NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, released February 26, 2024
How Identity and Access Management Supports NIST CSF 2.0
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 organizes cybersecurity outcomes into six Functions and 22 categories, with 106 active subcategories. Its Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control category, PR.AA, holds the NIST CSF 2.0 identity outcomes and is where identity and access management most directly contributes. A small number of Govern, Identify, Detect, Respond and other Protect subcategories rely on identity work as well.
This matrix lists all 106 active subcategories, quotes NIST's outcome statements, and classifies each as primary (the five PR.AA-01 to PR.AA-05 rows), supporting (19 rows) or outside identity scope (GCA classification), which covers 82 rows. The matrix table does not list NIST's informative references to SP 800-53 Rev 5.2.0 control and enhancement identifiers. To move from an outcome to the controls, use the informative references NIST publishes for each subcategory. The CSF is a voluntary framework and describes outcomes, not requirements. This page is a mapping aid prepared by GCA, a practice opinion dated October 16, 2026, not legal advice and not an attestation.
For CIOs and compliance leaders
- Five of the 106 subcategories are primary identity outcomes, all in the PR.AA category. Another 19 are supporting, and 82 are outside identity scope (GCA classification).
- Use the matrix to show a board which outcomes identity work contributes to and which outcomes other owners control, such as physical access, which facilities and physical security usually own.
- The CSF describes outcomes you can measure your own program against. It does not score an organization, and nothing on this page is a rating.
Reference material, not a compliance determination. This matrix reflects GCA's practice view as of . It does not certify, warrant or predict the outcome of any assessment, audit or examination. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 controls. Read the full notice.
The matrix
- Primary
- Supporting
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Showing 106 of 106 requirements
| Requirement | Requirement text | Function | Identity relevance (GCA classification) | GCA approach | Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities | Evidence commonly examined |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PR.AA-01 PR.AA: Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control | Identities and credentials for authorized users, services, and hardware are managed by the organization In practice: HR is the authoritative source for people, and accounts are created, matched and removed from it. Service and device credentials are inventoried and kept in a vault. |
|
Primary |
Management of identities and credentials is commonly implemented through an authoritative HR source, lifecycle workflows, account correlation, and inventories and vaulting for service and device credentials. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PR.AA-02 PR.AA: Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control | Identities are proofed and bound to credentials based on the context of interactions In practice: At onboarding, the person's identity is verified, often remotely, and strong sign-in methods such as a security key are issued only to that verified person. |
|
Primary |
Identity proofing and binding to credentials is commonly implemented in onboarding, including remote verification and issuance of strong authenticators to the verified person. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PR.AA-03 PR.AA: Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control | Users, services, and hardware are authenticated In practice: People sign in with MFA through single sign-on, and applications and devices identify themselves with workload identities or certificates instead of shared passwords. |
|
Primary |
Authentication of users, services and hardware is commonly implemented through multi-factor and phishing-resistant authentication, single sign-on, workload identities and device certificates. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PR.AA-04 PR.AA: Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control | Identity assertions are protected, conveyed, and verified In practice: Sign-in tokens between systems are digitally signed with keys that are renewed on a schedule, and the receiving application checks the signature and lifetime before it trusts them. |
|
Primary |
Protection and verification of identity assertions is commonly implemented through signed SAML and OIDC tokens, signing-key lifecycle, token lifetime limits and relying-party validation. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PR.AA-05 PR.AA: Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control | Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, and incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties In practice: Roles define what each job may do, managers confirm access in periodic reviews, conflicting duties are flagged, and elevated access is switched on only when needed. |
|
Primary |
Access permissions are commonly defined through a role model, enforced by policy, reviewed through certification campaigns, and bounded by separation-of-duties rules and just-in-time privilege. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| DE.AE-02 DE.AE: Adverse Event Analysis | Potentially adverse events are analyzed to better understand associated activities In practice: Analysts investigate flagged events. Identity detections and sign-in context, such as location and device, help them understand what an account did around the event. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationEvent analysis is usually operated by security operations. |
Analysis of adverse events commonly draws on identity risk detections and sign-in context. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| DE.AE-03 DE.AE: Adverse Event Analysis | Information is correlated from multiple sources In practice: The central log platform joins data from many tools. Identity context such as user, device and role helps analysts connect events from different sources to one person. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationCorrelation is usually operated by security operations. |
