Identity platform audit logging of account lifecycle events commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(7) AC-2 (CE-7) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Account Management | Privileged User Accounts a. Establish and administer privileged user accounts in accordance with a role-based access scheme; an attribute-based access scheme b. Monitor privileged role or attribute assignments; c. Monitor changes to roles or attributes; and d. Revoke access when privileged role or attribute assignments are no longer appropriate. In practice: Administrators receive privileged accounts through a role-based request, and the security team gets an alert whenever someone is added to or removed from a privileged role. Access is pulled back when the job changes. |
|
Primary |
Role-based or attribute-based administration of privileged accounts, monitoring of privileged role or attribute assignments, and revocation commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(9) AC-2 (CE-9) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Account Management | Restrictions on Use of Shared and Group Accounts Only permit the use of shared and group accounts that meet agency-defined conditions for establishing shared and group accounts. In practice: Shared and group accounts are listed in an inventory with a named owner and a written reason. Anything outside the agency's stated conditions is replaced with individual accounts. |
|
Primary |
Inventory and ownership of shared, group and service accounts commonly contribute to restricting their use. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(12) AC-2 (CE-12) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Account Management | Account Monitoring for Atypical Usage a. Monitor system accounts for agency-defined atypical usage; and b. Report atypical usage of system accounts to agency-defined personnel or roles. In practice: Sign-in reports flag unusual activity, such as a login at an odd hour or from an unexpected place, and route it to the security team's queue for follow-up. |
|
Primary |
Sign-in analytics for unusual time or location commonly contribute to monitoring accounts for atypical usage. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(13) AC-2 (CE-13) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Account Management | Disable Accounts for High-Risk Individual Disable accounts of users posing a significant risk within one (1) day of discovery of the risk. In practice: When the security team flags a person as a significant risk, a short runbook lets the help desk disable that person's accounts through the identity platform within one day. |
|
Primary |
Rapid-disable runbooks tied to identity threat detection commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-3 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Access Enforcement Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies. (IRS-Defined): Users having accounts with administrator access privileges may access those accounts only from agency-owned or authorized contractor systems. In practice: Access to systems holding federal tax information follows the roles people were given, and administrator accounts work only from agency-owned or authorized contractor devices, checked at each sign-in. |
|
Primary |
Policy-based access decisions that distinguish administrator accounts and device ownership commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-5 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Separation of Duties a. Identify and document separate duties of individuals to prevent harmful activity without collusion; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. In practice: Request rules keep one person from holding two conflicting duties, such as creating a record and approving it. A report shows any conflicts that slip through so a manager can fix them. |
None marked | Primary |
Separation-of-duties policy design and violation reporting commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Least Privilege Employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks. In practice: Staff receive roles built around their actual tasks, and managers periodically confirm the access is still needed. Administrator rights are granted just in time rather than left on permanently, and shared administrator credentials are kept in a privileged access vault. |
None marked | Primary |
Role design, access review and privileged access controls commonly contribute to least privilege. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(1) AC-6 (CE-1) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Least Privilege | Authorize Access to Security Functions Authorize Access for Security Functions to: a. Explicitly authorize access to security functions deployed in hardware, software, and firmware; and b. Security-relevant information. In practice: Administrator access to security tools is a defined role that needs a recorded request and sign-off. People who finish that work have the elevation removed. |
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Primary |
Privileged role definition and approval-gated elevation commonly contribute to controlling access to security functions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(2) AC-6 (CE-2) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Least Privilege | Non-Privileged Access for Nonsecurity Functions Require that users of system accounts or roles with access to security functions including but not limited to: establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited and setting intrusion detection parameters use non-privileged accounts or roles, when accessing nonsecurity functions. (IRS-Defined): Prohibit accounts with administrative privileges (including local administrator rights) from web browsing and other Internet connections outside of the local protected boundary unless such risk is accepted in writing by the agency's CISO. (IRS-Defined): Block accounts with administrative privileges (including local administrator rights) from access to email unless such risk is accepted in writing by the agency's CISO. In practice: Administrators use one account for admin tasks and a separate everyday account for email and browsing, so a phishing click in the everyday account does not carry admin rights. |
|
Primary |
