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FFIEC Authentication and Access | Guidance issued August 11, 2021

How Identity and Access Management Supports FFIEC Authentication and Access Guidance

The FFIEC authentication guidance, titled Authentication and Access to Financial Institution Services and Systems, was issued August 11, 2021, and replaced the 2005 and 2011 internet banking authentication guidance. Its audience extends beyond customers to users of financial institution information systems, including employees, board members, third parties, service accounts, applications and devices. The guidance states that it does not impose any new regulatory requirements on financial institutions, and it presents examples of effective risk management principles and practices. This page reads it as a set of practices and shows where identity and access management commonly contributes.

The matrix has 40 rows. Of those, 21 are primary identity work, 15 are supporting, and 4 are outside identity scope (GCA classification). Rows are a GCA selection from the guidance sections and from its appendix, which the FFIEC itself describes as examples and not an all-inclusive list. Some identity-relevant appendix practices, such as unique passwords, password storage, device credentials and password reset training for call center staff, are not shown as separate rows. The FFIEC sunset its Cybersecurity Assessment Tool on August 31, 2025, as announced in its August 2024 sunset statement (OCC Bulletin 2024-25), and this page does not rely on it.

For CIOs and compliance leaders

Information as of Last verified FFIEC guidance issued August 11, 2021, replacing the 2005 and 2011 internet banking authentication guidance Version 1

Reference material, not a compliance determination. This matrix reflects GCA's practice view as of . It does not certify, warrant or predict the outcome of any assessment, audit or examination. The FFIEC guidance text controls. Read the full notice.

The matrix

  • Primary
  • Supporting
  • Outside identity scope (GCA classification)

FFIEC Authentication and Access to Financial Institution Services and Systems identity traceability matrix. FFIEC guidance issued August 11, 2021, replacing the 2005 and 2011 internet banking authentication guidance. Information as of October 16, 2026.
Requirement Requirement text Audience addressed Identity relevance (GCA classification) GCA approach Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities Evidence commonly examined
APP-A01 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Password controls: prohibited password lists

Customers’ or users’ password choices are checked against databases of prohibited or weak passwords, including dictionary words, common passwords, and passwords associated with prior account or data breaches.

In practice: When someone picks a new password, the system rejects common and easily guessed passwords using a banned list the organization can extend, and checks against known breached passwords where that capability is in place.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Primary
Why this classification

Banned password protection is directory and identity provider configuration.

  • Implement

Banned password protection with a custom list, plus a breached-password check where the platform or an add-on provides one, commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Password protection configuration export
APP-A03 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Incorrect log-in attempts

Customers and users are locked out of accounts after a certain number of incorrect log-in attempts. Passwords are reset only after requiring strong authentication of the customer or user.

In practice: After several wrong passwords the account locks, and a password reset, whether self-service or through the help desk, requires a strong verification step first.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Primary
Why this classification

Lockout and reset policy are identity platform configuration.

  • Implement

Lockout thresholds, and reset flows that require strong authentication, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Lockout policy export
  • Reset flow configuration
APP-A04 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Enhanced authentication for credential reset

Enhanced authentication controls are applied to customer and user credential resets, such as sending an OTP to a pre-established communication device; using an authenticator application to provide an OTP; biometric voice recognition; enabling secure video chat features to confirm identity; and call-backs to a pre-established phone number.

In practice: A user resets a password through self-service with a second check, and the help desk uses a verification step before doing the same by phone.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Primary
Why this classification

Credential reset verification is identity platform and service desk process work.

  • Implement

Self-service password reset with strong verification, and help desk reset procedures that require verification, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Reset policy export
  • Help desk verification procedure
APP-A14 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Password controls: password strength

Policies and standards address password strength, such as password length, defined character combinations, and the use of passphrases. A passphrase is a series of words or other text that is generally longer than a traditional password.

In practice: The password standard sets a minimum length and allows long passphrases, and the directory and identity provider enforce the same settings wherever a password is created or changed.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Primary
Why this classification

Password length and passphrase settings are directory and identity provider configuration; the written password standard is usually owned by security leadership.

