FFIEC Authentication and Access | Guidance issued August 11, 2021
How Identity and Access Management Supports FFIEC Authentication and Access Guidance
The FFIEC authentication guidance, titled Authentication and Access to Financial Institution Services and Systems, was issued August 11, 2021, and replaced the 2005 and 2011 internet banking authentication guidance. Its audience extends beyond customers to users of financial institution information systems, including employees, board members, third parties, service accounts, applications and devices. The guidance states that it does not impose any new regulatory requirements on financial institutions, and it presents examples of effective risk management principles and practices. This page reads it as a set of practices and shows where identity and access management commonly contributes.
The matrix has 40 rows. Of those, 21 are primary identity work, 15 are supporting, and 4 are outside identity scope (GCA classification). Rows are a GCA selection from the guidance sections and from its appendix, which the FFIEC itself describes as examples and not an all-inclusive list. Some identity-relevant appendix practices, such as unique passwords, password storage, device credentials and password reset training for call center staff, are not shown as separate rows. The FFIEC sunset its Cybersecurity Assessment Tool on August 31, 2025, as announced in its August 2024 sunset statement (OCC Bulletin 2024-25), and this page does not rely on it.
For CIOs and compliance leaders
- Twenty-one of 40 rows are primary identity work, including privileged user controls in APP-P02, APP-P05 and APP-P06, and password, account maintenance and reset controls in APP-A01, APP-A04, APP-A14 and APP-A15.
- Service accounts are covered directly. APP-U04 is a primary row, and the inventory and ownership of service accounts is identity governance work.
- The guidance describes practices. It does not impose new regulatory requirements, and it is not intended to serve as a comprehensive framework for identity and access management programs.
Reference material, not a compliance determination. This matrix reflects GCA's practice view as of . It does not certify, warrant or predict the outcome of any assessment, audit or examination. The FFIEC guidance text controls. Read the full notice.
The matrix
- Primary
- Supporting
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Showing 40 of 40 requirements
| Requirement | Requirement text | Audience addressed | Identity relevance (GCA classification) | GCA approach | Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities | Evidence commonly examined |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| APP-A01 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Password controls: prohibited password lists Customers’ or users’ password choices are checked against databases of prohibited or weak passwords, including dictionary words, common passwords, and passwords associated with prior account or data breaches. In practice: When someone picks a new password, the system rejects common and easily guessed passwords using a banned list the organization can extend, and checks against known breached passwords where that capability is in place. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationBanned password protection is directory and identity provider configuration. |
Banned password protection with a custom list, plus a breached-password check where the platform or an add-on provides one, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A03 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Incorrect log-in attempts Customers and users are locked out of accounts after a certain number of incorrect log-in attempts. Passwords are reset only after requiring strong authentication of the customer or user. In practice: After several wrong passwords the account locks, and a password reset, whether self-service or through the help desk, requires a strong verification step first. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationLockout and reset policy are identity platform configuration. |
Lockout thresholds, and reset flows that require strong authentication, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A04 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Enhanced authentication for credential reset Enhanced authentication controls are applied to customer and user credential resets, such as sending an OTP to a pre-established communication device; using an authenticator application to provide an OTP; biometric voice recognition; enabling secure video chat features to confirm identity; and call-backs to a pre-established phone number. In practice: A user resets a password through self-service with a second check, and the help desk uses a verification step before doing the same by phone. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationCredential reset verification is identity platform and service desk process work. |
Self-service password reset with strong verification, and help desk reset procedures that require verification, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A14 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Password controls: password strength Policies and standards address password strength, such as password length, defined character combinations, and the use of passphrases. A passphrase is a series of words or other text that is generally longer than a traditional password. In practice: The password standard sets a minimum length and allows long passphrases, and the directory and identity provider enforce the same settings wherever a password is created or changed. |
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Primary
Why this classificationPassword length and passphrase settings are directory and identity provider configuration; the written password standard is usually owned by security leadership. |
Password length and passphrase settings enforced in the directory and identity provider, aligned with the written password standard, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A15 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Account maintenance controls Enhanced authentication controls are applied for account maintenance activities (e.g., changes to physical or email address, password, contact information, or enrolled devices) performed or requested by customers or users. In practice: When someone adds a new phone as a sign-in method or changes a recovery email address, the system asks for a second verification step first, and the change is logged. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationStep-up authentication for changes to credentials, contact details and enrolled devices is identity platform work; profile changes inside banking applications are owned by the application. |
