SOX ITGC | GCA practice control set
How Identity and Access Management Supports SOX IT General Controls
No official IT general control catalog exists under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The 20 rows below are GCA's own control set, with GCA-assigned IDs, organized around the access-to-programs-and-data domain. For SOX ITGC work, IT general controls over access to programs and data are the domain auditors commonly examine when they test access controls for financial reporting systems, including SOX user access review and SOX segregation of duties. Section 404(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires management's annual assessment of internal control over financial reporting, and Section 404(b) requires the external auditor to attest to that assessment, except for emerging growth companies and issuers that are neither accelerated nor large accelerated filers (15 U.S.C. 7262). In that domain, in GCA's practice experience, identity and access management commonly contributes to whether user access is approved before it is granted, reviewed on a defined cycle with a complete population, kept free of conflicting duties, and limited for privileged, service and shared accounts.
The control set is GCA practice judgment, organized with reference to Section 404 (15 U.S.C. 7262) and the PCAOB auditing standard for integrated audits (AS 2201). The matrix has 20 rows: 15 access rows, 3 change-related rows and 2 operations rows. Of the 20, 12 are primary identity work, 5 are supporting, and 3 are outside identity scope (GCA classification).
For CIOs and compliance leaders
- ITGC-AP-04 covers periodic user access review. ITGC-AP-11 covers the completeness and accuracy of the user and entitlement listings that reviews and testing rely on.
- Segregation of duties (ITGC-AP-05), privileged and administrative access (ITGC-AP-06), and service, system and shared account governance (ITGC-AP-08) are primary identity rows.
- The control set is GCA practice judgment. The preventive and detective labels are GCA classifications, not regulatory ones.
Reference material, not a compliance determination. This matrix reflects GCA's practice view as of . It does not certify, warrant or predict the outcome of any assessment, audit or examination. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC rules that implement it and, for the auditor's attestation, PCAOB AS 2201 control. Read the full notice.
The matrix
- Primary
- Supporting
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Showing 20 of 20 requirements
| Requirement | Requirement description (GCA summary) | Control type | Identity relevance (GCA classification) | GCA approach | Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities | Evidence commonly examined |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ITGC-AP-01 AP: Access to programs and data | Access provisioning and approval New access to in-scope applications, databases and infrastructure is requested, approved by an accountable approver and provisioned from a recorded request. 15 U.S.C. 7262, Management assessment of internal controls (Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404), 15 U.S.C. 7262(a)(1): state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting 15 U.S.C. 7262, Management assessment of internal controls (Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404), 15 U.S.C. 7262(a)(2): contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting In practice: A new finance analyst asks for access to the general ledger in the access request workflow, the application owner approves it, and the account is created from that recorded request. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationJoiner provisioning is identity lifecycle work; the application owner or business approver owns the approval decision. |
A request and approval workflow with role-based birthright access, and approver evidence retained per request, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-02 AP: Access to programs and data | Access changes on role change Access is adjusted when a worker changes role, department or manager, so prior access does not accumulate. In practice: When an employee moves from accounts payable to treasury, the HR change triggers a recalculation, and the old payables access is removed instead of piling up next to the new access. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationMover handling is identity lifecycle work driven by HR source-of-record events. |
Mover triggers from the HR source, access recalculation and removal of access that no longer matches the new role commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-03 AP: Access to programs and data | Timely access removal on termination Access is disabled or removed within a defined interval after a worker leaves, for directory, application and privileged accounts. In practice: HR records a termination and the identity governance platform disables directory, application and administrator accounts, while a reconciliation report flags any account still active afterward. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationLeaver deprovisioning is identity lifecycle work; the HR source supplies the termination event. |
Leaver automation from the HR source, with reconciliation that finds accounts still active after the termination date, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-04 AP: Access to programs and data | Periodic user access review In-scope users and their access are reviewed on a defined cycle by an accountable reviewer, and access found inappropriate is removed and the removal is recorded. 15 U.S.C. 7262, Management assessment of internal controls (Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404), 15 U.S.C. 7262(a)(2): contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting In practice: On a defined cycle, often quarterly, managers and application owners work through a review campaign for in-scope systems, confirm or revoke each person's access, and export the revocations and completion record. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationAccess review campaigns are the principal identity governance control for this objective; reviewers sit in the business. |
