NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, release 5.2.0
How Identity and Access Management Supports NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 is the control catalog that FedRAMP baselines and many federal programs build on. Two of its families, Access Control (AC) and Identification and Authentication (IA), describe work that identity and access management teams do every day. This matrix lists every active AC and IA control and enhancement in release 5.2.0, including NIST 800-53 AC-2 (Account Management) and each of its active enhancements, plus a short set of identity-relevant controls from the AU, PS and SC families. For each row it quotes NIST's control statement and shows whether identity work is typically the primary implementation, a supporting input to a control another team owns, or outside identity scope (GCA classification).
Baseline membership is shown as its own facet. Each row states the lowest FedRAMP Rev 5 baseline list that includes the control, and whether it appears in the NIST SP 800-53B baselines. These lists are reference points for system owners. They say nothing about whether any cloud service or GCA engagement holds a FedRAMP authorization. This page is a mapping aid prepared by GCA, a practice opinion dated October 16, 2026, not legal advice and not an attestation.
For CIOs and compliance leaders
- The matrix covers 209 rows. 49 are primary identity controls, 72 are supporting, and 88 are outside identity scope (GCA classification). That split is GCA's classification, not NIST's.
- Under the published FedRAMP Rev 5 lists, 87 of the 209 rows appear in the Moderate list. Treat that as a planning list for system owners, not as an authorization result.
- Ask your assessor which rows they will sample and what evidence they expect. The NIST text controls, and the assessor decides what the evidence shows.
Reference material, not a compliance determination. This matrix reflects GCA's practice view as of . It does not certify, warrant or predict the outcome of any assessment, audit or examination. NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 controls. Read the full notice.
The matrix
- Primary
- Supporting
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Showing 209 of 209 requirements
| Requirement | Requirement text | Control type / FedRAMP Rev 5 baseline / SP 800-53B baseline | Identity relevance (GCA classification) | GCA approach | Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities | Evidence commonly examined |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AC-2 AC: Access Control | Account Management a. Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system; b. Assign account managers; c. Require [Assignment: organization-defined prerequisites and criteria] for group and role membership; d. Specify: 1. Authorized users of the system; 2. Group and role membership; and 3. Access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and [Assignment: organization-defined attributes (as required)] for each account; e. Require approvals by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] for requests to create accounts; f. Create, enable, modify, disable, and remove accounts in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined policy, procedures, prerequisites, and criteria]; g. Monitor the use of accounts; h. Notify account managers and [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within: 1. [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when accounts are no longer required; 2. [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when users are terminated or transferred; and 3. [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when system usage or need-to-know changes for an individual; i. Authorize access to the system based on: 1. A valid access authorization; 2. Intended system usage; and 3. [Assignment: organization-defined attributes (as required)]; j. Review accounts for compliance with account management requirements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; k. Establish and implement a process for changing shared or group account authenticators (if deployed) when individuals are removed from the group; and l. Align account management processes with personnel termination and transfer processes. In practice: HR events create, change and remove accounts in a lifecycle workflow, every account has a named owner, and managers often review their team's accounts on a quarterly schedule. |
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Primary |
Account management is typically implemented through HR-driven lifecycle workflows, account ownership by correlation, scheduled access reviews, and inactive-account handling. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(1) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Automated System Account Management Support the management of system accounts using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms]. In practice: Connectors create, change and disable accounts directly from the HR record, and a scheduled reconciliation job flags any account that no longer matches its source. |
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Primary |
Automated account management commonly means provisioning connectors and reconciliation jobs that create, change and disable accounts from the authoritative source. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(2) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Automated Temporary and Emergency Account Management Automatically [Selection: remove; disable] temporary and emergency accounts after [Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of account]. In practice: A contractor's temporary account is created with an end date and switches off on that date automatically, so nobody has to remember to remove it. |
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Primary |
Temporary and emergency accounts commonly carry an automatic expiry date set at creation, enforced by the lifecycle platform or by time-bound privileged assignments. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(3) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Disable Accounts Disable accounts within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when the accounts: (a) Have expired; (b) Are no longer associated with a user or individual; (c) Are in violation of organizational policy; or (d) Have been inactive for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. In practice: A scheduled job disables accounts that expired or have not signed in for a long stretch, and the few kept on purpose are listed with a reason and an owner. |
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Primary |
Disablement of inactive and expired accounts is commonly automated from last-sign-in and lifecycle-state data, with exceptions recorded. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(4) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Automated Audit Actions Automatically audit account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions. In practice: Every account creation, change, disablement and removal is written to an audit log and sent to the security team's monitoring tool for review. |
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Primary |