Step-up authentication for changes to credentials, recovery contact details and enrolled devices, with a log of each change, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A16 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Rate limit on log-in attempts Rate limits, which represent the number of log-in submissions over a set timeframe, are applied for correct and incorrect log-in attempts from the same user or from different users from the same IP address. These controls limit the overall volume of authentication requests and can slow potential attacks. In practice: The sign-in service slows or blocks repeated attempts against one account or from one network address, which slows automated guessing, and throttling events are logged. |
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Primary
Why this classificationThrottling of sign-in attempts is identity provider configuration; network and application edge rate limits are usually owned by network and application teams. |
Sign-in throttling and lockout settings at the identity provider, where supported, with throttling events logged, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-P02 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Privileged users: dedicated devices or accounts Privileged users have dedicated devices or accounts for all privileged or administrative activities. The dedicated devices cannot access the Internet. In practice: An administrator has one everyday account for email and a separate administrative account used only for privileged work, and membership is reviewed. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationSeparate administrative accounts are identity governance work. |
Separate administrative identities and tiering, with review of administrative account membership, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-P05 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Privileged users: dual controls More than one privileged user at the financial institution must approve access to certain critical systems or certain requests for administrative changes. In practice: A request for access to a critical system needs approval from at least two privileged users, set up as a multi-stage or multi-confirmer approval, before the elevation is granted. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationMulti-party approval for privileged access is a privileged access workflow. |
A multi-approver or multi-stage approval workflow for elevation to critical systems commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-P06 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Privileged users: enhanced authentication for system and software updates Privileged users are re-authenticated with MFA prior to making system configuration changes, uploading or updating software or firmware, or executing significant system processes. In practice: Before making a configuration change or installing a software update, the administrator is asked for MFA again at the admin portal. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationStep-up authentication for administrative actions is identity platform work. |
Step-up multi-factor authentication on privileged elevation and administrative portals commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-U01 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Access approval policies Policies establish approval and documentation standards for defining users’ authority to access financial institution information systems. In practice: A user requests access in a workflow, the manager and application owner sign off, and the decision record is kept with the request. |
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Primary
Why this classificationAccess approval and documentation are identity governance workflow. |
A request, approval and fulfillment workflow with retained approver records commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-U02 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Least privilege access provisioning User access is limited to those information systems and resources related to the user’s job function or role. In practice: A new employee receives the standard access for their role, and any extra access is an exception that gets reviewed. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationRole-based least privilege is identity governance work. |
A role model and birthright access aligned to job function, with exceptions reviewed, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-U03 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Single sign-on capability Single sign-on capability is established for users to allow access to multiple internal information systems with a single authentication solution. In practice: Staff sign in once with single sign-on to reach internal applications, so strong authentication and monitoring happen at one point. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationSingle sign-on is identity platform work. |
Federated single sign-on for internal applications commonly lets strong authentication and monitoring apply at one point. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-U04 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Service accounts Service accounts are inventoried, and employees or departments are assigned responsibility for managing service accounts according to the financial institution’s password management and other security policies. In practice: Service accounts are discovered and listed, each has a named owner, and the owner is responsible for managing its credentials under policy. |
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Primary
Why this classificationService account inventory and ownership are identity governance work. |
Discovery, owner assignment and credential management for service accounts commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-U05 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Automatic suspension or de-provisioning of user credentials Policies and system controls are in place to de-provision or suspend access credentials after a certain period of account inactivity. In practice: Accounts that sit unused for a set number of days are suspended automatically, and bringing one back follows a recorded re-enable process. |
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Primary
Why this classificationDormancy-based suspension is identity lifecycle work. |
Inactivity thresholds with automated suspension and a recorded re-enable process commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-U06 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Notification to security administrators of change in user status System administrators are informed in a timely manner of changes (e.g., alteration, removal, or suspension) to user status. In practice: When HR records a transfer or termination, that change flows to connected systems and the affected system administrators are notified. |
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Primary
Why this classificationJoiner, mover and leaver events are identity lifecycle work. |
