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Defense contractors handling CUI

How Identity and Access Management Supports CMMC Level 2

CMMC Level 2 requirements come from the 110 requirements in NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2, as incorporated by reference in 32 CFR Part 170. NIST has since published Revision 3, but 32 CFR Part 170 and DoD contract clauses continue to reference Revision 2. This page sets out those requirements in a matrix, shows where identity and access management work commonly contributes, and quotes each requirement from NIST.

Identity work carries the most weight in the Access Control (AC) and Identification and Authentication (IA) families. The matrix lists 22 AC and 11 IA requirements. Across all 110, GCA classifies 21 as primary identity work, 33 as supporting and 56 as outside identity scope (GCA classification).

Requirement text is quoted from NIST. Requirement 3.5.3 reads "Use multifactor authentication for local and network access to privileged accounts and for network access to non-privileged accounts." Requirement 3.1.5 reads "Employ the principle of least privilege, including for specific security functions and privileged accounts."

Program status as of October 16, 2026. 32 CFR Part 170 remains in effect, and the CMMC contract clause rule (90 FR 43560) took effect on November 10, 2025. On July 13, 2026, the DoD Chief Information Officer (the Department is now styled the Department of War) suspended the move to Phase 2, which had been scheduled for November 2026. DFARS Class Deviation 2026-O0025, Revision 3 (September 3, 2026) carries that suspension into contracting. It permits Level 1 (Self) and Level 2 (Self) requirements, keeps the requirement to implement NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 under DFARS 252.204-7012, and directs contracting officers to work with requiring activities to remove or revise CMMC requirements in new and existing solicitations and contracts; for an existing contract the deviation requires removal by modification, as the FAQ below explains. The suspension does not change the 110 requirements below. Read the clauses in your own solicitations and contracts and check current DoD guidance before you rely on any date.

Points and POA&M eligibility are summarized from 32 CFR 170.21 and 170.24.

For CIOs and compliance leaders

Information as of Last verified NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 as incorporated by reference in 32 CFR Part 170 Version 1

Reference material, not a compliance determination. This matrix reflects GCA's practice view as of . It does not certify, warrant or predict the outcome of any assessment, audit or examination. NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 and 32 CFR Part 170 control. Read the full notice.

The matrix

  • Primary
  • Supporting
  • Outside identity scope (GCA classification)

Left rule marks identity-relevant requirements that are not POA&M-eligible.

CMMC 2.0 Level 2 identity traceability matrix. NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 as incorporated by reference in 32 CFR Part 170. Information as of October 16, 2026.
Requirement Requirement text Points / POA&M Identity relevance (GCA classification) GCA approach Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities Evidence commonly examined
3.1.1 AC.L2-3.1.1 AC: Access Control

Limit system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, and devices (including other systems).

In practice: New hires, contractors and service accounts get access to systems that hold controlled unclassified information only through an approved request, and every account is tied to a known person, process or device.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Primary
  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Role Mining Engine

Access is commonly limited to authorized users, processes and devices through an identity governance access model, joiner, mover and leaver provisioning, and identity correlation that ties each account to an owner.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authoritative account inventory reconciled to HR (correlation report with orphan and unowned accounts resolved)
  • Provisioning and deprovisioning logs
  • Workload identity and device inventory
  • Policy-based access rule export requiring a registered device or a device that passes device-compliance policy
3.1.2 AC.L2-3.1.2 AC: Access Control

Limit system access to the types of transactions and functions that authorized users are permitted to execute.

In practice: Roles bundle the transactions and functions each job needs, such as view versus approve, and managers confirm in periodic access reviews that people still need what their role gives them.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Primary
  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage
  • Role Mining Engine

Permitted transactions and functions are commonly defined in a role and entitlement model, often refined through role mining, and confirmed in periodic access reviews.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Role and entitlement catalog with owner approvals
  • Access certification campaign export with per-reviewer decisions and revocations
  • App role assignment exports
3.1.4 AC.L2-3.1.4 AC: Access Control

Separate the duties of individuals to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion.

In practice: A person who can create a vendor cannot also approve payment to that vendor. The governance platform flags conflicting access at request time, and any exception needs a named approver and a compensating control.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
  • Assess
  • Implement

Separation of duties is commonly enforced through conflict rules for toxic access combinations, checked at request time, with approved exceptions tied to mitigating controls.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • SoD rule set (conflict matrix) with business sign-off
  • SoD violation report
  • Approved exceptions with mitigating controls and expiry dates
3.1.5 AC.L2-3.1.5 AC: Access Control

Employ the principle of least privilege, including for specific security functions and privileged accounts.

In practice: Administrators hold elevated rights only for the tasks that need them, often through time-limited activation of a privileged role or a vaulted credential check-out, and owners regularly review who still holds those rights.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Primary
  • Implement
  • Manage

Least privilege for privileged accounts is commonly pursued through privileged access management, just-in-time privileged role activation and periodic privileged access reviews.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Privileged account inventory
  • Privileged role assignment and activation settings export showing time-limited rather than standing assignments
  • Privileged access review results
3.1.6 AC.L2-3.1.6 AC: Access Control

Use non-privileged accounts or roles when accessing nonsecurity functions.

In practice: An engineer reads email and browses the web with a standard account and uses a separate, clearly labeled admin account only for administration. Account classification helps tell the two kinds apart.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
  • Implement

Use of non-privileged accounts for everyday work is commonly supported by separate privileged identities, an administrator account standard and account-type classification.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Mapping of each administrator's privileged account to a distinct non-privileged account
  • Policy restricting administrative accounts from email and web browsing
  • Account-type report
3.1.7 AC.L2-3.1.7 AC: Access Control

Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions and capture the execution of such functions in audit logs.

In practice: A standard user who tries to run an administrator task is blocked, and when an approved administrator does run one, the privileged access tools record who did it and when.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
Why this classification

Capture of privileged function use is delivered by the privileged access tooling that identity teams run. Alerting, retention and review sit with security operations and are supporting rows in this series.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Privileged functions are commonly restricted through privileged role activation and privileged access management, with each execution captured in administrative audit logs.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Privileged role activation logs
  • PAM session logs and recordings
  • Directory audit log entries for privileged operations
3.1.8 AC.L2-3.1.8 AC: Access Control

Limit unsuccessful logon attempts.

In practice: The directory and sign-in service lock an account after a set number of failed attempts, and the help desk follows a defined process to verify the user before unlocking it.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
  • Implement

Limits on unsuccessful logon attempts are commonly set through lockout policy on the directory and identity provider.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Account lockout policy export from the directory and identity provider
  • Sample lockout events
3.3.2 AU.L2-3.3.2 AU: Audit and Accountability

Ensure that the actions of individual system users can be uniquely traced to those users, so they can be held accountable for their actions.