Account creation, modification, enabling, disabling and removal events are commonly captured in identity provider and governance audit logs and forwarded for review. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(7) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Privileged User Accounts (a) Establish and administer privileged user accounts in accordance with [Selection: a role-based access scheme; an attribute-based access scheme]; (b) Monitor privileged role or attribute assignments; (c) Monitor changes to roles or attributes; and (d) Revoke access when privileged role or attribute assignments are no longer appropriate. In practice: Administrators use separate admin accounts, hold privileged roles only when needed, and the small group with those roles is reviewed on a regular schedule. |
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Primary |
Privileged user accounts are commonly administered under a role-based or attribute-based scheme, with just-in-time rather than standing assignments, separate administrative identities, monitoring of privileged assignments and changes to them, and removal when an assignment is no longer appropriate. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(9) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Restrictions on Use of Shared and Group Accounts Only permit the use of shared and group accounts that meet [Assignment: organization-defined conditions for establishing shared and group accounts]. In practice: A shared account turns up in a correlation report, gets a named owner and a written reason, and where allowed, is checked out from a vault so each use traces to one person. |
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Primary |
Shared and group accounts are commonly found by correlation, justified and owned, and where permitted, placed behind credential check-out and session attribution. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(11) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Usage Conditions Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances and/or usage conditions] for [Assignment: organization-defined system accounts]. In practice: Sign-in rules limit sensitive accounts to approved locations and managed devices, so an administrator account is blocked from an unusual place. |
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Primary |
Usage conditions are commonly expressed as policy-based access rules on location, device and risk signals, and time-bound assignments where needed. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(12) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Account Monitoring for Atypical Usage (a) Monitor system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical usage]; and (b) Report atypical usage of system accounts to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]. In practice: Sign-in analytics flag unusual account activity, such as a login from a new country at 3 a.m., and the alert goes to a named team with a defined reporting path. |
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Primary |
Atypical account usage is commonly monitored through identity risk detections and sign-in analytics, with a defined reporting path. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(13) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Disable Accounts for High-risk Individuals Disable accounts of individuals within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of discovery of [Assignment: organization-defined significant risks]. In practice: When HR or the security team flags a high-risk individual, a fast-track lifecycle action disables their accounts within the time the organization has set. |
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Primary |
Disabling accounts for high-risk individuals is commonly an expedited lifecycle action triggered by a defined HR or security signal. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-3 AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies. In practice: Access to an application comes from group or role membership granted through an approved request, and the sign-in service checks that membership each time someone tries to open it. |
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Primary |
Access enforcement is commonly implemented through role and group based authorization at the identity provider and application, with policy-based conditions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-3(7) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Role-based Access Control Enforce a role-based access control policy over defined subjects and objects and control access based upon [Assignment: organization-defined roles and users authorized to assume such roles]. In practice: Teams analyze who holds which access, build a reviewed catalogue of job-based roles, and map each role to the entitlements it grants so access follows the job. |
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Primary |
Role-based access control is typically implemented through role mining, a reviewed role catalogue and role-to-entitlement mapping. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-3(8) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Revocation of Access Authorizations Enforce the revocation of access authorizations resulting from changes to the security attributes of subjects and objects based on [Assignment: organization-defined rules governing the timing of revocations of access authorizations]. In practice: When someone changes jobs or a reviewer says no, the access is removed through the same workflow, and the time between the event and the removal is tracked. |
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Primary |
Revocation of access authorizations is commonly driven by lifecycle events and review decisions, with timeliness measured from the event. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-3(13) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Attribute-based Access Control Enforce attribute-based access control policy over defined subjects and objects and control access based upon [Assignment: organization-defined attributes to assume access permissions]. In practice: HR attributes like department, location and worker type feed dynamic groups, so a nurse and an accountant get different access automatically from their record. |
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Primary |
Attribute-based access control is commonly implemented with authoritative identity attributes feeding dynamic groups and policy conditions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-5 AC: Access Control | Separation of Duties a. Identify and document [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals requiring separation]; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. In practice: The business lists conflicting duties, such as creating and paying a vendor, and the request workflow blocks that combination or sends it for exception sign-off with a compensating check. |
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Primary |