  • Implement

Password length and passphrase settings enforced in the directory and identity provider, aligned with the written password standard, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Password and lockout policy export
  • Written password policy with owner and approval date
APP-A15 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Account maintenance controls

Enhanced authentication controls are applied for account maintenance activities (e.g., changes to physical or email address, password, contact information, or enrolled devices) performed or requested by customers or users.

In practice: When someone adds a new phone as a sign-in method or changes a recovery email address, the system asks for a second verification step first, and the change is logged.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Primary
Why this classification

Step-up authentication for changes to credentials, contact details and enrolled devices is identity platform work; profile changes inside banking applications are owned by the application.

  • Implement

Step-up authentication for changes to credentials, recovery contact details and enrolled devices, with a log of each change, commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authentication method change policy export
  • Sample log of credential and device changes showing the verification step
APP-A16 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Rate limit on log-in attempts

Rate limits, which represent the number of log-in submissions over a set timeframe, are applied for correct and incorrect log-in attempts from the same user or from different users from the same IP address. These controls limit the overall volume of authentication requests and can slow potential attacks.

In practice: The sign-in service slows or blocks repeated attempts against one account or from one network address, which slows automated guessing, and throttling events are logged.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Primary
Why this classification

Throttling of sign-in attempts is identity provider configuration; network and application edge rate limits are usually owned by network and application teams.

  • Implement

Sign-in throttling and lockout settings at the identity provider, where supported, with throttling events logged, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Lockout and throttling policy export
  • Sample of sign-in throttling events
APP-P02 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Privileged users: dedicated devices or accounts

Privileged users have dedicated devices or accounts for all privileged or administrative activities. The dedicated devices cannot access the Internet.

In practice: An administrator has one everyday account for email and a separate administrative account used only for privileged work, and membership is reviewed.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Separate administrative accounts are identity governance work.

  • Assess
  • Implement

Separate administrative identities and tiering, with review of administrative account membership, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Privileged account inventory and vault or elevation policy export
APP-P05 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Privileged users: dual controls

More than one privileged user at the financial institution must approve access to certain critical systems or certain requests for administrative changes.

In practice: A request for access to a critical system needs approval from at least two privileged users, set up as a multi-stage or multi-confirmer approval, before the elevation is granted.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Multi-party approval for privileged access is a privileged access workflow.

  • Implement

A multi-approver or multi-stage approval workflow for elevation to critical systems commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Elevation approval record showing two approvers
APP-P06 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Privileged users: enhanced authentication for system and software updates

Privileged users are re-authenticated with MFA prior to making system configuration changes, uploading or updating software or firmware, or executing significant system processes.

In practice: Before making a configuration change or installing a software update, the administrator is asked for MFA again at the admin portal.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Step-up authentication for administrative actions is identity platform work.

  • Implement

Step-up multi-factor authentication on privileged elevation and administrative portals commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Step-up authentication policy export
APP-U01 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Access approval policies

Policies establish approval and documentation standards for defining users’ authority to access financial institution information systems.

In practice: A user requests access in a workflow, the manager and application owner sign off, and the decision record is kept with the request.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Access approval and documentation are identity governance workflow.

  • Implement
  • Manage

A request, approval and fulfillment workflow with retained approver records commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Entra
Evidence commonly examined
  • Joiner, mover and leaver workflow configuration export and sample request records
APP-U02 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Least privilege access provisioning

User access is limited to those information systems and resources related to the user’s job function or role.

In practice: A new employee receives the standard access for their role, and any extra access is an exception that gets reviewed.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Role-based least privilege is identity governance work.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Role Mining Engine

A role model and birthright access aligned to job function, with exceptions reviewed, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Entra
Evidence commonly examined
  • Role catalog
  • Access review campaign export showing reviewer, decision, date and remediation status
APP-U03 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Single sign-on capability

Single sign-on capability is established for users to allow access to multiple internal information systems with a single authentication solution.

In practice: Staff sign in once with single sign-on to reach internal applications, so strong authentication and monitoring happen at one point.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Single sign-on is identity platform work.