Correlation across sources commonly depends on identity context such as user, device and role in the SIEM. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| DE.CM-03 DE.CM: Continuous Monitoring | Personnel activity and technology usage are monitored to find potentially adverse events In practice: The security team watches for adverse events. Identity supplies sign-in risk alerts, sign-in analytics and logs of administrator activity as inputs to that monitoring. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationMonitoring is usually operated by security operations; identity systems supply the signals. |
Personnel activity monitoring commonly uses identity risk detections, sign-in analytics and privileged activity logs. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| DE.CM-06 DE.CM: Continuous Monitoring | External service provider activities and services are monitored to find potentially adverse events In practice: The security team monitors service providers. Identity logs show when guest, partner and delegated administrator accounts sign in and what they touch. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationProvider monitoring is usually operated by security operations. |
External service provider activity commonly appears in identity logs for guest, partner and delegated administrator accounts. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| GV.PO-01 GV.PO: Policy | Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is established based on organizational context, cybersecurity strategy, and priorities and is communicated and enforced In practice: Leadership owns the policy. An identity assessment feeds it with findings about how sign-in, access and administrator rights work today, which helps in writing the standards. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationPolicy ownership usually sits with security governance. |
Identity assessment commonly supplies policy inputs for authentication, access and privileged access standards. |
Not mapped | Evidence commonly examined
|
| GV.RR-02 GV.RR: Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities | Roles, responsibilities, and authorities related to cybersecurity risk management are established, communicated, understood, and enforced In practice: Leadership assigns cybersecurity responsibilities, and identity records them as named owners for each application and entitlement and as the approvers in the access request workflow. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationEstablishing cybersecurity roles and responsibilities is usually an executive governance task; identity records the resulting authorities. |
Authorities related to cybersecurity are commonly reflected in a role model, access request approvers and named owners for applications and entitlements. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| GV.RR-04 GV.RR: Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities | Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices In practice: HR practices such as onboarding checks, job changes and exit steps connect to identity lifecycle workflows, so an HR event triggers the matching access change. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationHuman resources practice is usually owned by HR; identity lifecycle consumes its events. |
Human resources practices that touch identity, such as onboarding checks, role changes and exit procedures, are commonly connected to lifecycle workflows. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| GV.SC-07 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | The risks posed by a supplier, their products and services, and other third parties are understood, recorded, prioritized, assessed, responded to, and monitored over the course of the relationship In practice: Each supplier account has a sponsor inside the company and an end date, and the sponsor reviews that third-party access periodically, often every quarter. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationSupplier risk assessment is usually owned by third-party risk management. |
Sponsor-owned external accounts, end dates and periodic review of third-party access commonly contribute to managing supplier and third-party risk for identity. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| GV.SC-10 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | Cybersecurity supply chain risk management plans include provisions for activities that occur after the conclusion of a partnership or service agreement In practice: When a supplier contract ends, the sponsor triggers removal of that supplier's accounts and access, and the identity process confirms they are gone. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationContract close-out is usually owned by procurement and the business owner. |
Post-agreement activities commonly include timely removal of supplier and partner identities and access when a relationship ends. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| ID.AM-01 ID.AM: Asset Management | Inventories of hardware managed by the organization are maintained In practice: The asset team keeps the hardware inventory. Identity contributes by giving each managed device its own registered identity, which links the inventory to access decisions. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationHardware inventory is usually owned by IT asset management. |
Hardware inventories commonly connect to device identity registration, which gives each managed device an identity. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| ID.AM-02 ID.AM: Asset Management | Inventories of software, services, and systems managed by the organization are maintained In practice: The inventory of applications and systems lines up with identity records, such as registered apps, single sign-on connections and service accounts, each with a named owner. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationInventory ownership usually sits with IT asset and configuration management. |
Inventories of software, services and systems commonly connect to application registrations, federation entries and service account inventories. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| ID.AM-08 ID.AM: Asset Management | Systems, hardware, software, services, and data are managed throughout their life cycles In practice: When a system or application is retired, its app registration, service accounts and workload identities are removed as well, which keeps stale access from piling up. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationLife cycle management is usually owned by system and asset owners. |