Separation of duties is commonly implemented as defined conflict rules, preventive checks at request time, detective violation reports and approved exceptions with mitigating controls. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6 AC: Access Control | Least Privilege Employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks. In practice: Access is scoped to what each job needs: roles are designed narrowly, managers recertify access on a schedule, and extra rights are granted for a limited time. |
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Primary |
Least privilege is commonly pursued through role design, periodic access review and just-in-time elevation for privileged access. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(1) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Authorize Access to Security Functions Authorize access for [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or roles] to: (a) [Assignment: organization-defined security functions (deployed in hardware, software, and firmware)]; and (b) [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant information]. In practice: Rights to change security settings sit in a few named privileged roles, each with an approval step and a short, known list of people who can hold it. |
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Primary |
Authorization of access to security functions is commonly implemented as named privileged roles with approval, held by a limited population. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(2) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Non-privileged Access for Nonsecurity Functions Require that users of system accounts (or roles) with access to [Assignment: organization-defined security functions or security-relevant information] use non-privileged accounts or roles, when accessing nonsecurity functions. In practice: Administrators read email and browse the web with a normal account, and switch to a separate admin account only when they perform security work. |
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Primary |
Non-privileged access for non-security functions is commonly implemented with separate administrative identities and privileged access workstations. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(5) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Privileged Accounts Restrict privileged accounts on the system to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]. In practice: Only people in defined roles can hold privileged accounts; the list is tied to job role, and an access review checks that it still matches. |
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Primary |
Restriction of privileged accounts to defined personnel or roles is commonly implemented through a defined list of who may hold privileged roles and access review. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(6) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Privileged Access by Non-organizational Users Prohibit privileged access to the system by non-organizational users. In practice: Members of the public who sign in to agency portals are held in a separate account population, policy blocks administrator role assignment to that population, and a review looks for any that were granted by mistake. |
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Primary |
Privileged access to the system by non-organizational users is prohibited. Separating the accounts of non-organizational users (people without employee-equivalent status under the organization's own rules) from administrative roles, and reviewing for exceptions, commonly contributes to preventing it. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(7) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Review of User Privileges (a) Review [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] the privileges assigned to [Assignment: organization-defined roles or classes of users] to validate the need for such privileges; and (b) Reassign or remove privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission and business needs. In practice: Reviewers go through each role's and each person's privileges in a certification campaign, and every keep or remove decision is recorded with the reviewer's name. |
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Primary |
Periodic review of the privileges assigned to roles and users is commonly run as certification campaigns with recorded reviewer decisions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(9) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Log Use of Privileged Functions Log the execution of privileged functions. In practice: Each time someone activates a privileged role or runs an admin action, the event is logged with the person, the time and the action for later review. |
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Primary
Why this classificationCapture of privileged function use is delivered by the privileged access tooling that identity teams run. Alerting, retention and review sit with security operations and are supporting rows in this series. |
Use of privileged functions is commonly captured in privileged role activation and administrative audit logs. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-7 AC: Access Control | Unsuccessful Logon Attempts a. Enforce a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and b. Automatically [Selection (one or more): lock the account or node for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; lock the account or node until released by an administrator; delay next logon prompt per [Assignment: organization-defined delay algorithm]; notify system administrator; take other [Assignment: organization-defined action]] when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded. In practice: After a set number of wrong passwords, the account locks or slows down, with the limit and timing chosen by the organization and applied in the directory and sign-in service. |
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Primary |
Unsuccessful logon limits are commonly set as lockout and throttling policy on the directory and identity provider. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-17 AC: Access Control | Remote Access a. Establish and document usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; and b. Authorize each type of remote access to the system prior to allowing such connections. In practice: Remote workers sign in through the identity service with MFA and access rules that check device and location, under a documented remote access policy. |
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Primary |
Remote access is commonly governed by policy-based access rules, multi-factor authentication and session controls at the identity provider. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2 IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) Uniquely identify and authenticate organizational users and associate that unique identification with processes acting on behalf of those users. In practice: Every employee and contractor signs in with their own account through one enterprise identity service, accounts are matched to real people, and MFA is required. |
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Primary |