  • Implement

Federated single sign-on for internal applications commonly lets strong authentication and monitoring apply at one point.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Application onboarding list showing single sign-on coverage
APP-U04 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Service accounts

Service accounts are inventoried, and employees or departments are assigned responsibility for managing service accounts according to the financial institution’s password management and other security policies.

In practice: Service accounts are discovered and listed, each has a named owner, and the owner is responsible for managing its credentials under policy.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Service account inventory and ownership are identity governance work.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Discovery, owner assignment and credential management for service accounts commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Service account inventory with named owner and last-review date
APP-U05 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Automatic suspension or de-provisioning of user credentials

Policies and system controls are in place to de-provision or suspend access credentials after a certain period of account inactivity.

In practice: Accounts that sit unused for a set number of days are suspended automatically, and bringing one back follows a recorded re-enable process.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Primary
Why this classification

Dormancy-based suspension is identity lifecycle work.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Inactivity thresholds with automated suspension and a recorded re-enable process commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Dormant account report with disposition
APP-U06 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Notification to security administrators of change in user status

System administrators are informed in a timely manner of changes (e.g., alteration, removal, or suspension) to user status.

In practice: When HR records a transfer or termination, that change flows to connected systems and the affected system administrators are notified.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Joiner, mover and leaver events are identity lifecycle work.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Lifecycle events from the HR source, propagated to connected systems and to system administrators, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Entra
Evidence commonly examined
  • Joiner, mover and leaver workflow configuration export and sample request records
S3-02 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5)

Risk assessment: identify users

Identify all users, including employees, service accounts, and users at third parties, that access financial institution information systems and data.

In practice: A single list shows every employee, service account and third-party user, each with an owner and a status such as active or terminated.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Identifying every user population, including service accounts and third parties, is identity governance work.

  • Assess
  • Implement

Authoritative identity records for workforce, third-party and service identities, with owner and status attributes, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
  • Entra
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity listing by population type
  • Service account inventory with named owner and last-review date
S3-03 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5)

Risk assessment: high-risk user identification

Identify users who represent a high risk and for which enhanced authentication controls are warranted to protect information systems.

In practice: Administrators, remote users and people in sensitive roles are flagged from entitlement data so they receive stronger sign-in checks and more frequent review.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

High-risk user populations such as privileged and remote users are identified from identity and entitlement data.

  • Assess
  • Implement

Classification of privileged, remote and key-position users from entitlement data commonly drives stronger authentication and review.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Privileged account inventory and vault or elevation policy export
  • High-risk user population definition
S4-01 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5)

Layered security: least privilege provisioning

Layered security controls also can include assigning users’ access rights to information systems based on the principle of least privilege provisioning.

In practice: Roles are defined by job function, access is granted from the role, and managers review whether anyone holds more than the job needs.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Least privilege provisioning is identity governance work.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage
  • Role Mining Engine

Role-based provisioning and review commonly limit user access rights to job need.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Role catalog
  • Access review campaign export showing reviewer, decision, date and remediation status
S5-01 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5)

Multi-factor authentication as part of layered security

When a financial institution management’s risk assessment indicates that single-factor authentication with layered security is inadequate, MFA or controls of equivalent strength as part of layered security can more effectively mitigate risks.

In practice: Where the risk assessment says a password alone is not enough, MFA is required for high-risk users and activities, and any accepted exception is documented.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Primary
Why this classification

Multi-factor authentication is identity platform work. The guidance ties its use to the institution risk assessment.

  • Assess
  • Implement
  • Manage

Risk-based multi-factor policy for high-risk users and high-risk activity, with documented residual risk acceptance, commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authentication policy export showing the factors required by population and application
  • Risk assessment extract linking authentication choices to risk
S5-02 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5)

Strong authentication for high-risk users

For high-risk users, strong authentication, such as MFA solutions using hardware and cryptographic factors, can mitigate risks associated with unauthorized access to information systems.

In practice: Administrators and other high-risk users sign in with hardware security keys or certificates instead of a text message code.

  • Audience addressed Users
Primary
Why this classification

Phishing-resistant and hardware-backed authentication for privileged users is identity platform work.

