Defense contractors handling CUI
How Identity and Access Management Supports CMMC Level 2
CMMC Level 2 requirements come from the 110 requirements in NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2, as incorporated by reference in 32 CFR Part 170. NIST has since published Revision 3, but 32 CFR Part 170 and DoD contract clauses continue to reference Revision 2. This page sets out those requirements in a matrix, shows where identity and access management work commonly contributes, and quotes each requirement from NIST.
Identity work carries the most weight in the Access Control (AC) and Identification and Authentication (IA) families. The matrix lists 22 AC and 11 IA requirements. Across all 110, GCA classifies 21 as primary identity work, 33 as supporting and 56 as outside identity scope (GCA classification).
Requirement text is quoted from NIST. Requirement 3.5.3 reads "Use multifactor authentication for local and network access to privileged accounts and for network access to non-privileged accounts." Requirement 3.1.5 reads "Employ the principle of least privilege, including for specific security functions and privileged accounts."
Program status as of October 16, 2026. 32 CFR Part 170 remains in effect, and the CMMC contract clause rule (90 FR 43560) took effect on November 10, 2025. On July 13, 2026, the DoD Chief Information Officer (the Department is now styled the Department of War) suspended the move to Phase 2, which had been scheduled for November 2026. DFARS Class Deviation 2026-O0025, Revision 3 (September 3, 2026) carries that suspension into contracting. It permits Level 1 (Self) and Level 2 (Self) requirements, keeps the requirement to implement NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 under DFARS 252.204-7012, and directs contracting officers to work with requiring activities to remove or revise CMMC requirements in new and existing solicitations and contracts; for an existing contract the deviation requires removal by modification, as the FAQ below explains. The suspension does not change the 110 requirements below. Read the clauses in your own solicitations and contracts and check current DoD guidance before you rely on any date.
Points and POA&M eligibility are summarized from 32 CFR 170.21 and 170.24.
For CIOs and compliance leaders
- Start with the 21 primary rows. In those rows identity work is typically the principal means of implementing the requirement, so they are the first place to test evidence.
- Points and POA&M eligibility come from 32 CFR 170.21 and 170.24. Check each row against the regulation before you score it.
- The matrix shows GCA's practice view. Evidence examples are illustrative, and assessors determine sufficiency.
Reference material, not a compliance determination. This matrix reflects GCA's practice view as of . It does not certify, warrant or predict the outcome of any assessment, audit or examination. NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 and 32 CFR Part 170 control. Read the full notice.
The matrix
- Primary
- Supporting
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Left rule marks identity-relevant requirements that are not POA&M-eligible.
Showing 110 of 110 requirements
| Requirement | Requirement text | Points / POA&M | Identity relevance (GCA classification) | GCA approach | Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities | Evidence commonly examined |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1.1 AC.L2-3.1.1 AC: Access Control | Limit system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, and devices (including other systems). In practice: New hires, contractors and service accounts get access to systems that hold controlled unclassified information only through an approved request, and every account is tied to a known person, process or device. |
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Primary |
Access is commonly limited to authorized users, processes and devices through an identity governance access model, joiner, mover and leaver provisioning, and identity correlation that ties each account to an owner. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.2 AC.L2-3.1.2 AC: Access Control | Limit system access to the types of transactions and functions that authorized users are permitted to execute. In practice: Roles bundle the transactions and functions each job needs, such as view versus approve, and managers confirm in periodic access reviews that people still need what their role gives them. |
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Primary |
Permitted transactions and functions are commonly defined in a role and entitlement model, often refined through role mining, and confirmed in periodic access reviews. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.4 AC.L2-3.1.4 AC: Access Control | Separate the duties of individuals to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. In practice: A person who can create a vendor cannot also approve payment to that vendor. The governance platform flags conflicting access at request time, and any exception needs a named approver and a compensating control. |
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Primary |
Separation of duties is commonly enforced through conflict rules for toxic access combinations, checked at request time, with approved exceptions tied to mitigating controls. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.5 AC.L2-3.1.5 AC: Access Control | Employ the principle of least privilege, including for specific security functions and privileged accounts. In practice: Administrators hold elevated rights only for the tasks that need them, often through time-limited activation of a privileged role or a vaulted credential check-out, and owners regularly review who still holds those rights. |
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Primary |
Least privilege for privileged accounts is commonly pursued through privileged access management, just-in-time privileged role activation and periodic privileged access reviews. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.6 AC.L2-3.1.6 AC: Access Control | Use non-privileged accounts or roles when accessing nonsecurity functions. In practice: An engineer reads email and browses the web with a standard account and uses a separate, clearly labeled admin account only for administration. Account classification helps tell the two kinds apart. |
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Primary |
Use of non-privileged accounts for everyday work is commonly supported by separate privileged identities, an administrator account standard and account-type classification. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.7 AC.L2-3.1.7 AC: Access Control | Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions and capture the execution of such functions in audit logs. In practice: A standard user who tries to run an administrator task is blocked, and when an approved administrator does run one, the privileged access tools record who did it and when. |
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Primary
Why this classificationCapture of privileged function use is delivered by the privileged access tooling that identity teams run. Alerting, retention and review sit with security operations and are supporting rows in this series. |
Privileged functions are commonly restricted through privileged role activation and privileged access management, with each execution captured in administrative audit logs. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.8 AC.L2-3.1.8 AC: Access Control | Limit unsuccessful logon attempts. In practice: The directory and sign-in service lock an account after a set number of failed attempts, and the help desk follows a defined process to verify the user before unlocking it. |
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Primary |
Limits on unsuccessful logon attempts are commonly set through lockout policy on the directory and identity provider. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.3.2 AU.L2-3.3.2 AU: Audit and Accountability | Ensure that the actions of individual system users can be uniquely traced to those users, so they can be held accountable for their actions. In practice: Every person signs in with their own account, so log entries point to one individual. Shared and orphaned accounts are found and removed, and any shared credential is checked out from a vault and logged. |
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Primary
Why this classificationTraceability to an individual depends on unique identifiers and on removing shared and orphan accounts, which is identity work. The audit record mechanics (event selection, content, generation) are supporting rows elsewhere in this series. |
Traceability of user actions is commonly supported by identity correlation that removes shared and orphan accounts and by privileged access management check-out of shared credentials. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.3.9 AU.L2-3.3.9 AU: Audit and Accountability | Limit management of audit logging functionality to a subset of privileged users. In practice: Only a small group of approved administrators can change logging settings. They receive that role through the privileged access process, and owners review the membership periodically. |