Unique identification and authentication of organizational users is commonly implemented through a single enterprise identity provider, correlation of accounts to people and multi-factor authentication. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(1) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Multi-factor Authentication to Privileged Accounts Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts. In practice: Administrators must use MFA every time they sign in or activate a privileged role, enforced by policy on those roles rather than left to individual choice. |
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Primary |
Multi-factor authentication for privileged accounts is commonly enforced by policy on administrative roles and role activation. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(2) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Multi-factor Authentication to Non-privileged Accounts Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts. In practice: Regular users also go through MFA at sign-in, and a registration report shows who has set up a second factor and who still needs to. |
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Primary |
Multi-factor authentication for non-privileged accounts is commonly enforced by policy for all users, with registration reporting. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(5) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Individual Authentication with Group Authentication When shared accounts or authenticators are employed, require users to be individually authenticated before granting access to the shared accounts or resources. In practice: When a shared account is allowed, the person first signs in as themselves, then checks the credential out from a vault, so each use traces to one individual. |
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Primary |
Individual authentication before group account use is commonly implemented by credential check-out and session attribution to the requesting person. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(6) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Access to Accounts —separate Device Implement multi-factor authentication for [Selection (one or more): local; network; remote] access to [Selection (one or more): privileged accounts; non-privileged accounts] such that: (a) One of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining access; and (b) The device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism requirements]. In practice: The second factor lives on a separate device, such as a phone authenticator app, a hardware security key or a passkey stored on that device. |
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Primary |
Authentication with a factor on a separate device is commonly implemented with authenticator apps on a phone, hardware security keys, or passkeys held on a device other than the one gaining access. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(8) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Access to Accounts — Replay Resistant Implement replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for access to [Selection (one or more): privileged accounts; non-privileged accounts]. In practice: Phishing-resistant methods such as security keys or certificates are used; they are designed so a captured sign-in does not work when replayed by someone else. |
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Primary |
Replay-resistant authentication is commonly provided by phishing-resistant methods such as FIDO2 security keys and certificate-based authentication. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-2(10) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Single Sign-on Provide a single sign-on capability for [Assignment: organization-defined system accounts and services]. In practice: Users sign in once and open their business apps without more prompts, because the apps trust the enterprise identity service through standard federation. |
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Primary |
Single sign-on is commonly implemented with SAML and OIDC federation to the enterprise identity provider. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-4 IA: Identification and Authentication | Identifier Management Manage system identifiers by: a. Receiving authorization from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to assign an individual, group, role, service, or device identifier; b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, service, or device; c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device; and d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. In practice: Managers or HR authorize new accounts, each person gets one unique identifier at hire under a written naming standard, and old identifiers are not reused for the period the organization sets. |
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Primary |
Identifier management is commonly implemented as an authoritative identifier standard, issuance at hire and prevention of reuse across lifecycle events. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-4(4) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identifier Management | Identify User Status Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as [Assignment: organization-defined characteristic identifying individual status]. In practice: Each identifier shows whether the person is an employee, contractor or intern, using worker-type and employment-status fields from the HR record. |
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Primary |
Identifying user status is commonly implemented with worker-type and employment-status attributes that drive identifier conventions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-5 IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management Manage system authenticators by: a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticator; b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the organization; c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use; d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lost or compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators; e. Changing default authenticators prior to first use; f. Changing or refreshing authenticators [Assignment: organization-defined time period by authenticator type] or when [Assignment: organization-defined events] occur; g. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; h. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators; and i. Changing authenticators for group or role accounts when membership to those accounts changes. In practice: People register authenticators such as an authenticator app or key through a defined process, shared secrets sit in a vault, and credentials are rotated on a schedule. |
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Primary |