  • Implement

Hardware-key or certificate-based authentication for administrators and other high-risk users commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authentication method policy for privileged roles
  • Registered authenticator method report
S8-01 MO: Monitoring, help desk and third-party access (Sections 6, 8, 9, 11)

Call center and IT help desk authentication

Threat actors frequently have used social engineering and other techniques to deceive customer call center and IT help desk representatives into resetting passwords and other credentials, thereby granting threat actors access to information systems, user and customer accounts, or confidential information. A comprehensive risk assessment supports mitigation of this risk by identifying emerging threats, setting secure processes, employee training, and establishing effective controls for the customer call center and IT help desk operations.

In practice: Before the help desk resets a password, the caller completes a verification step, and the agent's check is recorded in the ticket.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Primary
Why this classification

Credential reset and identity proofing at the help desk are identity and access management processes, implemented jointly with the service desk.

  • Assess
  • Implement

Verified self-service reset, strong authentication for help desk resets and recorded identity verification steps commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Help desk reset procedure with verification steps
  • Reset activity log sample
APP-A02 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Application timeouts

Customers and users are re-authenticated after a period of inactivity within a service or a system.

In practice: The application owner sets how long an idle session stays open, and identity policy sets how often users must sign in again, tuned to risk.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Supporting
Why this classification

Application owners usually set and enforce inactivity timeouts. The identity provider contributes session lifetime and reauthentication interval policy that bounds how long a session lasts.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Identity provider session lifetime and re-sign-in settings, tuned by risk, commonly bound how long a session lasts; idle logout itself is usually enforced by the application or the endpoint.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Session lifetime policy export
APP-A05 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Endpoint and device authentication

Controls are in place to ensure only authorized devices can connect to the financial institution’s information systems, networks, or services.

In practice: The endpoint team manages the devices; identity policy checks that a laptop is registered and healthy, or holds a device certificate, before access.

  • Audience addressed Users
Supporting
Why this classification

Device authentication is usually shared with network and endpoint teams. Identity contributes device registration and device-state gating.

  • Implement

Device registration, device compliance gating in access policy and certificate-based device authentication commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Device registration listing
  • Access policy requiring registered or managed devices
APP-A06 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Remote access software controls

Remote access software, which allows remote access to a user’s computer or enterprise network or system, is disabled if it is not being used. If remote access software is used, controls to mitigate threats can include placing a firewall in front of systems that use remote access software, having remote users connect with a virtual private network (VPN) or other secure channel, and implementing strong passwords with MFA. Software is updated periodically.

In practice: The network team runs the VPN or remote tool; identity makes it require MFA through the central identity provider for every remote session.

  • Audience addressed Users
Supporting
Why this classification

Remote access software configuration is usually owned by network and endpoint teams. Identity supplies multi-factor authentication for remote users.

  • Implement

Multi-factor authentication on remote access paths, using the central identity provider, commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Authentication policy export showing the factors required by population and application
APP-A07 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Transaction and audit logs

Transaction and audit logs monitor and record system and account activity to identify unauthorized activities, detect intrusions, reconstruct events, and promote customer and user accountability.

In practice: The logging team owns log retention; identity audit logs are kept and forwarded with consistent user identifiers so events can be traced.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Supporting
Why this classification

Log architecture and retention are usually owned by security operations. Identity platforms produce authentication and administration records.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Identity audit logs that are retained and forwarded with consistent identifiers commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • SailPoint ISC
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • Netwrix IDM
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity audit log extract and retention settings
APP-A08 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Suspicious behavior monitoring

Processes monitor and report customer and user access, especially privileged and remote access users, for suspicious behavior.

In practice: Security operations watches for suspicious behavior, and identity risk detections for privileged and remote users are sent to that team.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Supporting
Why this classification

Monitoring is usually owned by security operations. Identity threat detection contributes risk signals.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Identity risk detections for privileged and remote users, routed to security operations, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity risk detection rule list
  • Identity audit log extract and retention settings
APP-A10 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Digital certificates

An inventory of machines that utilize digital certificates is maintained, and digital certificates and the underlying protocols are continually updated to address emerging threats.