Lifecycle events from the HR source, propagated to connected systems and to system administrators, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S3-02 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5) | Risk assessment: identify users Identify all users, including employees, service accounts, and users at third parties, that access financial institution information systems and data. In practice: A single list shows every employee, service account and third-party user, each with an owner and a status such as active or terminated. |
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Primary
Why this classificationIdentifying every user population, including service accounts and third parties, is identity governance work. |
Authoritative identity records for workforce, third-party and service identities, with owner and status attributes, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S3-03 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5) | Risk assessment: high-risk user identification Identify users who represent a high risk and for which enhanced authentication controls are warranted to protect information systems. In practice: Administrators, remote users and people in sensitive roles are flagged from entitlement data so they receive stronger sign-in checks and more frequent review. |
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Primary
Why this classificationHigh-risk user populations such as privileged and remote users are identified from identity and entitlement data. |
Classification of privileged, remote and key-position users from entitlement data commonly drives stronger authentication and review. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S4-01 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5) | Layered security: least privilege provisioning Layered security controls also can include assigning users’ access rights to information systems based on the principle of least privilege provisioning. In practice: Roles are defined by job function, access is granted from the role, and managers review whether anyone holds more than the job needs. |
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Primary
Why this classificationLeast privilege provisioning is identity governance work. |
Role-based provisioning and review commonly limit user access rights to job need. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S5-01 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5) | Multi-factor authentication as part of layered security When a financial institution management’s risk assessment indicates that single-factor authentication with layered security is inadequate, MFA or controls of equivalent strength as part of layered security can more effectively mitigate risks. In practice: Where the risk assessment says a password alone is not enough, MFA is required for high-risk users and activities, and any accepted exception is documented. |
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Primary
Why this classificationMulti-factor authentication is identity platform work. The guidance ties its use to the institution risk assessment. |
Risk-based multi-factor policy for high-risk users and high-risk activity, with documented residual risk acceptance, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S5-02 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5) | Strong authentication for high-risk users For high-risk users, strong authentication, such as MFA solutions using hardware and cryptographic factors, can mitigate risks associated with unauthorized access to information systems. In practice: Administrators and other high-risk users sign in with hardware security keys or certificates instead of a text message code. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationPhishing-resistant and hardware-backed authentication for privileged users is identity platform work. |
Hardware-key or certificate-based authentication for administrators and other high-risk users commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S8-01 MO: Monitoring, help desk and third-party access (Sections 6, 8, 9, 11) | Call center and IT help desk authentication Threat actors frequently have used social engineering and other techniques to deceive customer call center and IT help desk representatives into resetting passwords and other credentials, thereby granting threat actors access to information systems, user and customer accounts, or confidential information. A comprehensive risk assessment supports mitigation of this risk by identifying emerging threats, setting secure processes, employee training, and establishing effective controls for the customer call center and IT help desk operations. In practice: Before the help desk resets a password, the caller completes a verification step, and the agent's check is recorded in the ticket. |
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Primary
Why this classificationCredential reset and identity proofing at the help desk are identity and access management processes, implemented jointly with the service desk. |
Verified self-service reset, strong authentication for help desk resets and recorded identity verification steps commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A02 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Application timeouts Customers and users are re-authenticated after a period of inactivity within a service or a system. In practice: The application owner sets how long an idle session stays open, and identity policy sets how often users must sign in again, tuned to risk. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationApplication owners usually set and enforce inactivity timeouts. The identity provider contributes session lifetime and reauthentication interval policy that bounds how long a session lasts. |
Identity provider session lifetime and re-sign-in settings, tuned by risk, commonly bound how long a session lasts; idle logout itself is usually enforced by the application or the endpoint. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A05 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Endpoint and device authentication Controls are in place to ensure only authorized devices can connect to the financial institution’s information systems, networks, or services. In practice: The endpoint team manages the devices; identity policy checks that a laptop is registered and healthy, or holds a device certificate, before access. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationDevice authentication is usually shared with network and endpoint teams. Identity contributes device registration and device-state gating. |
Device registration, device compliance gating in access policy and certificate-based device authentication commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A06 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Remote access software controls Remote access software, which allows remote access to a user’s computer or enterprise network or system, is disabled if it is not being used. If remote access software is used, controls to mitigate threats can include placing a firewall in front of systems that use remote access software, having remote users connect with a virtual private network (VPN) or other secure channel, and implementing strong passwords with MFA. Software is updated periodically. In practice: The network team runs the VPN or remote tool; identity makes it require MFA through the central identity provider for every remote session. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationRemote access software configuration is usually owned by network and endpoint teams. Identity supplies multi-factor authentication for remote users. |