Authenticator management is commonly implemented through authenticator registration and lifecycle policy, credential vaulting for shared secrets and rotation. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-5(1) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Password-based Authentication For password-based authentication: (a) Maintain a list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly; (b) Verify, when users create or update passwords, that the passwords are not found on the list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords in IA-5(1)(a); (c) Transmit passwords only over cryptographically-protected channels; (d) Store passwords using an approved salted key derivation function, preferably using a keyed hash; (e) Require immediate selection of a new password upon account recovery; (f) Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters; (g) Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators; and (h) Enforce the following composition and complexity rules: [Assignment: organization-defined composition and complexity rules]. In practice: The sign-in service blocks common or leaked passwords and sets minimum length, while service account passwords are kept in a vault and changed regularly. |
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Primary |
Password-based authentication settings are commonly configured as banned-password lists, length and compromise screening on the identity provider, with vaulted rotation for service credentials. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-5(2) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Public Key-based Authentication (a) For public key-based authentication: (1) Enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key; and (2) Map the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and (b) When public key infrastructure (PKI) is used: (1) Validate certificates by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor, including checking certificate status information; and (2) Implement a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation. In practice: Certificates and managed SSH keys can be used to sign in, with the private key kept restricted and each key mapped to one account owner. |
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Primary |
Public key-based authentication is commonly implemented with certificate-based authentication and managed SSH keys. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-5(7) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | No Embedded Unencrypted Static Authenticators Ensure that unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications or other forms of static storage. In practice: Scripts and applications no longer hold passwords in code or config files; the secrets move to a vault or the application uses a workload identity. |
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Primary |
Removal of embedded static authenticators is commonly done by moving secrets to a vault or to workload identities. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-5(9) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Federated Credential Management Use the following external organizations to federate credentials: [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations]. In practice: Two organizations set up a trust between their identity services, so a partner's user can sign in with the credential their own employer issued. |
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Primary |
Federated credential management is commonly implemented through trust relationships between identity providers. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-8 IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users) Uniquely identify and authenticate non-organizational users or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users. In practice: Partners and guests sign in through external identity federation or a guest policy, so each outside person is still individually identified. |
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Primary |
Identification and authentication of non-organizational users is commonly implemented through external identity federation and guest access policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-8(2) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users) | Acceptance of External Authenticators (a) Accept only external authenticators that are NIST-compliant; and (b) Document and maintain a list of accepted external authenticators. In practice: The organization accepts only outside authenticators that meet NIST guidelines, keeps a written list of them, and limits federation with partner identity services to that list. |
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Primary |
Acceptance of external authenticators is commonly implemented through federation with partner identity providers and policy on accepted assurance. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-10 IA: Identification and Authentication | Adaptive Authentication Require individuals accessing the system to employ [Assignment: organization-defined supplemental authentication techniques or mechanisms] under specific [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances or situations]. In practice: Sign-in becomes stricter when something looks risky, such as an unfamiliar country, so the user is asked for an extra step on those attempts only. |
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Primary |
Adaptive authentication is commonly implemented as risk-based policy that raises authentication requirements on sign-ins that score as high risk. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-11 IA: Identification and Authentication | Re-authentication Require users to re-authenticate when [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances or situations requiring re-authentication]. In practice: Sensitive actions, such as changing bank details or approving a high-value request, prompt the user to sign in again, and a reauthentication interval policy sets how often. |
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Primary |
Re-authentication is commonly implemented through a reauthentication interval policy and step-up requirements for sensitive actions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-12 IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Proofing a. Identity proof users that require accounts for logical access to systems based on appropriate identity assurance level requirements as specified in applicable standards and guidelines; b. Resolve user identities to a unique individual; and c. Collect, validate, and verify identity evidence. In practice: New hires have their identity checked during onboarding, including remote checks with verifiable credentials, before an account with real access is issued. |
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Primary |
Identity proofing is commonly implemented as a verification step in onboarding, including remote verification with verifiable credentials. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-13 IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Providers and Authorization Servers Employ identity providers and authorization servers to manage user, device, and non-person entity (NPE) identities, attributes, and access rights supporting authentication and authorization decisions in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined identification and authentication policy] using [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms]. In practice: The organization runs its identity service and authorization server as the trusted source of sign-in, with managed signing keys, set token lifetimes and verified assertions. |
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Primary |