Separate administrative and everyday accounts commonly contribute here, including limits on browsing and email for administrative accounts. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(6) AC-6 (CE-6) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Least Privilege | Privileged Access by Non-Organizational Users Prohibit privileged access to the system by non-organizational users. In practice: Members of the public who sign in to agency portals are held in a separate account population, policy blocks administrator role assignment to that population, and a review looks for any that were granted by mistake. |
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Primary |
Privileged access to the system by non-organizational users is prohibited. Separating the accounts of non-organizational users (people without employee-equivalent status under the organization's own rules) from administrative roles, and reviewing for exceptions, commonly contributes to preventing it. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(7) AC-6 (CE-7) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Least Privilege | Review of User Privileges a. Review annually the privileges assigned to FTI to validate the need for such privileges; and b. Reassign or remove privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission and business needs. In practice: Each year, system owners receive a list of who holds privileges on systems with federal tax information and mark each one keep or remove. Removals are carried out and the decisions are saved. |
|
Primary |
Privilege review campaigns with recorded decisions commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(9) AC-6 (CE-9) AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Least Privilege | Auditing Use of Privileged Functions Audit the execution of privileged functions. In practice: Administrator sessions are recorded, and the log shows which privileged commands were run, by which named person, and when. The security team can pull that history on request. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationCapture of privileged function use is delivered by the privileged access tooling that identity teams run. Alerting, retention and review sit with security operations and are supporting rows in this series. |
Privileged session and activity logging commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-7 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Unsuccessful Logon Attempts a. Enforce a limit of three (3) consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a 120-minute period; and b. Automatically lock the account for 15 minutes or until released by an administrator when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded. In practice: The directory locks an account after three failed sign-ins in a 120-minute window. It stays locked for 15 minutes, or until an administrator unlocks it after confirming who is calling. |
None marked | Primary |
Directory and identity provider lockout settings commonly contribute here. Where a platform's lockout counting differs from a fixed 120-minute window, the on-premises directory policy and the cloud setting are documented side by side. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-17 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Remote Access a. Establish and document usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements and implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; and b. Authorize each type of remote access to the system prior to allowing such connections. Supplemental Guidance: [text omitted] Any remote access where (i) FTI is accessed or (ii) an FTI environment is administered over the remote connection must be performed using multifactor authentication. [text omitted] In practice: Each kind of remote access, such as VPN or remote desktop, is written down and authorized before use. The sign-in service requires MFA, so remote staff face a second check. |
None marked | Primary |
Policy-based remote access with multi-factor authentication commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2 IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) Uniquely identify and authenticate organizational users and associate that unique identification with processes acting on behalf of those users. In practice: Every employee signs in with their own named account through one single sign-on service, so activity in each application can be traced to a single person. |
None marked | Primary |
A central identity provider with unique user identities and single sign-on commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(1) IA-2 (CE-1) IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Multifactor Authentication to Privileged Accounts Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts. Supplemental Guidance: Regardless of the type of access (i.e., local, network or remote) privileged accounts must always authenticate using multifactor options, except in the event of direct terminal access from within a restricted area (as defined in Section 2.B.3, Restricted Area Access). [text omitted] In practice: Administrators must complete a second step, such as a code or security key, every time they sign in to a privileged account, in addition to their password. |
|
Primary |
Multi-factor authentication for privileged accounts commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(2) IA-2 (CE-2) IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Multifactor Authentication to Non-Privileged Accounts Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts. Supplemental Guidance: Regardless of the type of access (i.e., local, network or remote) non-privileged accounts must always authenticate using multifactor options. [text omitted] In practice: Regular staff also add a second sign-in step, such as a phone prompt, when they sign in to agency systems. Identity teams enroll each person and keep the rule on. |
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Primary |
Multi-factor authentication for non-privileged accounts commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(6) IA-2 (CE-6) IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Access to Accounts, Separate Device Implement multi-factor authentication for remote access to privileged accounts and non-privileged accounts such that: a. One of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining access; and b. The device meets Authenticator Assurance Level 2 (AAL) per NIST SP 800-63. In practice: For remote sign-ins, the second factor comes from a separate device such as a phone or hardware key, not from the laptop being used to connect. |