In practice: Every person signs in with their own account, so log entries point to one individual. Shared and orphaned accounts are found and removed, and any shared credential is checked out from a vault and logged.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Primary
Why this classification

Traceability to an individual depends on unique identifiers and on removing shared and orphan accounts, which is identity work. The audit record mechanics (event selection, content, generation) are supporting rows elsewhere in this series.

  • Assess
  • Implement

Traceability of user actions is commonly supported by identity correlation that removes shared and orphan accounts and by privileged access management check-out of shared credentials.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Correlation report showing each account owned by one identity
  • Shared or generic account inventory with PAM check-out logs
  • Sign-in logs attributing activity to a named individual account
3.3.9 AU.L2-3.3.9 AU: Audit and Accountability

Limit management of audit logging functionality to a subset of privileged users.

In practice: Only a small group of approved administrators can change logging settings. They receive that role through the privileged access process, and owners review the membership periodically.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
  • Implement
  • Manage

Management of audit logging is commonly limited to a small privileged group through just-in-time role activation and periodic review of that group.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Role assignment export listing who can change audit settings
  • Privileged role activation settings for those roles
  • Access review results for that group
3.5.1 IA.L2-3.5.1 IA: Identification and Authentication

Identify system users, processes acting on behalf of users, and devices.

In practice: Each person, service account and device has a unique identity in the directory, and an inventory of service and device identities shows who or what owns each one.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Primary
  • Assess
  • Implement

Identification of users, processes and devices is commonly implemented through directory and identity provider design, identity correlation and an inventory of service and device identities.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity inventory covering users, service accounts and devices
  • Correlation report
  • HR-to-directory reconciliation
3.5.2 IA.L2-3.5.2 IA: Identification and Authentication

Authenticate (or verify) the identities of users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to allowing access to organizational systems.

In practice: A user, an application or a device shows who it is at sign-in, through a password plus MFA for people or a certificate or workload identity for systems, before it reaches anything.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Primary
  • Implement

Authentication is commonly performed at the identity provider for users, workload identities and devices.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authentication methods policy export
  • Sign-in logs
  • Workload identity and certificate inventory
  • Device registration records
3.5.3 IA.L2-3.5.3 IA: Identification and Authentication

Use multifactor authentication for local and network access to privileged accounts and for network access to non-privileged accounts.

In practice: Administrators use MFA for every privileged sign-in, and regular users use MFA when connecting over the network. Many organizations choose phishing-resistant methods such as security keys.

  • Points 3 or 5
  • POA&M Not eligiblePartial credit (3 points) still exceeds 1
Primary
  • Implement

Multifactor authentication is commonly enforced through policy-based access rules at the identity provider, often with phishing-resistant methods, and through privileged access management for privileged sessions.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Policy-based access rule exports covering all users and all applications that handle CUI
  • MFA registration report with no exclusions left unexplained
  • Privileged local-access MFA configuration
3.5.4 IA.L2-3.5.4 IA: Identification and Authentication

Employ replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to privileged and non-privileged accounts.

In practice: Sign-in methods such as security keys, passkeys and certificates are designed so a captured login does not work if an attacker replays it later.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
  • Implement

Replay-resistant authentication is commonly implemented with FIDO2 security keys, passkeys and certificate-based authentication.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authentication methods policy export
  • Policy limiting sign-in to replay-resistant methods
  • Sign-in logs showing replay-resistant methods
3.5.5 IA.L2-3.5.5 IA: Identification and Authentication

Prevent reuse of identifiers for a defined period.

In practice: When someone leaves, their username is not handed to a new hire for a defined period. The identity lifecycle process checks new usernames against retired ones before creating accounts.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
  • Implement

Identifier reuse is commonly prevented by a non-reuse rule in identity governance naming and lifecycle processes.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identifier generation rule or naming policy
  • IGA configuration preventing reassignment
  • Sample of terminated identifiers held
3.5.6 IA.L2-3.5.6 IA: Identification and Authentication

Disable identifiers after a defined period of inactivity.

In practice: A scheduled report finds accounts nobody has used for a defined period, and the identity process disables them automatically or after the owner confirms.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
  • Implement
  • Manage

Inactive identifiers are commonly handled through dormant-account detection and automatic disablement.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Dormant-account rule configuration
  • Report of accounts disabled for inactivity with dates
3.5.7 IA.L2-3.5.7 IA: Identification and Authentication

Enforce a minimum password complexity and change of characters when new passwords are created.

In practice: The directory and sign-in service enforce password rules, such as minimum length and complexity, so a weak password is refused when someone sets or changes it.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
Why this classification

Password rules are configured in the directory and identity provider. NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 requires a minimum password complexity. NIST SP 800-63B-4 states that verifiers SHALL NOT impose composition rules, and OMB M-22-09 says password policies must not require special characters, so confirm with the assessor how the requirement is read for your environment.

  • Implement

Identity work commonly sets length and complexity rules on the directory and identity provider; the change-of-characters rule usually needs a password filter or an alternative the organization documents for its assessor, such as passwordless sign-in.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Password policy export (domain policy, fine-grained policies, IdP password policy)
3.5.8 IA.L2-3.5.8 IA: Identification and Authentication

Prohibit password reuse for a specified number of generations.

In practice: The directory or sign-in service remembers a defined number of earlier passwords and refuses them again; where a cloud directory keeps a shorter history, the rule is enforced in the on-premises directory, or the password is replaced by passwordless sign-in.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
  • Implement

Password reuse is commonly limited through password history enforcement in the directory or identity provider.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Password history setting export
3.5.9 IA.L2-3.5.9 IA: Identification and Authentication

Allow temporary password use for system logons with an immediate change to a permanent password.

In practice: A new hire gets a one-time temporary password, often issued by the onboarding process, and the system forces a new permanent password at the first sign-in.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Primary
  • Implement

Temporary passwords are commonly issued with a forced change at first logon, often through identity governance onboarding.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Onboarding workflow showing temporary credential issuance
  • Directory flag forcing change at next logon
3.5.10 IA.L2-3.5.10 IA: Identification and Authentication

Store and transmit only cryptographically-protected passwords.