Identity providers and authorization servers are commonly operated with managed signing keys, defined token lifetimes and verified assertions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-13(2) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Providers and Authorization Servers | Verification of Identity Assertions and Access Tokens The source and integrity of identity assertions and access tokens are verified before granting access to system and information resources. In practice: Each application checks that a token's signature is valid, that it was meant for that app and that it has not expired, before letting the person in. |
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Primary |
Verification of identity assertions and access tokens is commonly implemented through signature validation, audience and lifetime checks on relying parties. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-13(3) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Providers and Authorization Servers | Token Management In accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined identification and authentication policy], assertions and access tokens are: (a) generated; (b) issued; (c) refreshed; (d) revoked; (e) time-restricted; and (f) audience-restricted. In practice: Tokens have set lifetimes, can be revoked when a user leaves, and may be tied to a device or session, which limits what a stolen one can do. |
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Primary |
Token management is commonly implemented through token lifetime, revocation and protection or session-binding settings. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| PS-4 PS: Personnel Security | Personnel Termination Upon termination of individual employment: a. Disable system access within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; b. Terminate or revoke any authenticators and credentials associated with the individual; c. Conduct exit interviews that include a discussion of [Assignment: organization-defined information security topics]; d. Retrieve all security-related organizational system-related property; and e. Retain access to organizational information and systems formerly controlled by terminated individual. In practice: On the termination date, an HR event disables the person's accounts, removes their access and prompts return of credentials, all within the time the organization has set. |
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Primary |
Personnel termination is commonly implemented through lifecycle workflows that disable accounts, revoke access and retrieve credentials at the termination event. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| PS-4(2) PS: Personnel Security | Personnel Termination | Automated Actions Use [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms] to [Selection (one or more): notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of individual termination actions; disable access to system resources]. In practice: A termination in the HR system automatically starts a workflow that notifies the manager and security team and disables the accounts, with no manual ticket needed. |
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Primary |
Automated actions on termination are commonly implemented as lifecycle workflows that notify and act on the termination event. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| PS-5 PS: Personnel Security | Personnel Transfer a. Review and confirm ongoing operational need for current logical and physical access authorizations to systems and facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the organization; b. Initiate [Assignment: organization-defined transfer or reassignment actions] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period following the formal transfer action]; c. Modify access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational need due to reassignment or transfer; and d. Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. In practice: When someone moves to a new department, a mover workflow asks the manager to confirm which old access is still needed and removes the rest. |
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Primary |
Personnel transfer is commonly implemented through mover workflows that reassess access and trigger review when role or department changes. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-1 AC: Access Control | Policy and Procedures a. Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: 1. [Selection (one or more): organization-level; mission/business process-level; system-level] access control policy that: (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and the associated access controls; b. Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the access control policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current access control: 1. Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events]; and 2. Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events]. In practice: The security team writes the access control policy; identity work supplies the inputs, such as account types, who signs off on requests, how often access is reviewed and how exceptions are logged. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationPolicy and procedure documentation is usually owned by the security governance function; identity work supplies the inputs. |
Identity assessment commonly produces the inputs to access control policy: account types, approval roles, review cadence and exceptions. |
Not mapped | Evidence commonly examined
|
| AC-2(5) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Inactivity Logout Require that users log out when [Assignment: organization-defined time period of expected inactivity or description of when to log out]. In practice: Policy tells users to sign out when they expect to be away longer than a set time, and session limits at the sign-in service are kept consistent with that rule. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationNIST describes this enhancement as behavior- or policy-based; identity session settings only support it. |
Inactivity logout is a user rule set in policy and rules of behavior; NIST addresses automatic enforcement under AC-11. Identity work contributes by keeping identity provider session limits consistent with the logout rule the organization sets. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(6) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Dynamic Privilege Management Implement [Assignment: organization-defined dynamic privilege management capabilities]. In practice: Rather than leaving broad rights in place all the time, staff request elevated access for a task and it expires afterward; the security team defines when that applies. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationRequires system-level support for dynamic privilege changes; identity tooling contributes the elevation and policy layer. |
Dynamic privilege management is commonly approximated with just-in-time elevation and context-based policy rather than standing privileges. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-2(8) AC: Access Control | Account Management | Dynamic Account Management Create, activate, manage, and deactivate [Assignment: organization-defined system accounts] dynamically. In practice: Accounts for short-lived systems or automated workloads are created when the workload starts and removed when it ends, using the same lifecycle rules as people. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationApplies mainly to cloud and workload platforms that create accounts on demand. |