Multi-factor authentication on remote access paths, using the central identity provider, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A07 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Transaction and audit logs Transaction and audit logs monitor and record system and account activity to identify unauthorized activities, detect intrusions, reconstruct events, and promote customer and user accountability. In practice: The logging team owns log retention; identity audit logs are kept and forwarded with consistent user identifiers so events can be traced. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationLog architecture and retention are usually owned by security operations. Identity platforms produce authentication and administration records. |
Identity audit logs that are retained and forwarded with consistent identifiers commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A08 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Suspicious behavior monitoring Processes monitor and report customer and user access, especially privileged and remote access users, for suspicious behavior. In practice: Security operations watches for suspicious behavior, and identity risk detections for privileged and remote users are sent to that team. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationMonitoring is usually owned by security operations. Identity threat detection contributes risk signals. |
Identity risk detections for privileged and remote users, routed to security operations, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A10 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Digital certificates An inventory of machines that utilize digital certificates is maintained, and digital certificates and the underlying protocols are continually updated to address emerging threats. In practice: The infrastructure team renews certificates; identity helps keep an inventory of machine and workload identities with owners and expiry dates. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationCertificate inventory is usually owned by infrastructure and PKI teams. Machine and workload identity governance can supply the identity view. |
Machine and workload identity inventory with owner and certificate lifecycle tracking, where supported, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-P01 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Privileged users: change defaults Default passwords and other credentials for privileged users or system, service, or administrative accounts are changed or disabled. In practice: System owners run the platforms; identity places privileged and service accounts in a vault and rotates the default passwords that came with them. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationChanging defaults is usually owned by system administrators. Privileged credential vaulting can enforce and record the change. |
Vault onboarding of privileged and service accounts, with default credentials rotated, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-P03 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Privileged users: log and alert Systems are configured to log and alert when a privileged user account is added or removed and when unsuccessful logins or other anomalous behavior occurs. In practice: The monitoring team receives alerts when someone is added to a privileged group or when privileged sign-ins fail or look unusual. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationAlerting is usually owned by security operations. Identity platforms generate the privileged account change events. |
Alerts on privileged group changes and anomalous privileged sign-in events commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-P04 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Privileged users: periodic review of activity Staff independent of the privileged user’s organization or business unit is alerted of, and periodically reviews, privileged user activity for anomalous behavior. In practice: Staff outside the administrator's own team review privileged session recordings from a queue; identity supplies the sessions and assigns the reviewers. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationIndependent review is usually a security operations or internal audit process. Privileged session records come from privileged access tooling. |
Privileged session recording and review queues assigned to independent reviewers commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-P07 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls | Privileged users: log access Privileged user access is limited and defined between log-related privileges and other privileges. The logs of privileged user activity cannot be modified or deleted by the privileged user. In practice: Administrators do not hold the rights to change or delete the logs of their own activity; log privileges sit in a separate role, and identity reviews who belongs to it. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationLog protection and retention are usually owned by security operations and platform teams. Identity contributes the separation of log-related privileges from other privileges. |
Separate log-related roles and review of their membership commonly contribute here, while protection of the logs themselves is usually delivered by the logging platform. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S3-01 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5) | Risk assessment: inventory of information systems Inventory all information systems and their components, such as the hardware, operating systems, applications, infrastructure devices, APIs, data, and other assets, that require authentication and access controls. This inventory includes information systems provided by the financial institution’s third parties, such as cloud service providers. In practice: The security team keeps the inventory of systems; identity adds the list of onboarded applications and which accounts connect to each one. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationSystem inventory is usually owned by IT asset management. Identity contributes the application and account inventory that needs authentication and access controls. |