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Primary |
Multi-factor sign-in with a separate-device factor for remote access commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(8) IA-2 (CE-8) IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Access to Accounts, Replay Resistant Implement replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for access to privileged accounts with network access. In practice: Administrators use sign-in methods built to resist replay, such as one-time passcodes or, more strongly, hardware security keys, which also resist phishing, rather than a reusable password alone. |
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Primary |
Replay-resistant sign-in methods commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-4 IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identifier Management Manage system identifiers by: a. Receiving authorization from designated agency officials to assign an individual, group, role, service, or device identifier; b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, service, or device; c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device; and d. Preventing reuse of identifiers indefinitely In practice: Each new person gets a unique user ID from the HR-driven onboarding workflow. An ID is never reused for someone else, and each service or device receives its own identifier. |
None marked | Primary |
Unique identifier standards and non-reuse rules in lifecycle and correlation workflows commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-4(4) IA-4 (CE-4) IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identifier Management | Identify User Status Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as agency-defined characteristic identifying individual status (e.g., Contractor). (IRS-Defined): Change all default vendor-set or factory-set administrator accounts prior to implementation (e.g., during installation or immediately after installation). In practice: The identity source carries a worker-type attribute, such as employee or contractor, so every account shows what kind of person it belongs to and reports can be filtered by it. |
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Primary |
A worker-type attribute such as contractor, maintained in the identity source, commonly contributes here. Inventorying default vendor-set or factory-set administrator accounts, and renaming or disabling them before implementation, also commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-5 IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Authenticator Management Manage system authenticators by: a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticator; b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the organization; c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use; d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lost or compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators; e. Changing default authenticators prior to first use; f. Changing or refreshing authenticators every 90 days for all user accounts and every 366 days for service accounts or when events such as loss, theft or compromise occur; g. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; h. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators; and i. Changing authenticators for group or role accounts when membership to those accounts’ changes. In practice: New credentials are handed out only after the person is verified. Service account passwords sit in a vault and are rotated on a schedule, and leavers have their credentials revoked. |
None marked | Primary |
Authenticator lifecycle settings, credential vaulting and service account credential rotation commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-8 IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) Uniquely identify and authenticate non-organizational users or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users. In practice: Members of the public who use an agency portal to review a tax account or payment history each sign in with their own credential, so every person is individually identified and nobody shares a login. |
None marked | Primary |
Customer-facing identity configuration for public portals, including unique accounts and authentication for each member of the public, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-8(2) IA-8 (CE-2) IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) | Acceptance of External Credentials a. Accept only external authenticators that are NIST-compliant; and b. Document and maintain a list of accepted external authenticators. In practice: For its public portal, the agency keeps a written list of the outside credentials it accepts, such as a government sign-in service, and accepts only credentials that conform to NIST SP 800-63. |
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Primary |
A documented list of accepted external credentials for public-facing systems, limited to credentials that the supplemental guidance says must conform to NIST SP 800-63, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-8(4) IA-8 (CE-4) IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) | Use of Defined Profiles Conform to the following profiles for identity management: NIST or FICAM-issued profiles. (IRS-Defined): Deploy identification and authentication technology consistent with the results of the e-authentication risk analysis. In practice: When members of the public sign in to an agency portal through a federated credential, the setup follows the identity profiles the requirement names and the agency's e-authentication risk analysis, and the integration team records which application uses which profile. |
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Primary
Why this classificationClass differs from the NIST SP 800-53 r5 page: IRS Pub 1075 IA-8(4) itself names the required profiles (NIST or FICAM-issued), so federation integration is the direct identity work here, whereas the 800-53 page rates the IA-8(4) enhancement as supporting because it leaves the profiles to the sponsoring program. |
Federation profiles and application integration commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-11 IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Re-Authentication Require users to re-authenticate when switching to a privileged user role. In practice: Before an administrator switches into a privileged role, the sign-in service asks them to authenticate again, which makes a left-open session harder to misuse. |