In practice: The infrastructure team renews certificates; identity helps keep an inventory of machine and workload identities with owners and expiry dates.

  • Audience addressed Users
Supporting
Why this classification

Certificate inventory is usually owned by infrastructure and PKI teams. Machine and workload identity governance can supply the identity view.

  • Assess
  • Implement

Machine and workload identity inventory with owner and certificate lifecycle tracking, where supported, commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • Certificate and machine identity inventory with owner
APP-P01 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Privileged users: change defaults

Default passwords and other credentials for privileged users or system, service, or administrative accounts are changed or disabled.

In practice: System owners run the platforms; identity places privileged and service accounts in a vault and rotates the default passwords that came with them.

  • Audience addressed Users
Supporting
Why this classification

Changing defaults is usually owned by system administrators. Privileged credential vaulting can enforce and record the change.

  • Implement

Vault onboarding of privileged and service accounts, with default credentials rotated, commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Vault onboarding report showing rotated credentials
APP-P03 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Privileged users: log and alert

Systems are configured to log and alert when a privileged user account is added or removed and when unsuccessful logins or other anomalous behavior occurs.

In practice: The monitoring team receives alerts when someone is added to a privileged group or when privileged sign-ins fail or look unusual.

  • Audience addressed Users
Supporting
Why this classification

Alerting is usually owned by security operations. Identity platforms generate the privileged account change events.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Alerts on privileged group changes and anomalous privileged sign-in events commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity audit log extract and retention settings
  • Alert rule list for privileged account changes
APP-P04 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Privileged users: periodic review of activity

Staff independent of the privileged user’s organization or business unit is alerted of, and periodically reviews, privileged user activity for anomalous behavior.

In practice: Staff outside the administrator's own team review privileged session recordings from a queue; identity supplies the sessions and assigns the reviewers.

  • Audience addressed Users
Supporting
Why this classification

Independent review is usually a security operations or internal audit process. Privileged session records come from privileged access tooling.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Privileged session recording and review queues assigned to independent reviewers commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
  • Entra
Evidence commonly examined
  • Privileged session review log with reviewer
APP-P07 AP-USR: Appendix: user access, account lifecycle and privileged user controls

Privileged users: log access

Privileged user access is limited and defined between log-related privileges and other privileges. The logs of privileged user activity cannot be modified or deleted by the privileged user.

In practice: Administrators do not hold the rights to change or delete the logs of their own activity; log privileges sit in a separate role, and identity reviews who belongs to it.

  • Audience addressed Users
Supporting
Why this classification

Log protection and retention are usually owned by security operations and platform teams. Identity contributes the separation of log-related privileges from other privileges.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Separate log-related roles and review of their membership commonly contribute here, while protection of the logs themselves is usually delivered by the logging platform.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Log administration role membership report with review record
S3-01 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5)

Risk assessment: inventory of information systems

Inventory all information systems and their components, such as the hardware, operating systems, applications, infrastructure devices, APIs, data, and other assets, that require authentication and access controls. This inventory includes information systems provided by the financial institution’s third parties, such as cloud service providers.

In practice: The security team keeps the inventory of systems; identity adds the list of onboarded applications and which accounts connect to each one.

  • Audience addressed Users
Supporting
Why this classification

System inventory is usually owned by IT asset management. Identity contributes the application and account inventory that needs authentication and access controls.

  • Assess

Application onboarding inventory and account-to-system mapping commonly show where authentication and access controls apply.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Application inventory with authentication method and owner
S3-04 RA: Risk assessment and layered security (Sections 3 to 5)

Risk assessment: controls assessment

Initially and periodically assess the design and effectiveness of access and authentication controls employed, including the availability of more advanced security options and configuration settings.

In practice: Management reviews how well sign-in and access controls are working, and identity reports where settings have drifted, against the institution's risk appetite.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Supporting
Why this classification

The assessment is usually owned by risk and security. Identity configuration and review results are the evidence base.