Dynamic account management commonly relies on automated creation and deactivation of accounts for ephemeral or workload identities. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-3(2) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Dual Authorization Enforce dual authorization for [Assignment: organization-defined privileged commands and/or other organization-defined actions]. In practice: For the riskiest actions, a second person must sign off before the elevation or vault check-out goes through, and both names are recorded. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationThe control targets specified system actions; identity tooling supplies approval workflow for privileged access. |
Dual authorization is commonly implemented as an approval step on privileged elevation or credential check-out. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-3(10) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Audited Override of Access Control Mechanisms Employ an audited override of automated access control mechanisms under [Assignment: organization-defined conditions] by [Assignment: organization-defined roles]. In practice: A break-glass account exists for emergencies; every use is alerted on and reviewed afterward by someone other than the person who used it. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationThe override mechanism itself is system-specific. |
Audited override is commonly implemented as emergency access accounts with monitored use and review after each activation. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-4(17) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Domain Authentication Uniquely identify and authenticate source and destination points by [Selection (one or more): organization, system, application, service, individual] for information transfer. In practice: When two systems exchange data, each uses its own service identity and certificate so both ends are known; the network and application teams own the flow itself. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement is usually a network and data architecture concern. Identity commonly contributes the workload identities and certificate or token based service authentication on which the transfer mechanism relies to identify its endpoints. |
Workload identities and certificate or token based service authentication can support domain authentication of transfer endpoints. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(3) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Network Access to Privileged Commands Authorize network access to [Assignment: organization-defined privileged commands] only for [Assignment: organization-defined compelling operational needs] and document the rationale for such access in the security plan for the system. In practice: Remote use of powerful commands goes through a brokered session that records who connected and requires a written business reason first. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationNetwork path restrictions are usually owned by network and platform engineering. |
Network access to privileged commands is commonly brokered through privileged session management with documented rationale. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(8) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Privilege Levels for Code Execution Prevent the following software from executing at higher privilege levels than users executing the software: [Assignment: organization-defined software]. In practice: The endpoint team decides which software may run with elevated rights; identity roles help by limiting who can request that elevation in the first place. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationPrimary ownership usually sits with endpoint and platform engineering. |
Privilege levels for code execution are commonly constrained through endpoint privilege management policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-6(10) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Prohibit Non-privileged Users from Executing Privileged Functions Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions. In practice: The endpoint team sets elevation rules that stop regular users from running admin functions; identity contributes role design that keeps admin rights out of ordinary roles. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationTechnical prevention is usually enforced by the platform; identity work scopes who holds privilege. |
Prevention of privileged function execution by non-privileged users commonly depends on role design and endpoint elevation policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-7(4) AC: Access Control | Unsuccessful Logon Attempts | Use of Alternate Authentication Factor (a) Allow the use of [Assignment: organization-defined authentication factors] that are different from the primary authentication factors after the number of organization-defined consecutive invalid logon attempts have been exceeded; and (b) Enforce a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid logon attempts through use of the alternative factors by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. In practice: After repeated failed attempts, a user may show who they are another way, such as a security key; the allowed methods are set in the authentication policy. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationBehavior depends on the authenticator platform. |
Use of an alternate authentication factor after failed attempts commonly falls under authentication method policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-9(3) AC: Access Control | Previous Logon Notification | Notification of Account Changes Notify the user, upon successful logon, of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined security-related characteristics or parameters of the user’s account] during [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. In practice: When a user's password or sign-in method changes, the identity service sends them an alert, so they can spot a change they did not make. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationNotification delivery is usually platform specific. |
Identity work contributes user notifications of changes to sign-in methods and passwords; presenting those changes at the next logon, as the control states, depends on the platform. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-10 AC: Access Control | Concurrent Session Control Limit the number of concurrent sessions for each [Assignment: organization-defined account and/or account type] to [Assignment: organization-defined number]. In practice: The security team sets how many sessions one account can hold at once; where the sign-in service supports it, extra sessions are limited or ended. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationOften enforced in the application rather than the identity layer. |