None marked | Primary |
Step-up authentication when switching to a privileged role commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-12 IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identity Proofing a. Identity proof users that require accounts for logical access to systems based on appropriate identity assurance level requirements as specified in applicable standards and guidelines; b. Resolve user identities to a unique individual; and c. Collect, validate, and verify identity evidence. In practice: HR confirms a new hire's identity first. The onboarding workflow then links the new account to that one verified person and blocks duplicate or unmatched accounts. |
None marked | Primary |
Onboarding workflows that resolve each account to one verified person commonly contribute, alongside HR identity proofing. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| PS-4 PS: Personnel Security (Section 4.14) | Personnel Termination Upon termination of individual employment: a. Disable system access within three (3) business days; b. Terminate or revoke any authenticators and credentials associated with the individual; c. Conduct exit interviews that include a discussion of information security topics, specifically nondisclosure agreements; d. Retrieve all security-related organizational system-related property; and e. Retain access to organizational information and systems formerly controlled by terminated individual. In practice: When HR records a termination, the leaver workflow disables the person's accounts within three business days and revokes their tokens and credentials. |
None marked | Primary |
HR-driven leaver workflows commonly contribute to timely access disablement and authenticator revocation. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| PS-5 PS: Personnel Security (Section 4.14) | Personnel Transfer a. Review and confirm ongoing operational need for current logical and physical access authorizations to systems and facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the organization; b. Initiate transfer or when warranted extended reassignment actions within five (5) business days of the formal transfer action; c. Modify access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational need due to reassignment or transfer; and d. Notify designated agency personnel within five (5) business days of transfer. In practice: When someone changes jobs, the mover workflow asks the new manager to confirm which access to keep. Access that is no longer needed is removed. |
None marked | Primary |
Mover workflows and recertification on role change commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-12 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Session Termination Automatically terminate a user session after 30 minutes of inactivity. In practice: The application and endpoint teams set the 30-minute inactivity timeout; identity contributes idle-session and re-sign-in settings on the single sign-on service where the platform supports them, so a returning user has to sign in again. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationApplication and platform session handling is usually the primary implementation point. |
Session lifetime and inactivity settings on the identity provider commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-20 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Use of External Systems a. Establish terms and conditions, consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating and/or maintaining external systems, allowing authorized individuals to: 1. Access the system from external systems; and 2. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external systems; or b. Prohibit the use of non-agency managed external systems. In practice: The agency decides when staff may connect from outside systems. Identity contributes by letting sign-in rules check whether a device is registered and managed before access is allowed. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationAgreements and technical limits on external systems extend beyond identity. |
Device-aware access policy commonly contributes to governing access from external systems. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AU-2 AU: Audit and Accountability (Section 4.3) | Audit Events a. Identify the types of events that the system is capable of logging in support of the audit function: 1. All accesses or attempts to access an FTI system, including the identity of each user and device; 2. Logoff activities; 3. Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate IT security safeguards; 4. Security-relevant actions associated with processing FTI; 5. User generation of reports and extracts containing FTI; 6. Any interaction with FTI through an application; 7. Password changes; 8. Creation or modification of groups; 9. Privileged user actions; 10. Access to the system; 11. Creating and deleting files; 12. Change of permissions or privileges; 13. Command line changes and queries; 14. Changes made to an application or database; 15. System and data interactions; 16. Opening and/or closing of files; and 17. Program execution activities. b. Coordinate the event logging function with other organizational entities requiring audit related information to guide and inform the selection criteria for events to be logged; c. Specify the following event types for logging within the system: agency-defined subset of AU-2a requirements (e.g. Systems capable of required event types relevant to the use or administration of FTI); d. Provide a rationale for why the event types selected for logging are deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of incidents; and e. Review and update the event types selected for logging annually or when there is a system change. Document changes in the SSR. In practice: The security team decides which events get logged. Identity contributes by turning on logging for sign-ins, permission changes and privileged actions on the identity platform. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationAudit event selection is usually owned by security monitoring. |