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Primary |
Management of audit logging is commonly limited to a small privileged group through just-in-time role activation and periodic review of that group. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.1 IA.L2-3.5.1 IA: Identification and Authentication | Identify system users, processes acting on behalf of users, and devices. In practice: Each person, service account and device has a unique identity in the directory, and an inventory of service and device identities shows who or what owns each one. |
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Primary |
Identification of users, processes and devices is commonly implemented through directory and identity provider design, identity correlation and an inventory of service and device identities. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.2 IA.L2-3.5.2 IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticate (or verify) the identities of users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to allowing access to organizational systems. In practice: A user, an application or a device shows who it is at sign-in, through a password plus MFA for people or a certificate or workload identity for systems, before it reaches anything. |
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Primary |
Authentication is commonly performed at the identity provider for users, workload identities and devices. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.3 IA.L2-3.5.3 IA: Identification and Authentication | Use multifactor authentication for local and network access to privileged accounts and for network access to non-privileged accounts. In practice: Administrators use MFA for every privileged sign-in, and regular users use MFA when connecting over the network. Many organizations choose phishing-resistant methods such as security keys. |
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Primary |
Multifactor authentication is commonly enforced through policy-based access rules at the identity provider, often with phishing-resistant methods, and through privileged access management for privileged sessions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.4 IA.L2-3.5.4 IA: Identification and Authentication | Employ replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to privileged and non-privileged accounts. In practice: Sign-in methods such as security keys, passkeys and certificates are designed so a captured login does not work if an attacker replays it later. |
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Primary |
Replay-resistant authentication is commonly implemented with FIDO2 security keys, passkeys and certificate-based authentication. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.5 IA.L2-3.5.5 IA: Identification and Authentication | Prevent reuse of identifiers for a defined period. In practice: When someone leaves, their username is not handed to a new hire for a defined period. The identity lifecycle process checks new usernames against retired ones before creating accounts. |
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Primary |
Identifier reuse is commonly prevented by a non-reuse rule in identity governance naming and lifecycle processes. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.6 IA.L2-3.5.6 IA: Identification and Authentication | Disable identifiers after a defined period of inactivity. In practice: A scheduled report finds accounts nobody has used for a defined period, and the identity process disables them automatically or after the owner confirms. |
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Primary |
Inactive identifiers are commonly handled through dormant-account detection and automatic disablement. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.7 IA.L2-3.5.7 IA: Identification and Authentication | Enforce a minimum password complexity and change of characters when new passwords are created. In practice: The directory and sign-in service enforce password rules, such as minimum length and complexity, so a weak password is refused when someone sets or changes it. |
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Primary
Why this classificationPassword rules are configured in the directory and identity provider. NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 requires a minimum password complexity. NIST SP 800-63B-4 states that verifiers SHALL NOT impose composition rules, and OMB M-22-09 says password policies must not require special characters, so confirm with the assessor how the requirement is read for your environment. |
Identity work commonly sets length and complexity rules on the directory and identity provider; the change-of-characters rule usually needs a password filter or an alternative the organization documents for its assessor, such as passwordless sign-in. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.8 IA.L2-3.5.8 IA: Identification and Authentication | Prohibit password reuse for a specified number of generations. In practice: The directory or sign-in service remembers a defined number of earlier passwords and refuses them again; where a cloud directory keeps a shorter history, the rule is enforced in the on-premises directory, or the password is replaced by passwordless sign-in. |
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Primary |
Password reuse is commonly limited through password history enforcement in the directory or identity provider. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.9 IA.L2-3.5.9 IA: Identification and Authentication | Allow temporary password use for system logons with an immediate change to a permanent password. In practice: A new hire gets a one-time temporary password, often issued by the onboarding process, and the system forces a new permanent password at the first sign-in. |
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Primary |
Temporary passwords are commonly issued with a forced change at first logon, often through identity governance onboarding. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.10 IA.L2-3.5.10 IA: Identification and Authentication | Store and transmit only cryptographically-protected passwords. In practice: Passwords are stored in protected form in the directory and travel over encrypted connections. Shared and service account passwords live in a privileged access vault instead of spreadsheets. |
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Primary |
Protected password storage and transmission is commonly supported by cryptographically protected credential storage and privileged access management vaulting of shared and service credentials. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.7.5 MA.L2-3.7.5 MA: Maintenance | Require multifactor authentication to establish nonlocal maintenance sessions via external network connections and terminate such connections when nonlocal maintenance is complete. In practice: A vendor technician working remotely signs in with MFA through a privileged access broker, and the session closes automatically when the maintenance window ends. |
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Primary |
Nonlocal maintenance sessions are commonly protected by multifactor authentication and privileged-access-brokered vendor access with automatic session termination. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.9.2 PS.L2-3.9.2 PS: Personnel Security | Ensure that organizational systems containing CUI are protected during and after personnel actions such as terminations and transfers. In practice: When someone leaves, their accounts are removed on their last day through the leaver process. When someone changes jobs, the mover process reviews and trims the access from the old role. |
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Primary |
Protection of systems during personnel actions is commonly implemented through joiner, mover and leaver automation and recertification of access after a move. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.11 AC.L2-3.1.11 AC: Access Control | Terminate (automatically) a user session after a defined condition. In practice: Single sign-on sessions expire after a set time or condition, applications end their own sessions under the same policy, and privileged vault sessions close automatically when idle. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationApplication and platform session handling is usually the primary implementation point. The identity provider contributes session lifetime and reauthentication interval policy. |