In practice: Passwords are stored in protected form in the directory and travel over encrypted connections. Shared and service account passwords live in a privileged access vault instead of spreadsheets.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Primary
  • Implement

Protected password storage and transmission is commonly supported by cryptographically protected credential storage and privileged access management vaulting of shared and service credentials.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Directory and IdP documentation of hashed credential storage
  • PAM vault configuration
  • TLS on all authentication endpoints
3.7.5 MA.L2-3.7.5 MA: Maintenance

Require multifactor authentication to establish nonlocal maintenance sessions via external network connections and terminate such connections when nonlocal maintenance is complete.

In practice: A vendor technician working remotely signs in with MFA through a privileged access broker, and the session closes automatically when the maintenance window ends.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Primary
  • Implement

Nonlocal maintenance sessions are commonly protected by multifactor authentication and privileged-access-brokered vendor access with automatic session termination.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • PAM or remote-access policy requiring MFA for nonlocal maintenance
  • Session logs showing termination at completion
3.9.2 PS.L2-3.9.2 PS: Personnel Security

Ensure that organizational systems containing CUI are protected during and after personnel actions such as terminations and transfers.

In practice: When someone leaves, their accounts are removed on their last day through the leaver process. When someone changes jobs, the mover process reviews and trims the access from the old role.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Primary
  • Implement
  • Manage

Protection of systems during personnel actions is commonly implemented through joiner, mover and leaver automation and recertification of access after a move.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Termination-to-disablement timing report from HR feed to account disablement
  • Leaver and mover provisioning logs
  • Post-transfer access review
3.1.11 AC.L2-3.1.11 AC: Access Control

Terminate (automatically) a user session after a defined condition.

In practice: Single sign-on sessions expire after a set time or condition, applications end their own sessions under the same policy, and privileged vault sessions close automatically when idle.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Application and platform session handling is usually the primary implementation point. The identity provider contributes session lifetime and reauthentication interval policy.

  • Implement

Identity provider session lifetime and reauthentication interval policy commonly bound how long a session lasts, and privileged access management commonly closes privileged sessions after inactivity.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Session lifetime and reauthentication interval policy export
  • IdP session policy export
  • PAM session timeout configuration
3.1.12 AC.L2-3.1.12 AC: Access Control

Monitor and control remote access sessions.

In practice: Remote workers sign in through policies that check the user and device, and remote administrator sessions run through a privileged access vault that records what happens during the session.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Remote access monitoring is usually carried by network and remote access gateway tooling. Identity contributes sign-in logging and access policy enforcement.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Remote access sessions are commonly controlled through policy-based access rules at the identity provider and monitored through privileged session management.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Policy-based access rule export scoped to remote access
  • Sign-in logs
  • VPN or ZTNA access logs
  • PAM session recordings for remote administration
3.1.15 AC.L2-3.1.15 AC: Access Control

Authorize remote execution of privileged commands and remote access to security-relevant information.

In practice: A vendor engineer who needs a remote administrator session requests it, a designated approver signs off, and the privileged access vault opens the session for that task only.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Primary enforcement of remote privileged commands is usually on the remote access gateway or the target system. Identity contributes approval and brokering of privileged sessions.

  • Implement

Remote privileged sessions are commonly authorized through approval workflows in privileged access management and approval-gated privileged role activation.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • PAM policy requiring approval for remote privileged sessions
  • Approval records
  • Privileged role activation approval history
3.1.16 AC.L2-3.1.16 AC: Access Control

Authorize wireless access prior to allowing such connections.

In practice: The network team runs the wireless infrastructure. Identity supplies the directory-backed check, often certificate-based, that decides whether a device or person may join the wireless network.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Wireless network authorization is usually set up by network engineering; identity contributes the directory-backed and certificate-based authentication behind it.

  • Implement

Wireless authorization is commonly directory-backed through 802.1X with a RADIUS service and certificate-based authentication.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
Evidence commonly examined
  • Wireless authorization policy
  • RADIUS policy export showing directory groups authorized to connect
3.1.17 AC.L2-3.1.17 AC: Access Control

Protect wireless access using authentication and encryption.

In practice: Wireless networks use enterprise sign-in rather than a shared password. Identity issues the certificates or directory credentials each person or device presents, and the network team configures encryption.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Wireless encryption and network configuration are usually owned by network engineering; identity contributes the certificate or directory credentials used to authenticate.

  • Implement

Wireless authentication is commonly supported by certificate or directory credentials presented to WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise networks.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
Evidence commonly examined
  • Wireless controller configuration (EAP method, encryption)
  • Certificate template or directory group used for authorization
3.1.18 AC.L2-3.1.18 AC: Access Control

Control connection of mobile devices.

In practice: Mobile device management owns the device rules. Identity sign-in policies check whether a phone or tablet is registered and meets those rules before it can open email or files containing CUI.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Mobile device management is usually owned by endpoint engineering; identity contributes device registration and compliance state as inputs to access rules.

  • Implement

Mobile device connections are commonly gated by device registration and compliance state in policy-based access rules at the identity provider.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Policy-based access rule export requiring a device that passes device-compliance policy
  • MDM enrollment inventory
3.1.20 AC.L2-3.1.20 AC: Access Control

Verify and control/limit connections to and use of external systems.

In practice: Security policy sets the terms for outside systems. Identity settings give partner and contractor staff on unmanaged devices limited guest access and decide what those connections may reach.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Not eligibleNamed exclusion in 170.21(a)(2)(iii)
  • Also Level 1
Supporting
Why this classification

Agreements and technical limits on external systems extend beyond identity; identity contributes unmanaged-device and external identity access policy.

  • Implement

Connections from external systems are commonly limited through unmanaged-device access policy and external identity and cross-organization access settings.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Policy-based access rule export for unmanaged or external devices
  • External organization access settings export
  • List of authorized external systems and terms of use
3.3.1 AU.L2-3.3.1 AU: Audit and Accountability

Create and retain system audit logs and records to the extent needed to enable the monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful or unauthorized system activity.

In practice: The security team runs logging and retention. Sign-in, privileged access and access governance logs are onboarded to the central log platform so investigators can see who accessed what.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Audit logging is usually owned by security operations; identity contributes the identity provider, privileged access and governance log sources onboarded to the SIEM.

  • Implement

Audit logging is commonly supported by onboarding identity provider, privileged access management and identity governance log sources to the SIEM with defined retention.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Log source inventory including IdP, PAM and IGA
  • Retention configuration
  • Sample sign-in and audit records
3.3.5 AU.L2-3.3.5 AU: Audit and Accountability

Correlate audit record review, analysis, and reporting processes for investigation and response to indications of unlawful, unauthorized, suspicious, or unusual activity.

In practice: The security operations team does the analysis. Identity adds context to alerts, such as the account owner, their role and privilege level, so analysts understand an event faster.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Correlation and review of audit records are usually run by security operations; identity contributes context such as risk signals, account owner and privilege level.