Application onboarding inventory and account-to-system mapping commonly show where authentication and access controls apply. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S3-04 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5) | Risk assessment: controls assessment Initially and periodically assess the design and effectiveness of access and authentication controls employed, including the availability of more advanced security options and configuration settings. In practice: Management reviews how well sign-in and access controls are working, and identity reports where settings have drifted, against the institution's risk appetite. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationThe assessment is usually owned by risk and security. Identity configuration and review results are the evidence base. |
Periodic assessment of identity control design and drift, reported against the institution's risk appetite, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S6-01 MO: Monitoring, help desk and third-party access (Sections 6, 8, 9, 11) | Monitoring, logging and reporting Monitoring, activity logging, and reporting processes and controls assist financial institution management in determining if attempted or realized unauthorized access to information systems and accounts has occurred. In practice: Another team watches for unauthorized access; identity audit and detection events are kept and forwarded to that team's monitoring tools. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationMonitoring is usually owned by security operations. Identity platforms supply authentication and privilege events. |
Identity audit and detection events that are retained and forwarded for monitoring commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S9-01 MO: Monitoring, help desk and third-party access (Sections 6, 8, 9, 11) | Customer-permissioned entities: credential and API-based authentication A comprehensive risk management program includes an assessment of risks and effective mitigating controls for credential and API-based authentication when CPEs access a financial institution’s information systems and customer information. In practice: The risk team assesses outside parties; identity keeps a list of the API clients and credentials those parties use and who is responsible for each. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationThird-party aggregator access is usually governed by digital banking and API platform owners. Identity contributes token, credential and service identity governance. |
Inventory and governance of API clients and credentials used by external parties commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| S11-01 MO: Monitoring, help desk and third-party access (Sections 6, 8, 9, 11) | Customer and user identity verification Reliable identity verification methods can help reduce risk when establishing new customer accounts and when access is first requested for new users of information systems. In practice: HR or the onboarding team verifies new users; identity records that proofing step in the lifecycle workflow, and the workflow asks for it again when someone seeks higher access. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationIdentity proofing of new workforce and customer identities is usually shared between HR, onboarding and the identity platform. |
Identity proofing steps at onboarding and at elevation of access, recorded in the lifecycle workflow, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| APP-A09 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Monitoring and reporting of unauthorized access by third parties Processes are in place for third-party service providers to report, and the financial institution to log and monitor, unauthorized access to critical outsourced systems. |
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Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationThird-party reporting and monitoring processes are usually owned by vendor risk and security operations. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| APP-A11 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Network segmentation Networks, systems, services, and data are physically and logically segmented based on the financial institution’s asset classification and risk assessment. |
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Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationNetwork segmentation is usually owned by network architecture. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| APP-A12 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Transaction value, frequency and timing controls Transaction controls, such as transaction value limits, restrictions on devices for adding payment recipients, limits on the number of transactions allowed per day, and allowable payment windows (i.e., permissible days and times during which transactions can be initiated) are applied for certain account and digital banking activities. |
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Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationTransaction limits are usually owned by digital banking and payments teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| APP-A13 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls | Email systems: patch management Email systems are updated and patched periodically, and the email system vendor is monitored for email system end-of-life. |
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Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationPatching is usually owned by infrastructure and messaging teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
No requirements match the current filters.
Summary
- Primary
- 21
- Identity platforms or processes are typically the principal means of implementing the requirement.
- Supporting
- 15
- Another discipline owns the requirement. Identity configuration or evidence contributes.
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
- 4
- Listed for completeness, with a one-line note on what the requirement is.
How to read the matrix
- Audience addressed
- Whether the quoted practice addresses users of financial institution information systems (employees, board members, third parties, service accounts, applications and devices), customers of digital banking services, or both. The guidance defines users and customers in its Section 1. This column is GCA classification.
- Identity relevance
Identity relevance is a GCA classification of whether identity capabilities are typically the principal means of implementing a requirement (Primary), contribute to a requirement owned by another discipline (Supporting), or usually sit outside identity work (Outside identity scope (GCA classification)).
It describes where primary implementation ownership usually sits. It is not a statement about whether identity configuration could be relevant to a particular incident, finding or environment. Every "Outside identity scope (GCA classification)" classification carries a rationale, and other classifications show one where GCA has recorded it, under "Why this classification" beside the label.
- Platform families
- Product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped a platform family to the requirement. It does not mean a product lacks a capability.