Life cycle management commonly includes decommissioning of application registrations, service accounts and workload identities. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| ID.IM-01 ID.IM: Improvement | Improvements are identified from evaluations In practice: An identity assessment or recurring control check produces a list of improvement items, such as unowned accounts or missing MFA, each assigned to a team to fix. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationImprovement programs are usually owned by security governance. |
Identity assessments and recurring control monitoring commonly produce improvement items for identity processes. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| ID.RA-07 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | Changes and exceptions are managed, assessed for risk impact, recorded, and tracked In practice: When someone needs an exception to an access rule, the request records who approved it, the reason and an end date, and the exception is revisited in the next access review. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationChange and exception management is usually a broader risk process. |
Exceptions to access policy, such as separation-of-duties exceptions, are commonly recorded with approver, justification and expiry and revisited in access review. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PR.AA-06 PR.AA: Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control | Physical access to assets is managed, monitored, and enforced commensurate with risk In practice: The facilities team runs badge systems. Where a connection exists, joiner, mover and leaver events update physical access, so a departing employee's badge is switched off with their accounts. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationPhysical access control is usually owned by facilities and physical security; identity lifecycle supplies the trigger and the review data. |
Physical access is commonly aligned with identity lifecycle by connecting badge and physical access systems to joiner, mover and leaver events. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PR.IR-01 PR.IR: Technology Infrastructure Resilience | Networks and environments are protected from unauthorized logical access and usage In practice: The network team owns network protection. Identity adds access rules that weigh who the user is, whether the device is managed and how risky the sign-in looks. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationNetwork and environment protection is usually owned by network and platform engineering. |
Protection from unauthorized logical access is commonly strengthened by identity-aware access policy that weighs user, device and risk signals. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PR.PS-04 PR.PS: Platform Security | Log records are generated and made available for continuous monitoring In practice: The security team runs continuous monitoring. Sign-in, access governance and privileged access logs are onboarded to it and kept for the retention period the organization has defined. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationLog generation and monitoring are usually owned by platform owners and security operations. |
Identity provider, governance and privileged access logs are commonly onboarded to continuous monitoring with defined retention. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PR.PS-05 PR.PS: Platform Security | Installation and execution of unauthorized software are prevented In practice: Endpoint teams control software installation. Identity helps by removing standing local administrator rights, so installing software needs an approved, time-limited elevation. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationSoftware control is usually owned by endpoint engineering. |
Prevention of unauthorized software installation is commonly supported by removing standing local administrator rights. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| RS.MI-01 RS.MI: Incident Mitigation | Incidents are contained In practice: The security team leads containment. Identity provides quick actions such as disabling an account, revoking active sessions and resetting credentials for the affected users. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationIncident containment is usually led by incident response; identity supplies the actions. |
Containment commonly includes identity actions such as disabling accounts, revoking sessions and resetting credentials. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| DE.AE-04 DE.AE: Adverse Event Analysis | The estimated impact and scope of adverse events are understood |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDetection outcome; ownership usually sits with security operations. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| DE.AE-06 DE.AE: Adverse Event Analysis | Information on adverse events is provided to authorized staff and tools |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDetection outcome; ownership usually sits with security operations. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| DE.AE-07 DE.AE: Adverse Event Analysis | Cyber threat intelligence and other contextual information are integrated into the analysis |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDetection outcome; ownership usually sits with security operations. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| DE.AE-08 DE.AE: Adverse Event Analysis | Incidents are declared when adverse events meet the defined incident criteria |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDetection outcome; ownership usually sits with security operations. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| DE.CM-01 DE.CM: Continuous Monitoring | Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDetection outcome; ownership usually sits with security operations. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| DE.CM-02 DE.CM: Continuous Monitoring | The physical environment is monitored to find potentially adverse events |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDetection outcome; ownership usually sits with security operations. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| DE.CM-09 DE.CM: Continuous Monitoring | Computing hardware and software, runtime environments, and their data are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDetection outcome; ownership usually sits with security operations. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.OC-01 GV.OC: Organizational Context | The organizational mission is understood and informs cybersecurity risk management |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.OC-02 GV.OC: Organizational Context | Internal and external stakeholders are understood, and their needs and expectations regarding cybersecurity risk management are understood and considered |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.OC-03 GV.OC: Organizational Context | Legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements regarding cybersecurity - including privacy and civil liberties obligations - are understood and managed |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.OC-04 GV.OC: Organizational Context | Critical objectives, capabilities, and services that external stakeholders depend on or expect from the organization are understood and communicated |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.OC-05 GV.OC: Organizational Context | Outcomes, capabilities, and services that the organization depends on are understood and communicated |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.OV-01 GV.OV: Oversight | Cybersecurity risk management strategy outcomes are reviewed to inform and adjust strategy and direction |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.OV-02 GV.OV: Oversight | The cybersecurity risk management strategy is reviewed and adjusted to ensure coverage of organizational requirements and risks |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.OV-03 GV.OV: Oversight | Organizational cybersecurity risk management performance is evaluated and reviewed for adjustments needed |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.PO-02 GV.PO: Policy | Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is reviewed, updated, communicated, and enforced to reflect changes in requirements, threats, technology, and organizational mission |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.RM-01 GV.RM: Risk Management Strategy | Risk management objectives are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.RM-02 GV.RM: Risk Management Strategy | Risk appetite and risk tolerance statements are established, communicated, and maintained |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.RM-03 GV.RM: Risk Management Strategy | Cybersecurity risk management activities and outcomes are included in enterprise risk management processes |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.RM-04 GV.RM: Risk Management Strategy | Strategic direction that describes appropriate risk response options is established and communicated |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.RM-05 GV.RM: Risk Management Strategy | Lines of communication across the organization are established for cybersecurity risks, including risks from suppliers and other third parties |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.RM-06 GV.RM: Risk Management Strategy | A standardized method for calculating, documenting, categorizing, and prioritizing cybersecurity risks is established and communicated |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.RM-07 GV.RM: Risk Management Strategy | Strategic opportunities (i.e., positive risks) are characterized and are included in organizational cybersecurity risk discussions |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.RR-01 GV.RR: Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities | Organizational leadership is responsible and accountable for cybersecurity risk and fosters a culture that is risk-aware, ethical, and continually improving |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.RR-03 GV.RR: Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities | Adequate resources are allocated commensurate with the cybersecurity risk strategy, roles, responsibilities, and policies |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.SC-01 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | A cybersecurity supply chain risk management program, strategy, objectives, policies, and processes are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.SC-02 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for suppliers, customers, and partners are established, communicated, and coordinated internally and externally |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.SC-03 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | Cybersecurity supply chain risk management is integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management, risk assessment, and improvement processes |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.SC-04 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | Suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.SC-05 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | Requirements to address cybersecurity risks in supply chains are established, prioritized, and integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third parties |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.SC-06 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | Planning and due diligence are performed to reduce risks before entering into formal supplier or other third-party relationships |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.SC-08 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | Relevant suppliers and other third parties are included in incident planning, response, and recovery activities |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| GV.SC-09 GV.SC: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management | Supply chain security practices are integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management programs, and their performance is monitored throughout the technology product and service life cycle |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCybersecurity governance outcome; ownership usually sits with executive leadership and security governance. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.AM-03 ID.AM: Asset Management | Representations of the organization's authorized network communication and internal and external network data flows are maintained |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.AM-04 ID.AM: Asset Management | Inventories of services provided by suppliers are maintained |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.AM-05 ID.AM: Asset Management | Assets are prioritized based on classification, criticality, resources, and impact on the mission |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.AM-07 ID.AM: Asset Management | Inventories of data and corresponding metadata for designated data types are maintained |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.IM-02 ID.IM: Improvement | Improvements are identified from security tests and exercises, including those done in coordination with suppliers and relevant third parties |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.IM-03 ID.IM: Improvement | Improvements are identified from execution of operational processes, procedures, and activities |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.IM-04 ID.IM: Improvement | Incident response plans and other cybersecurity plans that affect operations are established, communicated, maintained, and improved |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.RA-01 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | Vulnerabilities in assets are identified, validated, and recorded |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.RA-02 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.RA-03 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | Internal and external threats to the organization are identified and recorded |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.RA-04 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | Potential impacts and likelihoods of threats exploiting vulnerabilities are identified and recorded |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.RA-05 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to understand inherent risk and inform risk response prioritization |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.RA-06 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | Risk responses are chosen, prioritized, planned, tracked, and communicated |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.RA-08 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | Processes for receiving, analyzing, and responding to vulnerability disclosures are established |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.RA-09 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | The authenticity and integrity of hardware and software are assessed prior to acquisition and use |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ID.RA-10 ID.RA: Risk Assessment | Critical suppliers are assessed prior to acquisition |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRisk identification outcome; ownership usually sits with risk, asset and vulnerability management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.AT-01 PR.AT: Awareness and Training | Personnel are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform general tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAwareness and training outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with the security awareness and training program. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.AT-02 PR.AT: Awareness and Training | Individuals in specialized roles are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAwareness and training outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with the security awareness and training program. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.DS-01 PR.DS: Data Security | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest are protected |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.DS-02 PR.DS: Data Security | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.DS-10 PR.DS: Data Security | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use are protected |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.DS-11 PR.DS: Data Security | Backups of data are created, protected, maintained, and tested |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.IR-02 PR.IR: Technology Infrastructure Resilience | The organization's technology assets are protected from environmental threats |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.IR-03 PR.IR: Technology Infrastructure Resilience | Mechanisms are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.IR-04 PR.IR: Technology Infrastructure Resilience | Adequate resource capacity to ensure availability is maintained |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.PS-01 PR.PS: Platform Security | Configuration management practices are established and applied |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.PS-02 PR.PS: Platform Security | Software is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.PS-03 PR.PS: Platform Security | Hardware is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PR.PS-06 PR.PS: Platform Security | Secure software development practices are integrated, and their performance is monitored throughout the software development life cycle |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtective outcome that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with data, platform or resilience engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RC.CO-03 RC.CO: Incident Recovery Communication | Recovery activities and progress in restoring operational capabilities are communicated to designated internal and external stakeholders |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRecovery outcome; ownership usually sits with recovery and business continuity teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RC.CO-04 RC.CO: Incident Recovery Communication | Public updates on incident recovery are shared using approved methods and messaging |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRecovery outcome; ownership usually sits with recovery and business continuity teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RC.RP-01 RC.RP: Incident Recovery Plan Execution | The recovery portion of the incident response plan is executed once initiated from the incident response process |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRecovery outcome; ownership usually sits with recovery and business continuity teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RC.RP-02 RC.RP: Incident Recovery Plan Execution | Recovery actions are selected, scoped, prioritized, and performed |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRecovery outcome; ownership usually sits with recovery and business continuity teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RC.RP-03 RC.RP: Incident Recovery Plan Execution | The integrity of backups and other restoration assets is verified before using them for restoration |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRecovery outcome; ownership usually sits with recovery and business continuity teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RC.RP-04 RC.RP: Incident Recovery Plan Execution | Critical mission functions and cybersecurity risk management are considered to establish post-incident operational norms |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRecovery outcome; ownership usually sits with recovery and business continuity teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RC.RP-05 RC.RP: Incident Recovery Plan Execution | The integrity of restored assets is verified, systems and services are restored, and normal operating status is confirmed |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRecovery outcome; ownership usually sits with recovery and business continuity teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RC.RP-06 RC.RP: Incident Recovery Plan Execution | The end of incident recovery is declared based on criteria, and incident-related documentation is completed |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRecovery outcome; ownership usually sits with recovery and business continuity teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.AN-03 RS.AN: Incident Analysis | Analysis is performed to establish what has taken place during an incident and the root cause of the incident |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.AN-06 RS.AN: Incident Analysis | Actions performed during an investigation are recorded, and the records' integrity and provenance are preserved |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.AN-07 RS.AN: Incident Analysis | Incident data and metadata are collected, and their integrity and provenance are preserved |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.AN-08 RS.AN: Incident Analysis | An incident's magnitude is estimated and validated |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.CO-02 RS.CO: Incident Response Reporting and Communication | Internal and external stakeholders are notified of incidents |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.CO-03 RS.CO: Incident Response Reporting and Communication | Information is shared with designated internal and external stakeholders |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.MA-01 RS.MA: Incident Management | The incident response plan is executed in coordination with relevant third parties once an incident is declared |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.MA-02 RS.MA: Incident Management | Incident reports are triaged and validated |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.MA-03 RS.MA: Incident Management | Incidents are categorized and prioritized |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.MA-04 RS.MA: Incident Management | Incidents are escalated or elevated as needed |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.MA-05 RS.MA: Incident Management | The criteria for initiating incident recovery are applied |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| RS.MI-02 RS.MI: Incident Mitigation | Incidents are eradicated |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIncident response outcome; ownership usually sits with incident response. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
No requirements match the current filters.
Summary
- Primary
- 5
- Identity platforms or processes are typically the principal means of implementing the requirement.
- Supporting
- 19
- Another discipline owns the requirement. Identity configuration or evidence contributes.
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
- 82
- Listed for completeness, with a one-line note on what the requirement is.
How to read the matrix
- Function
- The CSF 2.0 Function the subcategory belongs to: Govern (GV), Identify (ID), Protect (PR), Detect (DE), Respond (RS) or Recover (RC).
- Identity relevance
Identity relevance is a GCA classification of whether identity capabilities are typically the principal means of implementing a requirement (Primary), contribute to a requirement owned by another discipline (Supporting), or usually sit outside identity work (Outside identity scope (GCA classification)).
It describes where primary implementation ownership usually sits. It is not a statement about whether identity configuration could be relevant to a particular incident, finding or environment. Every "Outside identity scope (GCA classification)" classification carries a rationale, and other classifications show one where GCA has recorded it, under "Why this classification" beside the label.
- Platform families
- Product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped a platform family to the requirement. It does not mean a product lacks a capability.
- Evidence
- Examples of artifacts commonly examined. The list is not complete, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Sources
Important notice
Purpose. This NIST CSF 2.0 identity traceability matrix is general educational reference material, written by Robert Ivey and published by GCA Technology Services ("GCA") to help organizations plan identity and access management work. It is not legal, audit, accounting or compliance advice, and it is not a substitute for advice from qualified professionals who know your environment.
No compliance determination. Whether an organization meets a requirement is decided by the applicable assessor, auditor, certifying body or regulator, applying the governing requirements to that organization's actual systems, policies and evidence. Nothing in this matrix states or implies that any organization, product, service or configuration meets or complies with any requirement, or that any assessment, audit, examination or certification will have any particular outcome.