Scoped review campaigns with reviewer decisions, exception justification, revocation tracking and an exportable record of completeness commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-05 AP: Access to programs and data | Segregation of duties Conflicting access combinations are defined, prevented or detected, and approved exceptions are recorded with a compensating control. In practice: A rule set built with the process owner stops one person from both creating vendors and approving payments, and a scheduled scan reports any conflicts that exist, with approved exceptions noted. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationPreventive and detective SoD policy is identity governance work; the business and finance owners define which duties conflict. |
An SoD rule set built with the process owner, preventive checks at request time and detective scans across applications commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-06 AP: Access to programs and data | Privileged and administrative access Administrative and other privileged access to in-scope systems is limited, approved, separated from ordinary accounts and used only when needed. In practice: Administrators use a separate admin account for system work, elevate only when a task needs it, and the shared privileged passwords sit in a vault with the membership of admin groups reviewed regularly. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationPrivileged identity and credential controls are the identity and PAM disciplines; system owners decide who needs the access. |
Separate administrative accounts, just-in-time elevation, vaulting of shared privileged credentials and periodic review of privileged membership commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-08 AP: Access to programs and data | Service, system and shared account governance Non-human accounts have a named owner, a documented purpose, controlled credentials and a periodic review. In practice: Every service account has a named owner and a stated purpose, its password is rotated from a vault, and the account appears in the same review campaigns as regular user accounts. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationService account inventory and ownership are identity governance work; application teams own the account purpose. |
Discovery of service and workload identities, ownership assignment, credential rotation through a vault and inclusion in review campaigns commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-09 AP: Access to programs and data | Authentication and password settings In-scope systems enforce authentication settings set by policy, including password length, lockout and the handling of default and shared credentials. In practice: Password length and lockout settings are set once in the central directory, applications that use single sign-on rely on those settings instead of their own, and local accounts and default passwords are found and removed. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationDirectory and identity provider settings are identity platform configuration; the policy itself is set by security and IT leadership. |
Central policy on the directory or identity provider, single sign-on where applications allow it, and removal of local accounts and default credentials commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-10 AP: Access to programs and data | Multi-factor authentication for remote and privileged access Remote access and privileged access to in-scope systems require more than one authentication factor. In practice: Anyone signing in from outside the network, and every administrator, must complete a second factor; a registration report lists who is enrolled and any documented exclusions. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationMulti-factor authentication policy is identity platform work; it commonly contributes as an access-layer control for in-scope systems. |
Policy-based access rules at the identity provider that require multi-factor authentication for remote and administrative sign-in, with registration reporting and documented exclusions, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-12 AP: Access to programs and data | Dormant and inactive accounts Accounts that have not been used for a defined period are reviewed and disabled or removed. In practice: A last-sign-in report across the directory and applications lists accounts unused beyond a set number of days, and the owner either confirms the account is needed or it is disabled. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationDormancy-based disablement is identity lifecycle work; the account owner confirms exceptions. |
Last-sign-in analysis across directory and applications, a dormancy threshold and an automated or reviewed disable step commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-13 AP: Access to programs and data | Emergency and break-glass access Emergency access to in-scope systems is time-limited, approved, logged and reviewed after use. In practice: Emergency accounts are checked out with an approval, expire after a short window, and the session record is reviewed by a second person once the incident is over. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationEmergency access accounts, checkout, approval and session recording are privileged access controls; the approval policy and the post-use review sit with IT management. |
Checkout-based emergency accounts with approval, session recording where available and a post-use review record commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-CH-01 CH: Program change and development (access aspects) | Separation of development, test and production access The same person does not hold unrestricted access to develop, approve and move a change into production. In practice: Roles are designed so the developer who writes a change is not the same person who approves it or deploys it to production, and a conflict rule flags anyone holding all three. |
|
Primary
Why this classificationAccess separation across environments is an entitlement and SoD question; the change process itself is owned by engineering and change management. |
Role design that separates developer, approver and deployer entitlements, with SoD rules covering the pipeline and production, commonly contributes here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-07 AP: Access to programs and data | Privileged activity logging and review Privileged activity on in-scope systems is logged, the logs are protected from alteration by the privileged user, and a person independent of the user reviews exceptions. In practice: The security team reviews privileged session activity independently of the administrators; identity tooling records elevations and session recordings and sends those events to the monitoring platform. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationThe identity platform produces the privileged session and elevation records; log retention and review sit with security operations. |