Identity provider session lifetime and reauthentication interval policy commonly bound how long a session lasts, and privileged access management commonly closes privileged sessions after inactivity. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.12 AC.L2-3.1.12 AC: Access Control | Monitor and control remote access sessions. In practice: Remote workers sign in through policies that check the user and device, and remote administrator sessions run through a privileged access vault that records what happens during the session. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationRemote access monitoring is usually carried by network and remote access gateway tooling. Identity contributes sign-in logging and access policy enforcement. |
Remote access sessions are commonly controlled through policy-based access rules at the identity provider and monitored through privileged session management. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.15 AC.L2-3.1.15 AC: Access Control | Authorize remote execution of privileged commands and remote access to security-relevant information. In practice: A vendor engineer who needs a remote administrator session requests it, a designated approver signs off, and the privileged access vault opens the session for that task only. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationPrimary enforcement of remote privileged commands is usually on the remote access gateway or the target system. Identity contributes approval and brokering of privileged sessions. |
Remote privileged sessions are commonly authorized through approval workflows in privileged access management and approval-gated privileged role activation. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.16 AC.L2-3.1.16 AC: Access Control | Authorize wireless access prior to allowing such connections. In practice: The network team runs the wireless infrastructure. Identity supplies the directory-backed check, often certificate-based, that decides whether a device or person may join the wireless network. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationWireless network authorization is usually set up by network engineering; identity contributes the directory-backed and certificate-based authentication behind it. |
Wireless authorization is commonly directory-backed through 802.1X with a RADIUS service and certificate-based authentication. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.17 AC.L2-3.1.17 AC: Access Control | Protect wireless access using authentication and encryption. In practice: Wireless networks use enterprise sign-in rather than a shared password. Identity issues the certificates or directory credentials each person or device presents, and the network team configures encryption. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationWireless encryption and network configuration are usually owned by network engineering; identity contributes the certificate or directory credentials used to authenticate. |
Wireless authentication is commonly supported by certificate or directory credentials presented to WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise networks. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.18 AC.L2-3.1.18 AC: Access Control | Control connection of mobile devices. In practice: Mobile device management owns the device rules. Identity sign-in policies check whether a phone or tablet is registered and meets those rules before it can open email or files containing CUI. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationMobile device management is usually owned by endpoint engineering; identity contributes device registration and compliance state as inputs to access rules. |
Mobile device connections are commonly gated by device registration and compliance state in policy-based access rules at the identity provider. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.1.20 AC.L2-3.1.20 AC: Access Control | Verify and control/limit connections to and use of external systems. In practice: Security policy sets the terms for outside systems. Identity settings give partner and contractor staff on unmanaged devices limited guest access and decide what those connections may reach. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationAgreements and technical limits on external systems extend beyond identity; identity contributes unmanaged-device and external identity access policy. |
Connections from external systems are commonly limited through unmanaged-device access policy and external identity and cross-organization access settings. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.3.1 AU.L2-3.3.1 AU: Audit and Accountability | Create and retain system audit logs and records to the extent needed to enable the monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful or unauthorized system activity. In practice: The security team runs logging and retention. Sign-in, privileged access and access governance logs are onboarded to the central log platform so investigators can see who accessed what. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationAudit logging is usually owned by security operations; identity contributes the identity provider, privileged access and governance log sources onboarded to the SIEM. |
Audit logging is commonly supported by onboarding identity provider, privileged access management and identity governance log sources to the SIEM with defined retention. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.3.5 AU.L2-3.3.5 AU: Audit and Accountability | Correlate audit record review, analysis, and reporting processes for investigation and response to indications of unlawful, unauthorized, suspicious, or unusual activity. In practice: The security operations team does the analysis. Identity adds context to alerts, such as the account owner, their role and privilege level, so analysts understand an event faster. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationCorrelation and review of audit records are usually run by security operations; identity contributes context such as risk signals, account owner and privilege level. |
Correlation of audit records is commonly supported by identity context such as risk signals, account owner and privilege level feeding SIEM correlation. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.3.8 AU.L2-3.3.8 AU: Audit and Accountability | Protect audit information and audit logging tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion. In practice: The security team protects the log platform itself. Identity helps by assigning access to log stores and the log platform through roles, limiting who can read or change records. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationProtection of audit information is usually owned by the SIEM and log platform owners; identity contributes role-based access to the log stores. |
Protection of audit information commonly includes role-based access to log stores and the SIEM. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.4.1 CM.L2-3.4.1 CM: Configuration Management | Establish and maintain baseline configurations and inventories of organizational systems (including hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) throughout the respective system development life cycles. In practice: IT owns the asset inventory; identity contributes named owners for systems and service accounts and device identity records that the inventory can draw on. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationBaseline configuration and inventory is usually owned by IT asset and configuration management. Identity contributes owner, service account and device identity records. |
Baseline inventories are commonly fed by owner attribution for systems and service accounts and by device identity records. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.4.5 CM.L2-3.4.5 CM: Configuration Management | Define, document, approve, and enforce physical and logical access restrictions associated with changes to organizational systems. In practice: Change management owns the approval process. Identity can tie elevated access to an approved change ticket and switch it on for the change window only. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationChange management is usually owned by IT operations; identity contributes just-in-time privilege tied to approved changes. |
Access restrictions for changes are commonly supported by just-in-time privilege tied to approved changes. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.4.9 CM.L2-3.4.9 CM: Configuration Management | Control and monitor user-installed software. In practice: Endpoint teams control what software people may install. Identity helps by removing everyday local administrator rights and granting elevated rights only on request for a defined purpose. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationControl of user-installed software is usually owned by endpoint engineering; privileged access tooling contributes by removing local administrator rights. |
User-installed software is commonly constrained by removing local administrator rights and applying endpoint privilege management. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.5.11 IA.L2-3.5.11 IA: Identification and Authentication | Obscure feedback of authentication information. In practice: When someone types a password, the sign-in screen shows dots or hides the entry so a person standing nearby cannot read it. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationMasking is a property of each sign-in surface, including operating system logon and applications; identity platforms implement it on their own sign-in pages. |