- Evidence
- Examples of artifacts commonly examined. The list is not complete, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Sources
- Authentication and Access to Financial Institution Services and Systems (FFIEC, August 11, 2021), as attached to OCC Bulletin 2021-36 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
- OCC Bulletin 2021-36, Information Security: FFIEC Statement on Authentication and Access to Financial Institution Services and Systems Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
- OCC Bulletin 2024-25, Cybersecurity: FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool Sunset Statement Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
- FFIEC IT Examination Handbook InfoBase (Information Security and Architecture, Infrastructure, and Operations booklets) Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
Important notice
Purpose. This FFIEC Authentication and Access identity traceability matrix is general educational reference material, written by Robert Ivey and published by GCA Technology Services ("GCA") to help organizations plan identity and access management work. It is not legal, audit, accounting or compliance advice, and it is not a substitute for advice from qualified professionals who know your environment.
No compliance determination. Whether an organization meets a requirement is decided by the applicable assessor, auditor, certifying body or regulator, applying the governing requirements to that organization's actual systems, policies and evidence. Nothing in this matrix states or implies that any organization, product, service or configuration meets or complies with any requirement, or that any assessment, audit, examination or certification will have any particular outcome.
Classifications are practice opinion. Relevance classifications, offering mappings, platform mappings and evidence examples are the author's professional judgment as of the date shown. They are not regulatory classifications and are not statements of the standard of care. Other qualified practitioners may reasonably classify requirements differently, and the right answer for a given environment depends on its facts.
Evidence examples are illustrative. Evidence listed is an example of artifacts commonly examined. It is not a complete list, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Source text controls. Requirement text and references come from the sources listed on this page. Where this matrix differs from a source, the source controls. Regulations, guidance and assessment methods change, so confirm current requirements with the issuing authority before relying on them.
Products and services. Platform names identify product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped that platform family to the requirement. It does not mean the product lacks a capability. GCA makes no representation about any third party's products, features, roadmaps or government authorization status, including FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels and similar programs. Confirm capabilities with the vendor and authorization status with the authorizing program.
GCA services. Offering descriptions identify the type of GCA service that addresses an area. The scope, deliverables, terms and outcomes of any GCA engagement are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work, and this page does not change those terms.
No relationship; no reliance. Reading or using this matrix does not create a client, advisory or other relationship with GCA or the author. To the fullest extent permitted by law, this material is provided "as is," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and GCA is not liable for any decision made or action taken in reliance on it.
No client data. This matrix contains no client data. Any example organization is fictitious.
Version 1 · Prepared · Last reviewed · Reviewed every 90 days · View changelog
© 2026 Quasius Investment Corp. d/b/a GCA Technology Services. The selection, arrangement, classifications and annotations in this matrix are GCA's original work. You may use this matrix within your organization for planning and may quote short portions with attribution to GCA and a link to this page. Republishing the matrix in whole or in substantial part requires GCA's written permission. Requirement text quoted on this page comes from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) and is reproduced with attribution. It is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright in the United States (17 U.S.C. 105). The source publication controls, and its publisher does not endorse this page.
Microsoft and Microsoft Entra are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. SailPoint, IdentityIQ and Identity Security Cloud are trademarks or product names of SailPoint Technologies, Inc. or its affiliates. Netwrix is a trademark of Netwrix Corporation. Okta is a trademark of Okta, Inc. Ping Identity is a trademark of Ping Identity Corporation. CyberArk is a trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. or its affiliates. BeyondTrust is a trademark of BeyondTrust Corporation. Delinea is a trademark of Delinea Inc. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council does not endorse this page. All other trademarks belong to their respective owners. These names identify products and programs only and do not imply endorsement by, sponsorship by or affiliation with any of these companies or programs, except where a GCA partnership is expressly stated elsewhere on gca.net.
Changelog
- Version 1: First publication.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is the FFIEC guidance binding?
The guidance says it does not impose any new regulatory requirements on financial institutions. It sets out examples of effective practices that, applied as appropriate to an institution's risk profile, can support alignment with safety and soundness standards and the Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards. Read it as a set of practices, not a list of mandatory controls.
Does this page rely on the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool?
No. The FFIEC sunset its Cybersecurity Assessment Tool on August 31, 2025, as announced in its August 2024 sunset statement (OCC Bulletin 2024-25). This page does not rely on it, and the mapping is built on the 2021 guidance text.
Who is in scope beyond customers?
The audience column marks 23 rows for users of financial institution information systems, 15 rows for both users and customers, and 2 rows for customers of digital banking services.