Session brokering and recording, elevation audit trails and forwarding of identity events to the monitoring platform commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-11 AP: Access to programs and data | Completeness and accuracy of user and entitlement listings The user and access listings used for reviews and testing are complete and accurate for the systems in scope. In practice: The control owner defines the listings; identity matches accounts to people, compares them with each target system's own list, and records how each listing was pulled. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationThe listing is a data output of the identity platform; the control over its accuracy is usually shared with the system owner and the audit team. |
Correlation of accounts to identities, reconciliation against the target system and a recorded extraction method for each in-scope listing commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-14 AP: Access to programs and data | Direct database and back-end data access Access that bypasses the application, such as direct database or file-level access, is limited, approved and monitored. In practice: Database administrator rights are requested and approved like any other access, the credentials sit in a vault, and those direct-access entitlements are included in the periodic review. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationIdentity governs who holds the access; database activity monitoring and platform hardening sit with the database and infrastructure teams. |
Inclusion of database and infrastructure entitlements in request and review processes, and vaulting of database administrator credentials, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-AP-15 AP: Access to programs and data | Third-party and contractor access Access held by contractors, vendors and other non-employees is sponsored, time-bound and reviewed. In practice: Each contractor account has a named internal sponsor and an end date, and contractors appear in the review campaigns so the sponsor confirms who still needs access. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationVendor management usually owns the contract and risk decision; identity contributes sponsor assignment, end dates and review of non-employee access. |
Sponsor assignment, end-date enforcement, and inclusion of non-employee identities in review campaigns commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-CH-02 CH: Program change and development (access aspects) | Restricted access to move changes into production Only authorized personnel and service identities can deploy or migrate changes to production systems. In practice: The change management owner controls releases; identity reviews which people and pipeline service accounts hold production deployment rights and grants elevated access just in time. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationDeployment tooling enforces the restriction; identity governs the membership and the service identities used by pipelines. |
Review of deployment roles and pipeline service identities, and just-in-time elevation for production deployment, commonly contribute here. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| ITGC-CH-03 CH: Program change and development (access aspects) | Change request, testing and approval workflow Changes follow a documented request, test and approval process before release. |
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Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, the change request, testing and approval workflow usually sits with engineering and IT service management; no identity contribution is typical. Access separation across environments is covered in ITGC-CH-01. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ITGC-OP-01 OP: Computer operations | Job scheduling and batch processing Scheduled jobs and batch processes run as authorized and exceptions are followed up. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, job scheduling and batch processing usually sit with IT operations; no identity contribution is typical. Governance of the accounts that jobs run under is covered in ITGC-AP-08. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| ITGC-OP-02 OP: Computer operations | Backup and recovery Data and systems are backed up and restoration is tested. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationResilience control usually owned by infrastructure and operations teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
No requirements match the current filters.
Summary
- Primary
- 12
- Identity platforms or processes are typically the principal means of implementing the requirement.
- Supporting
- 5
- Another discipline owns the requirement. Identity configuration or evidence contributes.
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
- 3
- Listed for completeness, with a one-line note on what the requirement is.
How to read the matrix
- Control type
- GCA practice classification of whether the identity control usually prevents an inappropriate access outcome or detects it after the fact. It is not a regulatory classification.
- Identity relevance
Identity relevance is a GCA classification of whether identity capabilities are typically the principal means of implementing a requirement (Primary), contribute to a requirement owned by another discipline (Supporting), or usually sit outside identity work (Outside identity scope (GCA classification)).
It describes where primary implementation ownership usually sits. It is not a statement about whether identity configuration could be relevant to a particular incident, finding or environment. Every "Outside identity scope (GCA classification)" classification carries a rationale, and other classifications show one where GCA has recorded it, under "Why this classification" beside the label.
- Platform families
- Product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped a platform family to the requirement. It does not mean a product lacks a capability.