Classifications are practice opinion. Relevance classifications, offering mappings, platform mappings and evidence examples are the author's professional judgment as of the date shown. They are not regulatory classifications and are not statements of the standard of care. Other qualified practitioners may reasonably classify requirements differently, and the right answer for a given environment depends on its facts.
Evidence examples are illustrative. Evidence listed is an example of artifacts commonly examined. It is not a complete list, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Source text controls. Requirement text and references come from the sources listed on this page. Where this matrix differs from a source, the source controls. Regulations, guidance and assessment methods change, so confirm current requirements with the issuing authority before relying on them.
Products and services. Platform names identify product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped that platform family to the requirement. It does not mean the product lacks a capability. GCA makes no representation about any third party's products, features, roadmaps or government authorization status, including FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels and similar programs. Confirm capabilities with the vendor and authorization status with the authorizing program.
GCA services. Offering descriptions identify the type of GCA service that addresses an area. The scope, deliverables, terms and outcomes of any GCA engagement are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work, and this page does not change those terms.
No relationship; no reliance. Reading or using this matrix does not create a client, advisory or other relationship with GCA or the author. To the fullest extent permitted by law, this material is provided "as is," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and GCA is not liable for any decision made or action taken in reliance on it.
No client data. This matrix contains no client data. Any example organization is fictitious.
Voluntary framework. The Cybersecurity Framework is voluntary. This page does not describe any organization, product or GCA engagement as meeting it.
Version 1 · Prepared · Last reviewed · Reviewed every 90 days · View changelog
© 2026 Quasius Investment Corp. d/b/a GCA Technology Services. The selection, arrangement, classifications and annotations in this matrix are GCA's original work. You may use this matrix within your organization for planning and may quote short portions with attribution to GCA and a link to this page. Republishing the matrix in whole or in substantial part requires GCA's written permission. Subcategory outcome statements quoted on this page come from the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29), as published in the NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool, and are reproduced with attribution. They are a work of the U.S. Government and are not subject to copyright in the United States (17 U.S.C. 105). The source publication controls, and its publisher does not endorse this page.
Microsoft and Microsoft Entra are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. SailPoint, IdentityIQ and Identity Security Cloud are trademarks or product names of SailPoint Technologies, Inc. or its affiliates. Netwrix is a trademark of Netwrix Corporation. Okta is a trademark of Okta, Inc. Ping Identity is a trademark of Ping Identity Corporation. CyberArk is a trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. or its affiliates. BeyondTrust is a trademark of BeyondTrust Corporation. Delinea is a trademark of Delinea Inc. NIST is an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce and does not endorse this page. All other trademarks belong to their respective owners. These names identify products and programs only and do not imply endorsement by, sponsorship by or affiliation with any of these companies or programs, except where a GCA partnership is expressly stated elsewhere on gca.net.
Changelog
- Version 1: First publication.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is the CSF a regulation?
No. The CSF is a voluntary framework. It describes cybersecurity outcomes and does not set requirements for any organization on its own. Other instruments can direct its use; for example, Executive Order 13800 directs federal agency heads to use it.
What are NIST's informative references?
They are NIST's published links from each subcategory to SP 800-53 Rev 5.2.0 controls. This page does not display them. NIST lists them as informative references and does not state that a control is equivalent to an outcome, so read them as pointers to review, not as proof that a control covers an outcome.
Does this matrix show that an organization meets the framework?
No. The CSF has no pass or fail result. Whether an organization achieves an outcome depends on its own systems, policies and evidence, and on how its assessor reads them.
Why is PR.AA-06 classed as supporting rather than primary?
In GCA's practice experience, physical access control is usually owned by facilities and physical security. Identity lifecycle supplies the trigger for access changes and the review data, which is why the row is marked supporting.