Identity platform event selection for sign-in, permission changes and privileged actions commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AU-3 AU: Audit and Accountability (Section 4.3) | Content of Audit Records Ensure that audit records contain information that establishes the following: a. What type of event occurred; b. When the event occurred; c. Where the event occurred; d. Source of the event; e. Outcome of the event; and f. Identity of any individuals, subjects, or objects/entities associated with the event. In practice: System owners decide what audit records contain; each identity log line adds what happened, when, where and which named account did it, which helps investigators trace activity. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationRecord content is determined by each log source. |
Identity audit records that carry the acting identity commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AU-6 AU: Audit and Accountability (Section 4.3) | Audit Review, Analysis and Reporting a. Review and analyze system audit records weekly for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity and the potential impact of the inappropriate or unusual activity; b. Report findings to the individual(s) specified within the agency’s incident response procedures; and c. Adjust the level of audit record review, analysis, and reporting within the system when there is a change in risk based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information. In practice: The security team reviews logs every week for odd activity. Identity logs add sign-in and permission-change records, and alerts flag unusual account behavior for that review. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationReview and reporting processes are usually owned by security operations. |
Identity log review and alerting commonly contribute to identifying unusual account activity. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AU-12 AU: Audit and Accountability (Section 4.3) | Audit Generation a. Provide audit record generation capability for the event types the system is capable of auditing as defined in AU-2a on all systems that receive, process, store, access, protect and/or transmit FTI; b. Allow SA and ISSO to select the event types that are to be logged by specific components of the system; and c. Generate audit records for the event types defined in AU-2c that include the audit record content defined in AU-3. In practice: System owners turn on audit logging; identity contributes by enabling log generation on the identity systems themselves, so account and sign-in events are captured from day one. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationGeneration capability is usually a feature of each system. |
Enabling identity audit generation on identity systems commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-1 IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures a. Develop, document, and disseminate to designated agency officials: 1. An agency or organization-level identification and authentication policy that: (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities and compliance; and (b) Is consistent with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and the associated access controls; b. Designate an agency official to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the access control policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current identification and authentication: 1. Policy every three (3) years (or if there is a significant change); and 2. Procedures every three (3) years (or if there is a significant change). In practice: The agency's written sign-in policy says who is covered and who owns it. An assessment of the current identity setup helps the policy writers describe what is actually in place. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationPolicy documentation is usually owned by the security governance function. |
Assessment work commonly contributes to documenting the identification and authentication policy and procedures. |
Not mapped | Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-3 IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Device Identification and Authentication Uniquely identify and authenticate devices before establishing a remote or network connection. In practice: Laptops and other devices are registered and issued a certificate. The network lets a device connect only when it can show that certificate, and the security team owns the network side. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationNetwork-layer device authentication is usually owned by network engineering. |
Device registration and certificate-based device authentication commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-9 IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Service Identification and Authentication Uniquely identify and authenticate agency-defined system services and applications before establishing communications with devices, users, or other services or applications. In practice: The application owner and developers decide how services identify themselves. Identity contributes by giving each service its own workload identity rather than a shared password. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationService design and protocol choice are usually owned by engineering. |
Workload identity and service authentication commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-12(1) IA-12 (CE-1) IA: Identification and Authentication (Section 4.7) | Identity Proofing | Supervisor Authorization Require that the registration process to receive an account for logical access includes supervisor or sponsor authorization. In practice: The agency sets the registration rules; in the access request workflow, a new account request routes to the supervisor or sponsor, and no account is created until they approve. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationProcedural step usually owned by human resources. |
Sponsor or supervisor approval steps in account request workflows commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| PS-3 PS: Personnel Security (Section 4.14) | Personnel Screening a. Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to the system; and b. Rescreen individuals in accordance with agency-defined conditions requiring rescreening but no less than once every five years. See Section 2.C.3, Background Investigation Minimum Requirements for additional requirements. In practice: HR owns background screening. The onboarding workflow holds a new hire's access until HR marks screening complete, and a rescreening date can trigger a task for HR. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationScreening itself is usually performed by human resources and security. |