  • Implement

Correlation of audit records is commonly supported by identity context such as risk signals, account owner and privilege level feeding SIEM correlation.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • SIEM correlation rules that use identity attributes
  • Sign-in risk investigations with tickets
3.3.8 AU.L2-3.3.8 AU: Audit and Accountability

Protect audit information and audit logging tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.

In practice: The security team protects the log platform itself. Identity helps by assigning access to log stores and the log platform through roles, limiting who can read or change records.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Protection of audit information is usually owned by the SIEM and log platform owners; identity contributes role-based access to the log stores.

  • Implement

Protection of audit information commonly includes role-based access to log stores and the SIEM.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Role assignment export for the log workspace or SIEM
  • Access review of that population
3.4.1 CM.L2-3.4.1 CM: Configuration Management

Establish and maintain baseline configurations and inventories of organizational systems (including hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) throughout the respective system development life cycles.

In practice: IT owns the asset inventory; identity contributes named owners for systems and service accounts and device identity records that the inventory can draw on.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Baseline configuration and inventory is usually owned by IT asset and configuration management. Identity contributes owner, service account and device identity records.

  • Assess
  • Implement

Baseline inventories are commonly fed by owner attribution for systems and service accounts and by device identity records.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Service account inventory with named owner and last-review date
  • Device registration listing with owner
3.4.5 CM.L2-3.4.5 CM: Configuration Management

Define, document, approve, and enforce physical and logical access restrictions associated with changes to organizational systems.

In practice: Change management owns the approval process. Identity can tie elevated access to an approved change ticket and switch it on for the change window only.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Change management is usually owned by IT operations; identity contributes just-in-time privilege tied to approved changes.

  • Implement

Access restrictions for changes are commonly supported by just-in-time privilege tied to approved changes.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • List of personnel authorized to make changes
  • Privileged role or PAM activation records correlated to change tickets
3.4.9 CM.L2-3.4.9 CM: Configuration Management

Control and monitor user-installed software.

In practice: Endpoint teams control what software people may install. Identity helps by removing everyday local administrator rights and granting elevated rights only on request for a defined purpose.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Control of user-installed software is usually owned by endpoint engineering; privileged access tooling contributes by removing local administrator rights.

  • Implement

User-installed software is commonly constrained by removing local administrator rights and applying endpoint privilege management.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Report of endpoints without standing local admin rights
  • Endpoint privilege management policy and elevation logs
3.5.11 IA.L2-3.5.11 IA: Identification and Authentication

Obscure feedback of authentication information.

In practice: When someone types a password, the sign-in screen shows dots or hides the entry so a person standing nearby cannot read it.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Masking is a property of each sign-in surface, including operating system logon and applications; identity platforms implement it on their own sign-in pages.

  • Implement

Masked credential entry is commonly provided on identity provider sign-in surfaces.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Screenshot of masked credential fields on sign-in pages
3.6.1 IR.L2-3.6.1 IR: Incident Response

Establish an operational incident-handling capability for organizational systems that includes preparation, detection, analysis, containment, recovery, and user response activities.

In practice: The security team runs the incident process. Identity supplies ready steps for containment, such as disabling an account or ending its active sessions, and logs show which accounts were involved.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Incident handling is usually led by security operations and incident response; identity contributes containment steps such as session revocation and account disablement.

  • Implement

Incident containment is commonly supported by identity containment playbooks such as session revocation and account disablement.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Incident runbook with identity containment steps
  • Record of a test or real revocation
3.7.2 MA.L2-3.7.2 MA: Maintenance

Provide controls on the tools, techniques, mechanisms, and personnel used to conduct system maintenance.

In practice: IT operations governs maintenance work. Identity gives outside maintenance staff named accounts with an end date instead of a shared login, so actions trace to a person and access lapses.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Maintenance tools and procedures are usually owned by IT operations; identity contributes named maintenance accounts with time-bound access.

  • Implement

Controls on maintenance personnel are commonly supported by named vendor and maintenance accounts with time-bound access.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Inventory of maintenance and vendor accounts with sponsors and expiry
  • Access approvals
3.7.6 MA.L2-3.7.6 MA: Maintenance

Supervise the maintenance activities of maintenance personnel without required access authorization.

In practice: IT operations supervises maintenance staff who lack standing access. An employee escorts them, and privileged session recording keeps a record of the work for later review.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Escorting and supervising maintenance staff is a physical and procedural task; identity tooling contributes privileged session monitoring.

  • Implement

Supervision of maintenance personnel is commonly supported by privileged session monitoring for escorted maintenance.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • PAM session recordings or live-monitoring records for maintenance sessions
3.8.2 MP.L2-3.8.2 MP: Media Protection

Limit access to CUI on system media to authorized users.

In practice: Data owners decide who may reach CUI on storage and media. Identity grants that access through named groups and runs periodic owner reviews of group membership.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Physical media handling is usually owned by IT operations; identity contributes group-based access to CUI repositories and periodic review.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Access to CUI on media is commonly limited through group-based access to CUI repositories with periodic review.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Group membership export for CUI repositories
  • Access review results
3.9.1 PS.L2-3.9.1 PS: Personnel Security

Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to organizational systems containing CUI.

In practice: HR owns the screening. The identity process can hold account creation until HR marks the background screening complete, so access to CUI systems is not granted too early.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Screening is usually performed by human resources and security; provisioning can be gated on the screening result.

  • Implement

Screening before access is commonly supported by provisioning that is gated on an HR screening-complete attribute.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • IGA rule or workflow that blocks provisioning until screening status is set
  • Sample joiner records
3.10.1 PE.L2-3.10.1 PE: Physical Protection

Limit physical access to organizational systems, equipment, and the respective operating environments to authorized individuals.

In practice: The facilities team controls the building and server rooms. Where a badge system connects to the identity process, new hires get door access and leavers lose it along with their accounts.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Supporting
Why this classification

Class differs from the HIPAA Security Rule page: that page rates 164.310(a)(1) (facility access controls) as outside identity scope, whereas 3.10.1 is rated supporting here because the requirement names authorized individuals, which identity provisioning can feed where a physical access control system connector exists. Primary implementation usually sits with facilities and physical security.

  • Implement

Physical access authorization is commonly supported by identity-governance-driven provisioning of physical access where a physical access control system connector exists.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Physical access authorization list reconciled to the identity source
3.10.5 PE.L2-3.10.5 PE: Physical Protection

Control and manage physical access devices.