  • Assess
  • Manage
  • Identity Practice Subscription

Periodic assessment of identity control design and drift, reported against the institution's risk appetite, commonly contributes here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Netwrix IDM
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity control assessment report
  • Configuration drift report
S6-01 MO: Monitoring, help desk and third-party access (Sections 6, 8, 9, 11)

Monitoring, logging and reporting

Monitoring, activity logging, and reporting processes and controls assist financial institution management in determining if attempted or realized unauthorized access to information systems and accounts has occurred.

In practice: Another team watches for unauthorized access; identity audit and detection events are kept and forwarded to that team's monitoring tools.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Supporting
Why this classification

Monitoring is usually owned by security operations. Identity platforms supply authentication and privilege events.

  • Implement
  • Manage

Identity audit and detection events that are retained and forwarded for monitoring commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
  • CyberArk / BeyondTrust / Delinea
  • SailPoint ISC
Evidence commonly examined
  • Identity audit log extract and retention settings
S9-01 MO: Monitoring, help desk and third-party access (Sections 6, 8, 9, 11)

Customer-permissioned entities: credential and API-based authentication

A comprehensive risk management program includes an assessment of risks and effective mitigating controls for credential and API-based authentication when CPEs access a financial institution’s information systems and customer information.

In practice: The risk team assesses outside parties; identity keeps a list of the API clients and credentials those parties use and who is responsible for each.

  • Audience addressed Customers
Supporting
Why this classification

Third-party aggregator access is usually governed by digital banking and API platform owners. Identity contributes token, credential and service identity governance.

  • Assess
  • Implement

Inventory and governance of API clients and credentials used by external parties commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • Entra
  • Okta / Ping
Evidence commonly examined
  • API client and credential inventory with owner
S11-01 MO: Monitoring, help desk and third-party access (Sections 6, 8, 9, 11)

Customer and user identity verification

Reliable identity verification methods can help reduce risk when establishing new customer accounts and when access is first requested for new users of information systems.

In practice: HR or the onboarding team verifies new users; identity records that proofing step in the lifecycle workflow, and the workflow asks for it again when someone seeks higher access.

  • Audience addressed Users and customers
Supporting
Why this classification

Identity proofing of new workforce and customer identities is usually shared between HR, onboarding and the identity platform.

  • Assess
  • Implement

Identity proofing steps at onboarding and at elevation of access, recorded in the lifecycle workflow, commonly contribute here.

Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
  • SailPoint IIQ
  • SailPoint ISC
  • Entra
Evidence commonly examined
  • Onboarding identity verification procedure and records
APP-A09 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Monitoring and reporting of unauthorized access by third parties

Processes are in place for third-party service providers to report, and the financial institution to log and monitor, unauthorized access to critical outsourced systems.

  • Audience addressed Users
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Third-party reporting and monitoring processes are usually owned by vendor risk and security operations.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
APP-A11 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Network segmentation

Networks, systems, services, and data are physically and logically segmented based on the financial institution’s asset classification and risk assessment.

  • Audience addressed Users
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Network segmentation is usually owned by network architecture.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
APP-A12 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Transaction value, frequency and timing controls

Transaction controls, such as transaction value limits, restrictions on devices for adding payment recipients, limits on the number of transactions allowed per day, and allowable payment windows (i.e., permissible days and times during which transactions can be initiated) are applied for certain account and digital banking activities.

  • Audience addressed Customers
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Transaction limits are usually owned by digital banking and payments teams.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
APP-A13 AP-OTH: Appendix: authentication, password, logging and architecture controls

Email systems: patch management

Email systems are updated and patched periodically, and the email system vendor is monitored for email system end-of-life.

  • Audience addressed Users
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classification

Patching is usually owned by infrastructure and messaging teams.

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Summary

Primary
21
Identity platforms or processes are typically the principal means of implementing the requirement.
Supporting
15
Another discipline owns the requirement. Identity configuration or evidence contributes.
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
4
Listed for completeness, with a one-line note on what the requirement is.

How to read the matrix

Audience addressed
Whether the quoted practice addresses users of financial institution information systems (employees, board members, third parties, service accounts, applications and devices), customers of digital banking services, or both. The guidance defines users and customers in its Section 1. This column is GCA classification.
Identity relevance

Identity relevance is a GCA classification of whether identity capabilities are typically the principal means of implementing a requirement (Primary), contribute to a requirement owned by another discipline (Supporting), or usually sit outside identity work (Outside identity scope (GCA classification)).