Masked credential entry is commonly provided on identity provider sign-in surfaces. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.6.1 IR.L2-3.6.1 IR: Incident Response | Establish an operational incident-handling capability for organizational systems that includes preparation, detection, analysis, containment, recovery, and user response activities. In practice: The security team runs the incident process. Identity supplies ready steps for containment, such as disabling an account or ending its active sessions, and logs show which accounts were involved. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationIncident handling is usually led by security operations and incident response; identity contributes containment steps such as session revocation and account disablement. |
Incident containment is commonly supported by identity containment playbooks such as session revocation and account disablement. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.7.2 MA.L2-3.7.2 MA: Maintenance | Provide controls on the tools, techniques, mechanisms, and personnel used to conduct system maintenance. In practice: IT operations governs maintenance work. Identity gives outside maintenance staff named accounts with an end date instead of a shared login, so actions trace to a person and access lapses. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationMaintenance tools and procedures are usually owned by IT operations; identity contributes named maintenance accounts with time-bound access. |
Controls on maintenance personnel are commonly supported by named vendor and maintenance accounts with time-bound access. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.7.6 MA.L2-3.7.6 MA: Maintenance | Supervise the maintenance activities of maintenance personnel without required access authorization. In practice: IT operations supervises maintenance staff who lack standing access. An employee escorts them, and privileged session recording keeps a record of the work for later review. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationEscorting and supervising maintenance staff is a physical and procedural task; identity tooling contributes privileged session monitoring. |
Supervision of maintenance personnel is commonly supported by privileged session monitoring for escorted maintenance. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.8.2 MP.L2-3.8.2 MP: Media Protection | Limit access to CUI on system media to authorized users. In practice: Data owners decide who may reach CUI on storage and media. Identity grants that access through named groups and runs periodic owner reviews of group membership. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationPhysical media handling is usually owned by IT operations; identity contributes group-based access to CUI repositories and periodic review. |
Access to CUI on media is commonly limited through group-based access to CUI repositories with periodic review. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.9.1 PS.L2-3.9.1 PS: Personnel Security | Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to organizational systems containing CUI. In practice: HR owns the screening. The identity process can hold account creation until HR marks the background screening complete, so access to CUI systems is not granted too early. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationScreening is usually performed by human resources and security; provisioning can be gated on the screening result. |
Screening before access is commonly supported by provisioning that is gated on an HR screening-complete attribute. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.10.1 PE.L2-3.10.1 PE: Physical Protection | Limit physical access to organizational systems, equipment, and the respective operating environments to authorized individuals. In practice: The facilities team controls the building and server rooms. Where a badge system connects to the identity process, new hires get door access and leavers lose it along with their accounts. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationClass differs from the HIPAA Security Rule page: that page rates 164.310(a)(1) (facility access controls) as outside identity scope, whereas 3.10.1 is rated supporting here because the requirement names authorized individuals, which identity provisioning can feed where a physical access control system connector exists. Primary implementation usually sits with facilities and physical security. |
Physical access authorization is commonly supported by identity-governance-driven provisioning of physical access where a physical access control system connector exists. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.10.5 PE.L2-3.10.5 PE: Physical Protection | Control and manage physical access devices. In practice: The facilities team manages badges and keys. Where a badge system connects to the identity process, issuing, changing and deactivating a badge follows the same joiner, mover and leaver events as accounts. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationClass differs from the HIPAA Security Rule page: that page rates 164.310(a)(1) as outside identity scope, whereas 3.10.5 is rated supporting here because badge lifecycle can follow joiner, mover and leaver events where a physical access control system connector exists. Primary implementation usually sits with facilities and physical security. |
Physical access devices are commonly managed by tying badge lifecycle to joiner, mover and leaver events where a physical access control system connector exists. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.11.1 RA.L2-3.11.1 RA: Risk Assessment | Periodically assess the risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, and individuals, resulting from the operation of organizational systems and the associated processing, storage, or transmission of CUI. In practice: The risk assessment team owns the assessment; identity hands over its account and entitlement inventory and recent review results for the access-related sections. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationThe risk assessment is usually owned by risk management and security governance. Identity inventory and access findings commonly inform it. |
Identity and entitlement inventory and review results are commonly supplied as inputs to the access-related risk assessment. |
Not mapped | Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.12.1 CA.L2-3.12.1 CA: Security Assessment | Periodically assess the security controls in organizational systems to determine if the controls are effective in their application. In practice: A periodic assessment of identity controls, such as MFA coverage and admin accounts, produces a list of gaps rated against each requirement for the security team to act on. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationControl assessment is usually owned by the compliance function; identity contributes a periodic gap assessment of identity controls. |
Identity controls are commonly assessed periodically through a gap assessment scored with the 32 CFR 170.24 methodology. |
Not mapped | Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.12.2 CA.L2-3.12.2 CA: Security Assessment | Develop and implement plans of action designed to correct deficiencies and reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities in organizational systems. In practice: Each identity gap found in an assessment becomes a plan-of-action item with a named owner and a target date, and the list is tracked until the gap is closed. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationPlans of action are usually owned by the compliance function and system owners; identity contributes POA&M entries for identity gaps. |
Plans of action are commonly supported by POA&M entries for identity gaps with named owners and target dates. |
Not mapped | Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.12.3 CA.L2-3.12.3 CA: Security Assessment | Monitor security controls on an ongoing basis to ensure the continued effectiveness of the controls. In practice: Identity controls are checked on a recurring schedule between formal assessments, so drift such as new unreviewed admin accounts shows up sooner. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationOngoing control monitoring is usually owned by security governance; identity contributes recurring control-health reporting and review-campaign metrics. |