In practice: The facilities team manages badges and keys. Where a badge system connects to the identity process, issuing, changing and deactivating a badge follows the same joiner, mover and leaver events as accounts.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Not eligibleNamed exclusion in 170.21(a)(2)(iii)
  • Also Level 1
Supporting
Why this classification

Class differs from the HIPAA Security Rule page: that page rates 164.310(a)(1) as outside identity scope, whereas 3.10.5 is rated supporting here because badge lifecycle can follow joiner, mover and leaver events where a physical access control system connector exists. Primary implementation usually sits with facilities and physical security.

  • Implement

Physical access devices are commonly managed by tying badge lifecycle to joiner, mover and leaver events where a physical access control system connector exists.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Badge revocation records matched to terminations
3.11.1 RA.L2-3.11.1 RA: Risk Assessment

Periodically assess the risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, and individuals, resulting from the operation of organizational systems and the associated processing, storage, or transmission of CUI.

In practice: The risk assessment team owns the assessment; identity hands over its account and entitlement inventory and recent review results for the access-related sections.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

The risk assessment is usually owned by risk management and security governance. Identity inventory and access findings commonly inform it.

  • Assess

Identity and entitlement inventory and review results are commonly supplied as inputs to the access-related risk assessment.

Not mapped
Evidence commonly examined
  • Risk assessment sections covering access to systems that handle CUI
3.12.1 CA.L2-3.12.1 CA: Security Assessment

Periodically assess the security controls in organizational systems to determine if the controls are effective in their application.

In practice: A periodic assessment of identity controls, such as MFA coverage and admin accounts, produces a list of gaps rated against each requirement for the security team to act on.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Control assessment is usually owned by the compliance function; identity contributes a periodic gap assessment of identity controls.

  • Assess

Identity controls are commonly assessed periodically through a gap assessment scored with the 32 CFR 170.24 methodology.

Not mapped
Evidence commonly examined
  • Dated assessment report against 800-171A objectives for AC, IA, AU and PS
3.12.2 CA.L2-3.12.2 CA: Security Assessment

Develop and implement plans of action designed to correct deficiencies and reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities in organizational systems.

In practice: Each identity gap found in an assessment becomes a plan-of-action item with a named owner and a target date, and the list is tracked until the gap is closed.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Plans of action are usually owned by the compliance function and system owners; identity contributes POA&M entries for identity gaps.

  • Assess

Plans of action are commonly supported by POA&M entries for identity gaps with named owners and target dates.

Not mapped
Evidence commonly examined
  • POA&M items for identity requirements with milestones
3.12.3 CA.L2-3.12.3 CA: Security Assessment

Monitor security controls on an ongoing basis to ensure the continued effectiveness of the controls.

In practice: Identity controls are checked on a recurring schedule between formal assessments, so drift such as new unreviewed admin accounts shows up sooner.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Ongoing control monitoring is usually owned by security governance; identity contributes recurring control-health reporting and review-campaign metrics.

  • Manage
  • Identity Practice Subscription

Identity controls are commonly monitored between assessments through recurring control-health reporting and review-campaign metrics.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Recurring control-health reports
  • Review campaign completion metrics over time
3.12.4 CA.L2-3.12.4 CA: Security Assessment

Develop, document, and periodically update system security plans that describe system boundaries, system environments of operation, how security requirements are implemented, and the relationships with or connections to other systems.

In practice: The compliance team owns the system security plan; identity contributes the sections on sign-in, MFA and access reviews. These plans are often marked CUI, so they stay in the organization's CUI environment.

  • Points N/ANot scored (SSP required to complete assessment). See 32 CFR 170.24(c)(2)(i)(B)(5).
  • POA&M Not eligibleNamed exclusion; no SSP means the assessment cannot be completed
Supporting
Why this classification

The system security plan is usually owned by the system owner and the compliance function; identity contributes its identity sections.

  • Assess

The identity sections of the SSP are commonly written to cover sign-in, MFA and access reviews. SSPs are often marked CUI, so they are handled inside the client's CUI environment.

Not mapped
Evidence commonly examined
  • Current SSP describing identity architecture, authentication, privileged access and account lifecycle
3.13.3 SC.L2-3.13.3 SC: System and Communications Protection

Separate user functionality from system management functionality.

In practice: The platform team separates management functions from user functions. Identity supplies separate admin identities, often used from a dedicated workstation, for management tasks.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Separation of management functions is usually designed by architecture and platform teams; identity contributes separate administrator identities and administrative portal restrictions.

  • Implement

Separation of user and management functionality is commonly supported by separate administrator identities, privileged access workstations and administrative portal restrictions.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Policy restricting administrative portals to privileged accounts and devices
  • PAW standard
3.13.9 SC.L2-3.13.9 SC: System and Communications Protection

Terminate network connections associated with communications sessions at the end of the sessions or after a defined period of inactivity.

In practice: Network connections close after a period of inactivity set by the organization, and the identity session timeout is aligned with that period.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Network device configuration is usually the primary implementation point; identity contributes by aligning identity session timeouts with the network inactivity period.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Network disconnect after inactivity is commonly aligned with session timeout policy.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Session lifetime and reauthentication interval policy export
3.13.10 SC.L2-3.13.10 SC: System and Communications Protection

Establish and manage cryptographic keys for cryptography employed in organizational systems.

In practice: The security team sets key management rules. Identity contributes by keeping SSH keys and service account credentials in a privileged access vault and rotating them on a schedule.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Cryptographic key management is usually owned by security engineering and PKI teams; privileged access tooling contributes vaulting and rotation of SSH keys and service credentials.

  • Implement

Cryptographic key management is commonly supported by vaulting and scheduled rotation of SSH keys and service account credentials.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Key and credential inventory with rotation history
  • Vault policy export
3.13.11 SC.L2-3.13.11 SC: System and Communications Protection

Employ FIPS-validated cryptography when used to protect the confidentiality of CUI.

In practice: The security team confirms that each identity product handling CUI uses encryption modules on the government's validated list, checking each product and version.

  • Points 3 or 5
  • POA&M Partial only (3.13.11)Only if encryption is employed but not FIPS-validated (3 points)
Supporting
Why this classification

Choice of cryptographic modules is usually owned by security engineering; identity work contributes by checking each identity tool that protects CUI against the NIST CMVP list.

  • Assess

Use of FIPS-validated cryptography is commonly confirmed by checking each identity tool that protects CUI against the NIST CMVP list, per product and version.

Not mapped
Evidence commonly examined
  • FIPS 140 certificate numbers for the modules in use
  • Configuration showing FIPS mode where required
3.13.15 SC.L2-3.13.15 SC: System and Communications Protection

Protect the authenticity of communications sessions.