It describes where primary implementation ownership usually sits. It is not a statement about whether identity configuration could be relevant to a particular incident, finding or environment. Every "Outside identity scope (GCA classification)" classification carries a rationale, and other classifications show one where GCA has recorded it, under "Why this classification" beside the label.

Platform families
Product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped a platform family to the requirement. It does not mean a product lacks a capability.
Evidence
Examples of artifacts commonly examined. The list is not complete, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.

Important notice

Purpose. This FFIEC Authentication and Access identity traceability matrix is general educational reference material, written by Robert Ivey and published by GCA Technology Services ("GCA") to help organizations plan identity and access management work. It is not legal, audit, accounting or compliance advice, and it is not a substitute for advice from qualified professionals who know your environment.

No compliance determination. Whether an organization meets a requirement is decided by the applicable assessor, auditor, certifying body or regulator, applying the governing requirements to that organization's actual systems, policies and evidence. Nothing in this matrix states or implies that any organization, product, service or configuration meets or complies with any requirement, or that any assessment, audit, examination or certification will have any particular outcome.

Classifications are practice opinion. Relevance classifications, offering mappings, platform mappings and evidence examples are the author's professional judgment as of the date shown. They are not regulatory classifications and are not statements of the standard of care. Other qualified practitioners may reasonably classify requirements differently, and the right answer for a given environment depends on its facts.

Evidence examples are illustrative. Evidence listed is an example of artifacts commonly examined. It is not a complete list, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.

Source text controls. Requirement text and references come from the sources listed on this page. Where this matrix differs from a source, the source controls. Regulations, guidance and assessment methods change, so confirm current requirements with the issuing authority before relying on them.

Products and services. Platform names identify product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped that platform family to the requirement. It does not mean the product lacks a capability. GCA makes no representation about any third party's products, features, roadmaps or government authorization status, including FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels and similar programs. Confirm capabilities with the vendor and authorization status with the authorizing program.

GCA services. Offering descriptions identify the type of GCA service that addresses an area. The scope, deliverables, terms and outcomes of any GCA engagement are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work, and this page does not change those terms.

No relationship; no reliance. Reading or using this matrix does not create a client, advisory or other relationship with GCA or the author. To the fullest extent permitted by law, this material is provided "as is," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and GCA is not liable for any decision made or action taken in reliance on it.

No client data. This matrix contains no client data. Any example organization is fictitious.

Version 1 · Prepared · Last reviewed · Reviewed every 90 days · View changelog

Microsoft and Microsoft Entra are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. SailPoint, IdentityIQ and Identity Security Cloud are trademarks or product names of SailPoint Technologies, Inc. or its affiliates. Netwrix is a trademark of Netwrix Corporation. Okta is a trademark of Okta, Inc. Ping Identity is a trademark of Ping Identity Corporation. CyberArk is a trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. or its affiliates. BeyondTrust is a trademark of BeyondTrust Corporation. Delinea is a trademark of Delinea Inc. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council does not endorse this page. All other trademarks belong to their respective owners. These names identify products and programs only and do not imply endorsement by, sponsorship by or affiliation with any of these companies or programs, except where a GCA partnership is expressly stated elsewhere on gca.net.

Changelog

  1. Version 1: First publication.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is the FFIEC guidance binding?

The guidance says it does not impose any new regulatory requirements on financial institutions. It sets out examples of effective practices that, applied as appropriate to an institution's risk profile, can support alignment with safety and soundness standards and the Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards. Read it as a set of practices, not a list of mandatory controls.

Does this page rely on the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool?

No. The FFIEC sunset its Cybersecurity Assessment Tool on August 31, 2025, as announced in its August 2024 sunset statement (OCC Bulletin 2024-25). This page does not rely on it, and the mapping is built on the 2021 guidance text.

Who is in scope beyond customers?

The audience column marks 23 rows for users of financial institution information systems, 15 rows for both users and customers, and 2 rows for customers of digital banking services.