Screening-complete gates and rescreening triggers in lifecycle workflows commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| PS-6 PS: Personnel Security (Section 4.14) | Access Agreements a. Develop and document access agreements for organizational systems; b. Review and update the access agreements at a minimum annually; and c. Verify that individuals requiring access to organizational information and systems: 1. Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and 2. Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational systems when access agreements have been updated or at a minimum annually. In practice: HR and legal own the access agreement. The onboarding and request workflows can require the person to acknowledge it before access is granted, and the date is recorded. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationAgreement content is owned by legal and human resources. |
Access agreements are commonly tracked as an acknowledgement step in onboarding and in access requests. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PS-7 PS: Personnel Security (Section 4.14) | External Personnel Security a. Establish personnel security requirements, including security roles and responsibilities for external providers; b. Require external providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures established by the organization; c. Document personnel security requirements; d. Require external providers to notify designated agency personnel of any personnel transfers or terminations of external personnel who possess organizational credentials and/or badges, or who have system privileges within three (3) business days; and e. Monitor provider compliance with personnel security requirements. In practice: The agency sets security terms for providers; identity contributes sponsored contractor and vendor accounts, each with an end date, that are turned off when the contract ends. |
None marked | Supporting
Why this classificationContract terms and security requirements are usually owned by procurement and security. |
Contractor and external identity lifecycle, sponsorship and expiry commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-8 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | System Use Notification a. Display a warning banner to users before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines and state that: 1. Users are accessing a U.S. Government System; 2. System usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit; 3. Unauthorized use of the system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties; and 4. Use of the system indicates consent to monitoring and recording; b. Retain the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the system; and c. For publicly accessible systems: 1. Display system use information warning banner before granting further access to the publicly accessible system; 2. Display references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities and 3. Include a description of the authorized uses of the system. |
None marked | Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDisplay of a system use notification. Primary ownership usually sits with application, endpoint and operating system teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-11 AC: Access Control (Section 4.1) | Device Lock a. Prevent further access to the system by initiating a device lock after 15 minutes of inactivity; requiring the user to initiate a device lock before leaving the system unattended; and b. Retain the device lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures. |
None marked | Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDevice lock after inactivity. Primary ownership usually sits with endpoint management and operating system configuration. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
No requirements match the current filters.
Summary
- Primary
- 34
- Identity platforms or processes are typically the principal means of implementing the requirement.
- Supporting
- 13
- Another discipline owns the requirement. Identity configuration or evidence contributes.
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
- 2
- Listed for completeness, with a one-line note on what the requirement is.
How to read the matrix
- Control enhancement
- True for a row that is a control enhancement (CE) under a base control. Section 4.0 of the publication identifies NIST control enhancements with a CE designation.
- Carries IRS-Defined text
- True when the quoted text includes a requirement the publication labels IRS-Defined. Section 4.0 of the publication states that IRS and Treasury defined requirements are identified as IRS-Defined.
- Identity relevance
Identity relevance is a GCA classification of whether identity capabilities are typically the principal means of implementing a requirement (Primary), contribute to a requirement owned by another discipline (Supporting), or usually sit outside identity work (Outside identity scope (GCA classification)).
It describes where primary implementation ownership usually sits. It is not a statement about whether identity configuration could be relevant to a particular incident, finding or environment. Every "Outside identity scope (GCA classification)" classification carries a rationale, and other classifications show one where GCA has recorded it, under "Why this classification" beside the label.
- Platform families
- Product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped a platform family to the requirement. It does not mean a product lacks a capability.
- Evidence
- Examples of artifacts commonly examined. The list is not complete, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Sources
- Publication 1075, Tax Information Security Guidelines for Federal, State and Local Agencies (Rev. 11-2021) Internal Revenue Service, Office of Safeguards
- IRS Safeguards Program page (lists the current revision of Publication 1075) Internal Revenue Service
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations National Institute of Standards and Technology
Important notice
Purpose. This IRS Publication 1075 identity traceability matrix is general educational reference material, written by Robert Ivey and published by GCA Technology Services ("GCA") to help organizations plan identity and access management work. It is not legal, audit, accounting or compliance advice, and it is not a substitute for advice from qualified professionals who know your environment.