In practice: The network team protects sessions in transit. Identity contributes signed sign-in tokens between systems and tracks the signing certificates so they are renewed before they expire.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Communications session protection is usually owned by network and application teams; identity contributes signed federation assertions, signing-certificate lifecycle and session binding.

  • Implement

Session authenticity is commonly supported by signed federation assertions and tokens, lifecycle management of SAML and OIDC signing certificates, and session binding.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Federation metadata showing signing certificates and expiry
  • Session binding policy
3.14.6 SI.L2-3.14.6 SI: System and Information Integrity

Monitor organizational systems, including inbound and outbound communications traffic, to detect attacks and indicators of potential attacks.

In practice: The security team monitors the environment. Identity adds signals such as sign-in risk events and sudden privilege changes so unusual activity surfaces as alerts for review.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Network traffic monitoring is usually owned by security operations; identity contributes identity threat detection signals such as sign-in risk events and privilege escalation alerts.

  • Implement

Detection of attacks is commonly supported by identity threat detection signals such as sign-in risk events and privilege escalation alerts.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity risk detection configuration
  • Alert records and triage tickets
3.14.7 SI.L2-3.14.7 SI: System and Information Integrity

Identify unauthorized use of organizational systems.

In practice: Reports flag unusual sign-ins, accounts that have gone dormant and accounts with no owner, giving the security team leads on use nobody authorized.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Supporting
Why this classification

Detection of unauthorized use is usually led by security operations; identity contributes anomalous sign-in detection and findings on dormant or orphan accounts.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Identification of unauthorized use is commonly supported by detection of anomalous sign-ins and of dormant or orphan accounts.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Risky user and sign-in reports
  • Orphan account report
  • Investigation records
3.1.3 AC.L2-3.1.3 AC: Access Control

Control the flow of CUI in accordance with approved authorizations.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of information flow enforcement usually sits with data loss prevention and boundary controls; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.1.9 AC.L2-3.1.9 AC: Access Control

Provide privacy and security notices consistent with applicable CUI rules.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, ownership of the system use notification (banner) usually sits with application and platform owners.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.1.10 AC.L2-3.1.10 AC: Access Control

Use session lock with pattern-hiding displays to prevent access and viewing of data after a period of inactivity.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, ownership of device lock behavior usually sits with endpoint management.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.1.13 AC.L2-3.1.13 AC: Access Control

Employ cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of remote access sessions.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of cryptographic protection of remote sessions usually sits with network and security engineering (VPN and TLS configuration); no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.1.14 AC.L2-3.1.14 AC: Access Control

Route remote access via managed access control points.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of managed remote access control points usually sits with network engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.1.19 AC.L2-3.1.19 AC: Access Control

Encrypt CUI on mobile devices and mobile computing platforms.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of mobile device encryption usually sits with endpoint management, consistent with the 800-53 page's classification of AC-19(5); no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.1.21 AC.L2-3.1.21 AC: Access Control

Limit use of portable storage devices on external systems.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of limits on portable storage on external systems usually sits with endpoint and data protection teams, consistent with the 800-53 page's classification of AC-20(2); no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.1.22 AC.L2-3.1.22 AC: Access Control

Control CUI posted or processed on publicly accessible systems.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Not eligibleNamed exclusion in 170.21(a)(2)(iii)
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, ownership of publicly accessible content review usually sits with communications and web owners.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.2.1 AT.L2-3.2.1 AT: Awareness and Training

Ensure that managers, systems administrators, and users of organizational systems are made aware of the security risks associated with their activities and of the applicable policies, standards, and procedures related to the security of those systems.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of security awareness programs usually sits with security and human resources teams; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.2.2 AT.L2-3.2.2 AT: Awareness and Training

Ensure that personnel are trained to carry out their assigned information security-related duties and responsibilities.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of role-based security training usually sits with security and human resources teams; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.2.3 AT.L2-3.2.3 AT: Awareness and Training

Provide security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of insider threat awareness training usually sits with security and human resources teams; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.3.3 AU.L2-3.3.3 AU: Audit and Accountability

Review and update logged events.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Class differs from the NIST SP 800-53 r5 page: the 800-53 page rates AU-2 as supporting because identity events are among those selected for logging, whereas 3.3.3 is the periodic review and update of the selected events, which in GCA's classification usually sits with security monitoring; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.3.4 AU.L2-3.3.4 AU: Audit and Accountability

Alert in the event of an audit logging process failure.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of logging failure alerting usually sits with security monitoring and operations; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.3.6 AU.L2-3.3.6 AU: Audit and Accountability

Provide audit record reduction and report generation to support on-demand analysis and reporting.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of audit reduction and reporting tooling usually sits with security monitoring and operations; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.3.7 AU.L2-3.3.7 AU: Audit and Accountability

Provide a system capability that compares and synchronizes internal system clocks with an authoritative source to generate time stamps for audit records.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of time synchronization usually sits with infrastructure and systems administration; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.4.2 CM.L2-3.4.2 CM: Configuration Management

Establish and enforce security configuration settings for information technology products employed in organizational systems.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of security configuration settings usually sits with IT configuration management and system owners; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.4.3 CM.L2-3.4.3 CM: Configuration Management

Track, review, approve or disapprove, and log changes to organizational systems.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of change control usually sits with IT change management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.4.4 CM.L2-3.4.4 CM: Configuration Management

Analyze the security impact of changes prior to implementation.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of security impact analysis usually sits with IT change management and security engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.4.6 CM.L2-3.4.6 CM: Configuration Management

Employ the principle of least functionality by configuring organizational systems to provide only essential capabilities.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of least functionality usually sits with system owners and configuration management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.4.7 CM.L2-3.4.7 CM: Configuration Management

Restrict, disable, or prevent the use of nonessential programs, functions, ports, protocols, and services.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of restricting nonessential programs, ports, protocols and services usually sits with system owners and network engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.4.8 CM.L2-3.4.8 CM: Configuration Management

Apply deny-by-exception (blacklisting) policy to prevent the use of unauthorized software or deny-all, permit-by-exception (whitelisting) policy to allow the execution of authorized software.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of application allow and deny listing usually sits with endpoint management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.6.2 IR.L2-3.6.2 IR: Incident Response

Track, document, and report incidents to designated officials and/or authorities both internal and external to the organization.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of incident tracking and reporting usually sits with security operations and the incident response team; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.6.3 IR.L2-3.6.3 IR: Incident Response

Test the organizational incident response capability.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of incident response testing usually sits with security operations and the incident response team; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.7.1 MA.L2-3.7.1 MA: Maintenance