- Evidence
- Examples of artifacts commonly examined. The list is not complete, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Sources
- 15 U.S.C. 7262, Management assessment of internal controls (Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404) U.S. Government Publishing Office (govinfo), United States Code
- AS 2201: An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
- 17 CFR 240.13a-15 and 240.15d-15, Controls and procedures U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (eCFR)
- 17 CFR 229.308 (Regulation S-K Item 308), Internal control over financial reporting U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (eCFR)
Important notice
Purpose. This Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404 ITGC identity traceability matrix is general educational reference material, written by Robert Ivey and published by GCA Technology Services ("GCA") to help organizations plan identity and access management work. It is not legal, audit, accounting or compliance advice, and it is not a substitute for advice from qualified professionals who know your environment.
No compliance determination. Whether an organization meets a requirement is decided by the applicable assessor, auditor, certifying body or regulator, applying the governing requirements to that organization's actual systems, policies and evidence. Nothing in this matrix states or implies that any organization, product, service or configuration meets or complies with any requirement, or that any assessment, audit, examination or certification will have any particular outcome.
Classifications are practice opinion. Relevance classifications, offering mappings, platform mappings and evidence examples are the author's professional judgment as of the date shown. They are not regulatory classifications and are not statements of the standard of care. Other qualified practitioners may reasonably classify requirements differently, and the right answer for a given environment depends on its facts.
Evidence examples are illustrative. Evidence listed is an example of artifacts commonly examined. It is not a complete list, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Source text controls. Requirement text and references come from the sources listed on this page. Where this matrix differs from a source, the source controls. Regulations, guidance and assessment methods change, so confirm current requirements with the issuing authority before relying on them.
Products and services. Platform names identify product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped that platform family to the requirement. It does not mean the product lacks a capability. GCA makes no representation about any third party's products, features, roadmaps or government authorization status, including FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels and similar programs. Confirm capabilities with the vendor and authorization status with the authorizing program.
GCA services. Offering descriptions identify the type of GCA service that addresses an area. The scope, deliverables, terms and outcomes of any GCA engagement are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work, and this page does not change those terms.
No relationship; no reliance. Reading or using this matrix does not create a client, advisory or other relationship with GCA or the author. To the fullest extent permitted by law, this material is provided "as is," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and GCA is not liable for any decision made or action taken in reliance on it.
No client data. This matrix contains no client data. Any example organization is fictitious.
Version 1 · Prepared · Last reviewed · Reviewed every 90 days · View changelog
© 2026 Quasius Investment Corp. d/b/a GCA Technology Services. The selection, arrangement, classifications and annotations in this matrix are GCA's original work. You may use this matrix within your organization for planning and may quote short portions with attribution to GCA and a link to this page. Republishing the matrix in whole or in substantial part requires GCA's written permission. The control set on this page is GCA's own, organized around the authority it cites. No official Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404 ITGC control catalog exists. Quoted statutory text is attributed to its source, and that source controls.
Microsoft and Microsoft Entra are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. SailPoint, IdentityIQ and Identity Security Cloud are trademarks or product names of SailPoint Technologies, Inc. or its affiliates. Netwrix is a trademark of Netwrix Corporation. Okta is a trademark of Okta, Inc. Ping Identity is a trademark of Ping Identity Corporation. CyberArk is a trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. or its affiliates. BeyondTrust is a trademark of BeyondTrust Corporation. Delinea is a trademark of Delinea Inc. The PCAOB does not endorse this page. All other trademarks belong to their respective owners. These names identify products and programs only and do not imply endorsement by, sponsorship by or affiliation with any of these companies or programs, except where a GCA partnership is expressly stated elsewhere on gca.net.
Changelog
- Version 1: First publication.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does this page say our controls are effective?
No. The rows describe where identity and access management commonly contributes to access controls. Whether a control operates effectively is a determination for management and auditors, based on your own evidence.
What evidence is commonly examined for user access review?
The matrix lists examples, including an access review campaign export showing reviewer, decision, date and remediation status, and a campaign scope definition showing which systems and populations were included. The list is illustrative, not complete.
What do the preventive and detective labels mean?
Each row is labeled preventive or detective as a GCA practice classification, meaning whether the control usually prevents an inappropriate access outcome or detects it after the fact. Of the 20 rows, 14 are preventive and 6 are detective. The labels are not regulatory classifications.