Identity controls are commonly monitored between assessments through recurring control-health reporting and review-campaign metrics. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.12.4 CA.L2-3.12.4 CA: Security Assessment | Develop, document, and periodically update system security plans that describe system boundaries, system environments of operation, how security requirements are implemented, and the relationships with or connections to other systems. In practice: The compliance team owns the system security plan; identity contributes the sections on sign-in, MFA and access reviews. These plans are often marked CUI, so they stay in the organization's CUI environment. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationThe system security plan is usually owned by the system owner and the compliance function; identity contributes its identity sections. |
The identity sections of the SSP are commonly written to cover sign-in, MFA and access reviews. SSPs are often marked CUI, so they are handled inside the client's CUI environment. |
Not mapped | Evidence commonly examined
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| 3.13.3 SC.L2-3.13.3 SC: System and Communications Protection | Separate user functionality from system management functionality. In practice: The platform team separates management functions from user functions. Identity supplies separate admin identities, often used from a dedicated workstation, for management tasks. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationSeparation of management functions is usually designed by architecture and platform teams; identity contributes separate administrator identities and administrative portal restrictions. |
Separation of user and management functionality is commonly supported by separate administrator identities, privileged access workstations and administrative portal restrictions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| 3.13.9 SC.L2-3.13.9 SC: System and Communications Protection | Terminate network connections associated with communications sessions at the end of the sessions or after a defined period of inactivity. In practice: Network connections close after a period of inactivity set by the organization, and the identity session timeout is aligned with that period. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationNetwork device configuration is usually the primary implementation point; identity contributes by aligning identity session timeouts with the network inactivity period. |
Network disconnect after inactivity is commonly aligned with session timeout policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| 3.13.10 SC.L2-3.13.10 SC: System and Communications Protection | Establish and manage cryptographic keys for cryptography employed in organizational systems. In practice: The security team sets key management rules. Identity contributes by keeping SSH keys and service account credentials in a privileged access vault and rotating them on a schedule. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationCryptographic key management is usually owned by security engineering and PKI teams; privileged access tooling contributes vaulting and rotation of SSH keys and service credentials. |
Cryptographic key management is commonly supported by vaulting and scheduled rotation of SSH keys and service account credentials. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| 3.13.11 SC.L2-3.13.11 SC: System and Communications Protection | Employ FIPS-validated cryptography when used to protect the confidentiality of CUI. In practice: The security team confirms that each identity product handling CUI uses encryption modules on the government's validated list, checking each product and version. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationChoice of cryptographic modules is usually owned by security engineering; identity work contributes by checking each identity tool that protects CUI against the NIST CMVP list. |
Use of FIPS-validated cryptography is commonly confirmed by checking each identity tool that protects CUI against the NIST CMVP list, per product and version. |
Not mapped | Evidence commonly examined
|
| 3.13.15 SC.L2-3.13.15 SC: System and Communications Protection | Protect the authenticity of communications sessions. In practice: The network team protects sessions in transit. Identity contributes signed sign-in tokens between systems and tracks the signing certificates so they are renewed before they expire. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationCommunications session protection is usually owned by network and application teams; identity contributes signed federation assertions, signing-certificate lifecycle and session binding. |
Session authenticity is commonly supported by signed federation assertions and tokens, lifecycle management of SAML and OIDC signing certificates, and session binding. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| 3.14.6 SI.L2-3.14.6 SI: System and Information Integrity | Monitor organizational systems, including inbound and outbound communications traffic, to detect attacks and indicators of potential attacks. In practice: The security team monitors the environment. Identity adds signals such as sign-in risk events and sudden privilege changes so unusual activity surfaces as alerts for review. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationNetwork traffic monitoring is usually owned by security operations; identity contributes identity threat detection signals such as sign-in risk events and privilege escalation alerts. |
Detection of attacks is commonly supported by identity threat detection signals such as sign-in risk events and privilege escalation alerts. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| 3.14.7 SI.L2-3.14.7 SI: System and Information Integrity | Identify unauthorized use of organizational systems. In practice: Reports flag unusual sign-ins, accounts that have gone dormant and accounts with no owner, giving the security team leads on use nobody authorized. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationDetection of unauthorized use is usually led by security operations; identity contributes anomalous sign-in detection and findings on dormant or orphan accounts. |
Identification of unauthorized use is commonly supported by detection of anomalous sign-ins and of dormant or orphan accounts. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| 3.1.3 AC.L2-3.1.3 AC: Access Control | Control the flow of CUI in accordance with approved authorizations. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of information flow enforcement usually sits with data loss prevention and boundary controls; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.1.9 AC.L2-3.1.9 AC: Access Control | Provide privacy and security notices consistent with applicable CUI rules. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, ownership of the system use notification (banner) usually sits with application and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.1.10 AC.L2-3.1.10 AC: Access Control | Use session lock with pattern-hiding displays to prevent access and viewing of data after a period of inactivity. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, ownership of device lock behavior usually sits with endpoint management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.1.13 AC.L2-3.1.13 AC: Access Control | Employ cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of remote access sessions. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of cryptographic protection of remote sessions usually sits with network and security engineering (VPN and TLS configuration); no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.1.14 AC.L2-3.1.14 AC: Access Control | Route remote access via managed access control points. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of managed remote access control points usually sits with network engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.1.19 AC.L2-3.1.19 AC: Access Control | Encrypt CUI on mobile devices and mobile computing platforms. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of mobile device encryption usually sits with endpoint management, consistent with the 800-53 page's classification of AC-19(5); no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.1.21 AC.L2-3.1.21 AC: Access Control | Limit use of portable storage devices on external systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of limits on portable storage on external systems usually sits with endpoint and data protection teams, consistent with the 800-53 page's classification of AC-20(2); no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.1.22 AC.L2-3.1.22 AC: Access Control | Control CUI posted or processed on publicly accessible systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, ownership of publicly accessible content review usually sits with communications and web owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.2.1 AT.L2-3.2.1 AT: Awareness and Training | Ensure that managers, systems administrators, and users of organizational systems are made aware of the security risks associated with their activities and of the applicable policies, standards, and procedures related to the security of those systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of security awareness programs usually sits with security and human resources teams; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.2.2 AT.L2-3.2.2 AT: Awareness and Training | Ensure that personnel are trained to carry out their assigned information security-related duties and responsibilities. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of role-based security training usually sits with security and human resources teams; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.2.3 AT.L2-3.2.3 AT: Awareness and Training | Provide security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of insider threat awareness training usually sits with security and human resources teams; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.3.3 AU.L2-3.3.3 AU: Audit and Accountability | Review and update logged events. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationClass differs from the NIST SP 800-53 r5 page: the 800-53 page rates AU-2 as supporting because identity events are among those selected for logging, whereas 3.3.3 is the periodic review and update of the selected events, which in GCA's classification usually sits with security monitoring; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.3.4 AU.L2-3.3.4 AU: Audit and Accountability | Alert in the event of an audit logging process failure. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of logging failure alerting usually sits with security monitoring and operations; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.3.6 AU.L2-3.3.6 AU: Audit and Accountability | Provide audit record reduction and report generation to support on-demand analysis and reporting. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of audit reduction and reporting tooling usually sits with security monitoring and operations; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.3.7 AU.L2-3.3.7 AU: Audit and Accountability | Provide a system capability that compares and synchronizes internal system clocks with an authoritative source to generate time stamps for audit records. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of time synchronization usually sits with infrastructure and systems administration; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.4.2 CM.L2-3.4.2 CM: Configuration Management | Establish and enforce security configuration settings for information technology products employed in organizational systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of security configuration settings usually sits with IT configuration management and system owners; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.4.3 CM.L2-3.4.3 CM: Configuration Management | Track, review, approve or disapprove, and log changes to organizational systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of change control usually sits with IT change management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.4.4 CM.L2-3.4.4 CM: Configuration Management | Analyze the security impact of changes prior to implementation. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of security impact analysis usually sits with IT change management and security engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.4.6 CM.L2-3.4.6 CM: Configuration Management | Employ the principle of least functionality by configuring organizational systems to provide only essential capabilities. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of least functionality usually sits with system owners and configuration management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.4.7 CM.L2-3.4.7 CM: Configuration Management | Restrict, disable, or prevent the use of nonessential programs, functions, ports, protocols, and services. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of restricting nonessential programs, ports, protocols and services usually sits with system owners and network engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.4.8 CM.L2-3.4.8 CM: Configuration Management | Apply deny-by-exception (blacklisting) policy to prevent the use of unauthorized software or deny-all, permit-by-exception (whitelisting) policy to allow the execution of authorized software. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of application allow and deny listing usually sits with endpoint management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.6.2 IR.L2-3.6.2 IR: Incident Response | Track, document, and report incidents to designated officials and/or authorities both internal and external to the organization. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of incident tracking and reporting usually sits with security operations and the incident response team; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.6.3 IR.L2-3.6.3 IR: Incident Response | Test the organizational incident response capability. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of incident response testing usually sits with security operations and the incident response team; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.7.1 MA.L2-3.7.1 MA: Maintenance | Perform maintenance on organizational systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of system maintenance usually sits with IT operations and facilities; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.7.3 MA.L2-3.7.3 MA: Maintenance | Ensure equipment removed for off-site maintenance is sanitized of any CUI. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of sanitizing equipment for off-site maintenance usually sits with IT operations and asset management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.7.4 MA.L2-3.7.4 MA: Maintenance | Check media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in organizational systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of scanning diagnostic media for malicious code usually sits with IT operations and endpoint security; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.8.1 MP.L2-3.8.1 MP: Media Protection | Protect (i.e., physically control and securely store) system media containing CUI, both paper and digital. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of physical media protection usually sits with IT operations and facilities; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.8.3 MP.L2-3.8.3 MP: Media Protection | Sanitize or destroy system media containing CUI before disposal or release for reuse. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of media sanitization usually sits with IT operations and asset management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.8.4 MP.L2-3.8.4 MP: Media Protection | Mark media with necessary CUI markings and distribution limitations. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of media marking usually sits with data owners and records management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.8.5 MP.L2-3.8.5 MP: Media Protection | Control access to media containing CUI and maintain accountability for media during transport outside of controlled areas. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of media transport accountability usually sits with IT operations and facilities; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.8.6 MP.L2-3.8.6 MP: Media Protection | Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of CUI stored on digital media during transport unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of media encryption in transport usually sits with endpoint and data protection teams; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.8.7 MP.L2-3.8.7 MP: Media Protection | Control the use of removable media on system components. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of removable media control usually sits with endpoint management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.8.8 MP.L2-3.8.8 MP: Media Protection | Prohibit the use of portable storage devices when such devices have no identifiable owner. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of controls on ownerless portable storage usually sits with endpoint management and asset management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.8.9 MP.L2-3.8.9 MP: Media Protection | Protect the confidentiality of backup CUI at storage locations. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of backup confidentiality usually sits with backup and infrastructure teams; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.10.2 PE.L2-3.10.2 PE: Physical Protection | Protect and monitor the physical facility and support infrastructure for organizational systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of facility protection and monitoring usually sits with facilities and physical security; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.10.3 PE.L2-3.10.3 PE: Physical Protection | Escort visitors and monitor visitor activity. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationClass differs from the HIPAA Security Rule page: that page rates 164.310(a)(2)(iii) (role-based physical access and visitor control) as supporting because it also covers role-based access. 3.10.3 covers visitor escort only, which in GCA's classification usually sits with facilities and physical security; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.10.4 PE.L2-3.10.4 PE: Physical Protection | Maintain audit logs of physical access. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of physical access logs usually sits with facilities and physical security; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.10.6 PE.L2-3.10.6 PE: Physical Protection | Enforce safeguarding measures for CUI at alternate work sites. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of alternate work site safeguards usually sits with facilities, endpoint management and the work site owner; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.11.2 RA.L2-3.11.2 RA: Risk Assessment | Scan for vulnerabilities in organizational systems and applications periodically and when new vulnerabilities affecting those systems and applications are identified. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of vulnerability scanning usually sits with security operations and vulnerability management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.11.3 RA.L2-3.11.3 RA: Risk Assessment | Remediate vulnerabilities in accordance with risk assessments. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of vulnerability remediation usually sits with system owners and vulnerability management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.1 SC.L2-3.13.1 SC: System and Communications Protection | Monitor, control, and protect communications (i.e., information transmitted or received by organizational systems) at the external boundaries and key internal boundaries of organizational systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of boundary protection usually sits with network and security engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.2 SC.L2-3.13.2 SC: System and Communications Protection | Employ architectural designs, software development techniques, and systems engineering principles that promote effective information security within organizational systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of security engineering principles usually sits with architecture and security engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.4 SC.L2-3.13.4 SC: System and Communications Protection | Prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of preventing unauthorized information transfer through shared resources usually sits with system and platform engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.5 SC.L2-3.13.5 SC: System and Communications Protection | Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are physically or logically separated from internal networks. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of DMZ subnetworks usually sits with network engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.6 SC.L2-3.13.6 SC: System and Communications Protection | Deny network communications traffic by default and allow network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception). |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of deny-by-default network traffic usually sits with network engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.7 SC.L2-3.13.7 SC: System and Communications Protection | Prevent remote devices from simultaneously establishing non-remote connections with organizational systems and communicating via some other connection to resources in external networks (i.e., split tunneling). |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of split tunneling prevention usually sits with network and endpoint engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.8 SC.L2-3.13.8 SC: System and Communications Protection | Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of CUI during transmission unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of encryption in transit usually sits with network and security engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.12 SC.L2-3.13.12 SC: System and Communications Protection | Prohibit remote activation of collaborative computing devices and provide indication of devices in use to users present at the device. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of collaborative computing device controls usually sits with endpoint management and IT operations; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.13 SC.L2-3.13.13 SC: System and Communications Protection | Control and monitor the use of mobile code. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of mobile code controls usually sits with endpoint and application security teams; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.14 SC.L2-3.13.14 SC: System and Communications Protection | Control and monitor the use of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of VoIP controls usually sits with network and telephony engineering; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.13.16 SC.L2-3.13.16 SC: System and Communications Protection | Protect the confidentiality of CUI at rest. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of encryption at rest usually sits with data protection and infrastructure teams; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.14.1 SI.L2-3.14.1 SI: System and Information Integrity | Identify, report, and correct system flaws in a timely manner. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of flaw remediation usually sits with system owners and vulnerability management; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.14.2 SI.L2-3.14.2 SI: System and Information Integrity | Provide protection from malicious code at designated locations within organizational systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of malicious code protection usually sits with endpoint security; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.14.3 SI.L2-3.14.3 SI: System and Information Integrity | Monitor system security alerts and advisories and take action in response. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of security alerts and advisories usually sits with security operations; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.14.4 SI.L2-3.14.4 SI: System and Information Integrity | Update malicious code protection mechanisms when new releases are available. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of malicious code protection updates usually sits with endpoint security; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 3.14.5 SI.L2-3.14.5 SI: System and Information Integrity | Perform periodic scans of organizational systems and real-time scans of files from external sources as files are downloaded, opened, or executed. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, primary implementation of malware scanning usually sits with endpoint security; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
No requirements match the current filters.
Summary
- Primary
- 21
- Identity platforms or processes are typically the principal means of implementing the requirement.
- Supporting
- 33
- Another discipline owns the requirement. Identity configuration or evidence contributes.
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
- 56
- Listed for completeness, with a one-line note on what the requirement is.
- Maximum Points total
- 313
- Sum, across every listed requirement, of the largest Points value it can carry.
- Identity-relevant, not POA&M-eligible
- 33
- Primary and Supporting requirements whose POA&M value is Not eligible. See the POA&M definition above.
How to read the matrix
- Points
- The value subtracted from 110 if the requirement is NOT MET, as codified in 32 CFR 170.24(c)(2). These match the DoD Assessment Methodology v1.2.1 values that contractors already post to SPRS.
- POA&M
- Under 32 CFR 170.21(a)(2), a requirement may sit on a Plan of Action and Milestones only if it is worth 1 point and is not one of six named exclusions (3.1.20, 3.1.22, 3.10.3, 3.10.4, 3.10.5, 3.12.4). The single exception is 3.13.11, which may be deferred at 3 points when encryption is employed but not FIPS-validated. POA&M items must be closed within 180 days. Conditional status also requires a score of at least 80 percent of the maximum (32 CFR 170.21(a)(2)(i)).
- Also Level 1
- The requirement is also one of the 17 Level 1 (FCI) requirements. Level 1 permits no POA&M at all.
- Identity relevance
Identity relevance is a GCA classification of whether identity capabilities are typically the principal means of implementing a requirement (Primary), contribute to a requirement owned by another discipline (Supporting), or usually sit outside identity work (Outside identity scope (GCA classification)).
It describes where primary implementation ownership usually sits. It is not a statement about whether identity configuration could be relevant to a particular incident, finding or environment. Every "Outside identity scope (GCA classification)" classification carries a rationale, and other classifications show one where GCA has recorded it, under "Why this classification" beside the label.
- Platform families
- Product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped a platform family to the requirement. It does not mean a product lacks a capability.