Perform maintenance on organizational systems.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of system maintenance usually sits with IT operations and facilities; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.7.3 MA.L2-3.7.3 MA: Maintenance

Ensure equipment removed for off-site maintenance is sanitized of any CUI.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of sanitizing equipment for off-site maintenance usually sits with IT operations and asset management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.7.4 MA.L2-3.7.4 MA: Maintenance

Check media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in organizational systems.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of scanning diagnostic media for malicious code usually sits with IT operations and endpoint security; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.8.1 MP.L2-3.8.1 MP: Media Protection

Protect (i.e., physically control and securely store) system media containing CUI, both paper and digital.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of physical media protection usually sits with IT operations and facilities; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.8.3 MP.L2-3.8.3 MP: Media Protection

Sanitize or destroy system media containing CUI before disposal or release for reuse.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of media sanitization usually sits with IT operations and asset management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.8.4 MP.L2-3.8.4 MP: Media Protection

Mark media with necessary CUI markings and distribution limitations.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of media marking usually sits with data owners and records management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.8.5 MP.L2-3.8.5 MP: Media Protection

Control access to media containing CUI and maintain accountability for media during transport outside of controlled areas.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of media transport accountability usually sits with IT operations and facilities; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.8.6 MP.L2-3.8.6 MP: Media Protection

Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of CUI stored on digital media during transport unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of media encryption in transport usually sits with endpoint and data protection teams; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.8.7 MP.L2-3.8.7 MP: Media Protection

Control the use of removable media on system components.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of removable media control usually sits with endpoint management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.8.8 MP.L2-3.8.8 MP: Media Protection

Prohibit the use of portable storage devices when such devices have no identifiable owner.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of controls on ownerless portable storage usually sits with endpoint management and asset management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.8.9 MP.L2-3.8.9 MP: Media Protection

Protect the confidentiality of backup CUI at storage locations.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of backup confidentiality usually sits with backup and infrastructure teams; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.10.2 PE.L2-3.10.2 PE: Physical Protection

Protect and monitor the physical facility and support infrastructure for organizational systems.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of facility protection and monitoring usually sits with facilities and physical security; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.10.3 PE.L2-3.10.3 PE: Physical Protection

Escort visitors and monitor visitor activity.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Not eligibleNamed exclusion in 170.21(a)(2)(iii)
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Class differs from the HIPAA Security Rule page: that page rates 164.310(a)(2)(iii) (role-based physical access and visitor control) as supporting because it also covers role-based access. 3.10.3 covers visitor escort only, which in GCA's classification usually sits with facilities and physical security; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.10.4 PE.L2-3.10.4 PE: Physical Protection

Maintain audit logs of physical access.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Not eligibleNamed exclusion in 170.21(a)(2)(iii)
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of physical access logs usually sits with facilities and physical security; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.10.6 PE.L2-3.10.6 PE: Physical Protection

Enforce safeguarding measures for CUI at alternate work sites.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of alternate work site safeguards usually sits with facilities, endpoint management and the work site owner; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.11.2 RA.L2-3.11.2 RA: Risk Assessment

Scan for vulnerabilities in organizational systems and applications periodically and when new vulnerabilities affecting those systems and applications are identified.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of vulnerability scanning usually sits with security operations and vulnerability management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.11.3 RA.L2-3.11.3 RA: Risk Assessment

Remediate vulnerabilities in accordance with risk assessments.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of vulnerability remediation usually sits with system owners and vulnerability management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.1 SC.L2-3.13.1 SC: System and Communications Protection

Monitor, control, and protect communications (i.e., information transmitted or received by organizational systems) at the external boundaries and key internal boundaries of organizational systems.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of boundary protection usually sits with network and security engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.2 SC.L2-3.13.2 SC: System and Communications Protection

Employ architectural designs, software development techniques, and systems engineering principles that promote effective information security within organizational systems.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of security engineering principles usually sits with architecture and security engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.4 SC.L2-3.13.4 SC: System and Communications Protection

Prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of preventing unauthorized information transfer through shared resources usually sits with system and platform engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.5 SC.L2-3.13.5 SC: System and Communications Protection

Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are physically or logically separated from internal networks.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of DMZ subnetworks usually sits with network engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.6 SC.L2-3.13.6 SC: System and Communications Protection

Deny network communications traffic by default and allow network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception).

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of deny-by-default network traffic usually sits with network engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.7 SC.L2-3.13.7 SC: System and Communications Protection

Prevent remote devices from simultaneously establishing non-remote connections with organizational systems and communicating via some other connection to resources in external networks (i.e., split tunneling).

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of split tunneling prevention usually sits with network and endpoint engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.8 SC.L2-3.13.8 SC: System and Communications Protection

Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of CUI during transmission unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of encryption in transit usually sits with network and security engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.12 SC.L2-3.13.12 SC: System and Communications Protection

Prohibit remote activation of collaborative computing devices and provide indication of devices in use to users present at the device.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of collaborative computing device controls usually sits with endpoint management and IT operations; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.13 SC.L2-3.13.13 SC: System and Communications Protection

Control and monitor the use of mobile code.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of mobile code controls usually sits with endpoint and application security teams; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.14 SC.L2-3.13.14 SC: System and Communications Protection

Control and monitor the use of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of VoIP controls usually sits with network and telephony engineering; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.13.16 SC.L2-3.13.16 SC: System and Communications Protection

Protect the confidentiality of CUI at rest.

  • Points 1
  • POA&M Eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of encryption at rest usually sits with data protection and infrastructure teams; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.14.1 SI.L2-3.14.1 SI: System and Information Integrity

Identify, report, and correct system flaws in a timely manner.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of flaw remediation usually sits with system owners and vulnerability management; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.14.2 SI.L2-3.14.2 SI: System and Information Integrity

Provide protection from malicious code at designated locations within organizational systems.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of malicious code protection usually sits with endpoint security; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.14.3 SI.L2-3.14.3 SI: System and Information Integrity

Monitor system security alerts and advisories and take action in response.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of security alerts and advisories usually sits with security operations; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.14.4 SI.L2-3.14.4 SI: System and Information Integrity

Update malicious code protection mechanisms when new releases are available.

  • Points 5
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of malicious code protection updates usually sits with endpoint security; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
3.14.5 SI.L2-3.14.5 SI: System and Information Integrity

Perform periodic scans of organizational systems and real-time scans of files from external sources as files are downloaded, opened, or executed.