No compliance determination. Whether an organization meets a requirement is decided by the applicable assessor, auditor, certifying body or regulator, applying the governing requirements to that organization's actual systems, policies and evidence. Nothing in this matrix states or implies that any organization, product, service or configuration meets or complies with any requirement, or that any assessment, audit, examination or certification will have any particular outcome.
Classifications are practice opinion. Relevance classifications, offering mappings, platform mappings and evidence examples are the author's professional judgment as of the date shown. They are not regulatory classifications and are not statements of the standard of care. Other qualified practitioners may reasonably classify requirements differently, and the right answer for a given environment depends on its facts.
Evidence examples are illustrative. Evidence listed is an example of artifacts commonly examined. It is not a complete list, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Source text controls. Requirement text and references come from the sources listed on this page. Where this matrix differs from a source, the source controls. Regulations, guidance and assessment methods change, so confirm current requirements with the issuing authority before relying on them.
Products and services. Platform names identify product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped that platform family to the requirement. It does not mean the product lacks a capability. GCA makes no representation about any third party's products, features, roadmaps or government authorization status, including FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels and similar programs. Confirm capabilities with the vendor and authorization status with the authorizing program.
GCA services. Offering descriptions identify the type of GCA service that addresses an area. The scope, deliverables, terms and outcomes of any GCA engagement are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work, and this page does not change those terms.
No relationship; no reliance. Reading or using this matrix does not create a client, advisory or other relationship with GCA or the author. To the fullest extent permitted by law, this material is provided "as is," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and GCA is not liable for any decision made or action taken in reliance on it.
No client data. This matrix contains no client data. Any example organization is fictitious.
Version 1 · Prepared · Last reviewed · Reviewed every 90 days · View changelog
© 2026 Quasius Investment Corp. d/b/a GCA Technology Services. The selection, arrangement, classifications and annotations in this matrix are GCA's original work. You may use this matrix within your organization for planning and may quote short portions with attribution to GCA and a link to this page. Republishing the matrix in whole or in substantial part requires GCA's written permission. Requirement text quoted on this page comes from the Internal Revenue Service, Publication 1075 (Rev. 11-2021), and is reproduced with attribution. It is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright in the United States (17 U.S.C. 105). The source publication controls, and its publisher does not endorse this page.
Microsoft and Microsoft Entra are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. SailPoint, IdentityIQ and Identity Security Cloud are trademarks or product names of SailPoint Technologies, Inc. or its affiliates. Netwrix is a trademark of Netwrix Corporation. Okta is a trademark of Okta, Inc. Ping Identity is a trademark of Ping Identity Corporation. CyberArk is a trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. or its affiliates. BeyondTrust is a trademark of BeyondTrust Corporation. Delinea is a trademark of Delinea Inc. The Internal Revenue Service does not endorse this page. All other trademarks belong to their respective owners. These names identify products and programs only and do not imply endorsement by, sponsorship by or affiliation with any of these companies or programs, except where a GCA partnership is expressly stated elsewhere on gca.net.
Changelog
- Version 1: First publication.
Frequently Asked Questions
What inactivity window applies to privileged accounts in Publication 1075?
AC-2(3) requires disabling privileged accounts inactive for 60 days and non-privileged accounts inactive for 120 days. The quoted AC-2(3) text also covers expired accounts and accounts no longer associated with a user.
How quickly must access end after termination?
PS-4 requires disabling system access within three (3) business days of termination. It also requires terminating or revoking any authenticators and credentials associated with the individual. The quoted text is in Section 4.0 of Rev. 11-2021.
Does Publication 1075 require multifactor authentication for remote access?
Yes. The AC-17 supplemental guidance requires multifactor authentication for any remote access where FTI is accessed or an FTI environment is administered over the remote connection. The supplemental guidance for IA-2(1) and IA-2(2) goes further: privileged and non-privileged accounts must authenticate with multifactor options regardless of access type (local, network or remote). The only exception is privileged direct terminal access from within a restricted area.
Is GCA affiliated with the IRS?
No. GCA is not affiliated with, and this page is not endorsed by, the Internal Revenue Service or its Office of Safeguards.