- Evidence
- Examples of artifacts commonly examined. The list is not complete, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Sources
- Class Deviation 2026-O0025, Revision 3, Revolutionary FAR Overhaul Part 40, DFARS Part 240 (September 3, 2026), implementing the DoD CIO memorandum of July 13, 2026 suspending CMMC Phase 2 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Defense Pricing, Contracting, and Acquisition Policy (DPCAP)
- DFARS Case 2019-D041, Assessing Contractor Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements, final rule, 90 FR 43560 (September 10, 2025), effective November 10, 2025 Federal Register
- NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2, Protecting CUI in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations (February 2020, updated January 2021; withdrawn by NIST May 14, 2024 and superseded by Rev 3, but still incorporated by reference in 32 CFR 170.2) NIST
- 32 CFR 170.14 (CMMC model and Level 3 requirements), 170.21 (POA&M requirements), 170.24 (CMMC scoring methodology) eCFR
- NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment Methodology, Version 1.2.1 (June 24, 2020) DoD Office of Defense Pricing and Contracting
- CMMC Assessment Guide, Level 2, Version 2.13 (September 2024) DoD CIO
- FedRAMP Marketplace, for current cloud service authorization status FedRAMP
Important notice
Purpose. This CMMC L2 identity traceability matrix is general educational reference material, written by Robert Ivey and published by GCA Technology Services ("GCA") to help organizations plan identity and access management work. It is not legal, audit, accounting or compliance advice, and it is not a substitute for advice from qualified professionals who know your environment.
No compliance determination. Whether an organization meets a requirement is decided by the applicable assessor, auditor, certifying body or regulator, applying the governing requirements to that organization's actual systems, policies and evidence. Nothing in this matrix states or implies that any organization, product, service or configuration meets or complies with any requirement, or that any assessment, audit, examination or certification will have any particular outcome.
Classifications are practice opinion. Relevance classifications, offering mappings, platform mappings and evidence examples are the author's professional judgment as of the date shown. They are not regulatory classifications and are not statements of the standard of care. Other qualified practitioners may reasonably classify requirements differently, and the right answer for a given environment depends on its facts.
Evidence examples are illustrative. Evidence listed is an example of artifacts commonly examined. It is not a complete list, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Source text controls. Requirement text and references come from the sources listed on this page. Where this matrix differs from a source, the source controls. Regulations, guidance and assessment methods change, so confirm current requirements with the issuing authority before relying on them.
Products and services. Platform names identify product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped that platform family to the requirement. It does not mean the product lacks a capability. GCA makes no representation about any third party's products, features, roadmaps or government authorization status, including FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels and similar programs. Confirm capabilities with the vendor and authorization status with the authorizing program.
GCA services. Offering descriptions identify the type of GCA service that addresses an area. The scope, deliverables, terms and outcomes of any GCA engagement are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work, and this page does not change those terms.
No relationship; no reliance. Reading or using this matrix does not create a client, advisory or other relationship with GCA or the author. To the fullest extent permitted by law, this material is provided "as is," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and GCA is not liable for any decision made or action taken in reliance on it.
No client data. This matrix contains no client data. Any example organization is fictitious.
Assessment status. GCA is not a CMMC Third-Party Assessment Organization (C3PAO) and does not perform CMMC certification assessments. Point values and POA&M rules are summarized from 32 CFR 170.21 and 170.24, and the regulation controls.
Version 1 · Prepared · Last reviewed · Reviewed every 90 days · View changelog
© 2026 Quasius Investment Corp. d/b/a GCA Technology Services. The selection, arrangement, classifications and annotations in this matrix are GCA's original work. You may use this matrix within your organization for planning and may quote short portions with attribution to GCA and a link to this page. Republishing the matrix in whole or in substantial part requires GCA's written permission. Requirement text quoted on this page comes from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2) and is reproduced with attribution. It is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright in the United States (17 U.S.C. 105). The source publication controls, and its publisher does not endorse this page.
Microsoft and Microsoft Entra are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. SailPoint, IdentityIQ and Identity Security Cloud are trademarks or product names of SailPoint Technologies, Inc. or its affiliates. Netwrix is a trademark of Netwrix Corporation. Okta is a trademark of Okta, Inc. Ping Identity is a trademark of Ping Identity Corporation. CyberArk is a trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. or its affiliates. BeyondTrust is a trademark of BeyondTrust Corporation. Delinea is a trademark of Delinea Inc. CMMC is a program of the U.S. Department of Defense. NIST is an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce and does not endorse this page. All other trademarks belong to their respective owners. These names identify products and programs only and do not imply endorsement by, sponsorship by or affiliation with any of these companies or programs, except where a GCA partnership is expressly stated elsewhere on gca.net.
Changelog
- Version 1: First publication.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is third-party CMMC Level 2 certification required as of the date of this page?
As of October 16, 2026, DoD has suspended the planned November 2026 move to Phase 2, when third-party Level 2 certification was to become a condition of award in applicable contracts. Under DFARS Class Deviation 2026-O0025, Revision 3, requiring activities may include Level 1 (Self) or Level 2 (Self) requirements, and contractors handling CUI must still implement NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 under DFARS 252.204-7012. For an existing contract that contains CMMC requirements, the deviation requires the contracting officer to remove them by modification before the next option period is exercised or through the next scheduled administrative modification. Until that modification is made, the requirements stay in the contract, so read your own contract. GCA does not give legal advice on contract terms.
Does identity and access management determine a CMMC Level 2 assessment result?
No. An assessor applies 32 CFR Part 170 and the NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 requirements to the organization's own systems and evidence. Identity work contributes to the requirements it touches, and the assessor decides sufficiency.
How many of the 110 requirements does this matrix treat as identity work?
The matrix classifies 21 requirements as primary and 33 as supporting. The other 56 are marked outside identity scope (GCA classification), and each of those rows carries a rationale. The classification is GCA practice opinion, not a regulatory category.
Does GCA perform CMMC certification assessments?
No. GCA is not a CMMC Third-Party Assessment Organization (C3PAO) and does not perform CMMC certification assessments. GCA services are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work.
Against which NIST text was the quoted material checked?
All 110 requirement texts were compared in full against NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 as of October 16, 2026, with no mismatches found. Footnote markers are omitted. The NIST publication controls, and quotation does not imply NIST endorsement.