  • Points 3
  • POA&M Not eligible
  • Also Level 1
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

In GCA's classification, primary implementation of malware scanning usually sits with endpoint security; no identity contribution is typical.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Summary

Primary
21
Identity platforms or processes are typically the principal means of implementing the requirement.
Supporting
33
Another discipline owns the requirement. Identity configuration or evidence contributes.
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
56
Listed for completeness, with a one-line note on what the requirement is.
Maximum Points total
313
Sum, across every listed requirement, of the largest Points value it can carry.
Identity-relevant, not POA&M-eligible
33
Primary and Supporting requirements whose POA&M value is Not eligible. See the POA&M definition above.

How to read the matrix

Points
The value subtracted from 110 if the requirement is NOT MET, as codified in 32 CFR 170.24(c)(2). These match the DoD Assessment Methodology v1.2.1 values that contractors already post to SPRS.
POA&M
Under 32 CFR 170.21(a)(2), a requirement may sit on a Plan of Action and Milestones only if it is worth 1 point and is not one of six named exclusions (3.1.20, 3.1.22, 3.10.3, 3.10.4, 3.10.5, 3.12.4). The single exception is 3.13.11, which may be deferred at 3 points when encryption is employed but not FIPS-validated. POA&M items must be closed within 180 days. Conditional status also requires a score of at least 80 percent of the maximum (32 CFR 170.21(a)(2)(i)).
Also Level 1
The requirement is also one of the 17 Level 1 (FCI) requirements. Level 1 permits no POA&M at all.
Identity relevance

Identity relevance is a GCA classification of whether identity capabilities are typically the principal means of implementing a requirement (Primary), contribute to a requirement owned by another discipline (Supporting), or usually sit outside identity work (Outside identity scope (GCA classification)).

It describes where primary implementation ownership usually sits. It is not a statement about whether identity configuration could be relevant to a particular incident, finding or environment. Every "Outside identity scope (GCA classification)" classification carries a rationale, and other classifications show one where GCA has recorded it, under "Why this classification" beside the label.

Platform families
Product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped a platform family to the requirement. It does not mean a product lacks a capability.
Evidence
Examples of artifacts commonly examined. The list is not complete, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.

Important notice

Purpose. This CMMC L2 identity traceability matrix is general educational reference material, written by Robert Ivey and published by GCA Technology Services ("GCA") to help organizations plan identity and access management work. It is not legal, audit, accounting or compliance advice, and it is not a substitute for advice from qualified professionals who know your environment.

No compliance determination. Whether an organization meets a requirement is decided by the applicable assessor, auditor, certifying body or regulator, applying the governing requirements to that organization's actual systems, policies and evidence. Nothing in this matrix states or implies that any organization, product, service or configuration meets or complies with any requirement, or that any assessment, audit, examination or certification will have any particular outcome.

Classifications are practice opinion. Relevance classifications, offering mappings, platform mappings and evidence examples are the author's professional judgment as of the date shown. They are not regulatory classifications and are not statements of the standard of care. Other qualified practitioners may reasonably classify requirements differently, and the right answer for a given environment depends on its facts.

Evidence examples are illustrative. Evidence listed is an example of artifacts commonly examined. It is not a complete list, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.

Source text controls. Requirement text and references come from the sources listed on this page. Where this matrix differs from a source, the source controls. Regulations, guidance and assessment methods change, so confirm current requirements with the issuing authority before relying on them.

Products and services. Platform names identify product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped that platform family to the requirement. It does not mean the product lacks a capability. GCA makes no representation about any third party's products, features, roadmaps or government authorization status, including FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels and similar programs. Confirm capabilities with the vendor and authorization status with the authorizing program.

GCA services. Offering descriptions identify the type of GCA service that addresses an area. The scope, deliverables, terms and outcomes of any GCA engagement are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work, and this page does not change those terms.

No relationship; no reliance. Reading or using this matrix does not create a client, advisory or other relationship with GCA or the author. To the fullest extent permitted by law, this material is provided "as is," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and GCA is not liable for any decision made or action taken in reliance on it.

No client data. This matrix contains no client data. Any example organization is fictitious.

Assessment status. GCA is not a CMMC Third-Party Assessment Organization (C3PAO) and does not perform CMMC certification assessments. Point values and POA&M rules are summarized from 32 CFR 170.21 and 170.24, and the regulation controls.

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Microsoft and Microsoft Entra are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. SailPoint, IdentityIQ and Identity Security Cloud are trademarks or product names of SailPoint Technologies, Inc. or its affiliates. Netwrix is a trademark of Netwrix Corporation. Okta is a trademark of Okta, Inc. Ping Identity is a trademark of Ping Identity Corporation. CyberArk is a trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. or its affiliates. BeyondTrust is a trademark of BeyondTrust Corporation. Delinea is a trademark of Delinea Inc. CMMC is a program of the U.S. Department of Defense. NIST is an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce and does not endorse this page. All other trademarks belong to their respective owners. These names identify products and programs only and do not imply endorsement by, sponsorship by or affiliation with any of these companies or programs, except where a GCA partnership is expressly stated elsewhere on gca.net.

Changelog

  1. Version 1: First publication.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is third-party CMMC Level 2 certification required as of the date of this page?

As of October 16, 2026, DoD has suspended the planned November 2026 move to Phase 2, when third-party Level 2 certification was to become a condition of award in applicable contracts. Under DFARS Class Deviation 2026-O0025, Revision 3, requiring activities may include Level 1 (Self) or Level 2 (Self) requirements, and contractors handling CUI must still implement NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 under DFARS 252.204-7012. For an existing contract that contains CMMC requirements, the deviation requires the contracting officer to remove them by modification before the next option period is exercised or through the next scheduled administrative modification. Until that modification is made, the requirements stay in the contract, so read your own contract. GCA does not give legal advice on contract terms.

Does identity and access management determine a CMMC Level 2 assessment result?

No. An assessor applies 32 CFR Part 170 and the NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 requirements to the organization's own systems and evidence. Identity work contributes to the requirements it touches, and the assessor decides sufficiency.

How many of the 110 requirements does this matrix treat as identity work?

The matrix classifies 21 requirements as primary and 33 as supporting. The other 56 are marked outside identity scope (GCA classification), and each of those rows carries a rationale. The classification is GCA practice opinion, not a regulatory category.

Does GCA perform CMMC certification assessments?

No. GCA is not a CMMC Third-Party Assessment Organization (C3PAO) and does not perform CMMC certification assessments. GCA services are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work.

Against which NIST text was the quoted material checked?

All 110 requirement texts were compared in full against NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 as of October 16, 2026, with no mismatches found. Footnote markers are omitted. The NIST publication controls, and quotation does not imply NIST endorsement.