Concurrent session limits are commonly addressed through session controls at the identity provider where supported. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-12 AC: Access Control | Session Termination Automatically terminate a user session after [Assignment: organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect]. In practice: Sessions end after conditions the organization sets, such as a maximum length or a revoked sign-in, using session lifetime and token revocation settings. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationApplication and platform session handling is usually the primary implementation point. |
Session termination conditions are commonly set through session lifetime, reauthentication interval and token revocation policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-12(1) AC: Access Control | Session Termination | User-initiated Logouts Provide a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions whenever authentication is used to gain access to [Assignment: organization-defined information resources]. In practice: Users have a clear sign out option, and where single sign-on is used, signing out can end the session across connected applications. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationApplication feature; identity provider contributes single logout. |
User-initiated logout is commonly supported through single logout and session revocation features. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-14 AC: Access Control | Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authentication a. Identify [Assignment: organization-defined user actions] that can be performed on the system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational mission and business functions; and b. Document and provide supporting rationale in the security plan for the system, user actions not requiring identification or authentication. In practice: The application owner lists the few actions anyone may take without signing in, like viewing a public page, and that list is reviewed with the access policy. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationDefining the permitted actions is usually a system owner decision. |
Actions permitted without identification are commonly documented as an exception list reviewed alongside access policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-16 AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes a. Provide the means to associate [Assignment: organization-defined types of security and privacy attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attribute values] for information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission; b. Ensure that the attribute associations are made and retained with the information; c. Establish the following permitted security and privacy attributes from the attributes defined in AC-16a for [Assignment: organization-defined systems]: [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributes]; d. Determine the following permitted attribute values or ranges for each of the established attributes: [Assignment: organization-defined attribute values or ranges for established attributes]; e. Audit changes to attributes; and f. Review [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributes] for applicability [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. In practice: Data owners define labels such as sensitivity or department, and identity attributes are managed under a standard with a named owner for each attribute. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationBinding attributes to information objects is usually a data platform concern. |
Security and privacy attributes associated with identities and resources are commonly governed through attribute standards and ownership. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-16(2) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Attribute Value Changes by Authorized Individuals Provide authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) the capability to define or change the value of associated security and privacy attributes. In practice: Only people in defined roles can change the value of a security attribute on a user or resource, and each change is logged and reviewed. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationObject-level attribute handling is usually platform specific. |
Attribute value changes by authorized individuals are commonly limited to defined roles, with changes logged and reviewed. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-16(10) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Attribute Configuration by Authorized Individuals Provide authorized individuals the capability to define or change the type and value of security and privacy attributes available for association with subjects and objects. In practice: Only named administrators can add or change the types of security attributes that exist, and that small group is part of regular access reviews. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationObject-level attribute handling is usually platform specific. |
Attribute configuration by authorized individuals is commonly limited to named administrative roles. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-17(1) AC: Access Control | Remote Access | Monitoring and Control Employ automated mechanisms to monitor and control remote access methods. In practice: Remote sign-ins are logged and checked against policy; identity tooling provides the sign-in records that the network team's monitoring uses. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationNetwork monitoring tooling carries primary ownership. |
Monitoring and control of remote access commonly includes sign-in logging and policy enforcement points that identity tooling feeds. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-17(4) AC: Access Control | Remote Access | Privileged Commands and Access (a) Authorize the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access only in a format that provides assessable evidence and for the following needs: [Assignment: organization-defined needs]; and (b) Document the rationale for remote access in the security plan for the system. In practice: Admin commands from outside the office run through a brokered session, so the activity is authorized and recorded before it reaches the system. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationPrimary enforcement is usually on the remote access gateway or target. |
Privileged commands over remote access are commonly authorized through brokered privileged sessions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-17(9) AC: Access Control | Remote Access | Disconnect or Disable Access Provide the capability to disconnect or disable remote access to the system within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. In practice: When a remote worker leaves or a device is lost, the help desk revokes their sessions and disables the account within the time the organization has set. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationConnection teardown is usually performed by the access gateway. |
Disconnecting or disabling remote access is commonly supported by session revocation and account disablement. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-17(10) AC: Access Control | Remote Access | Authenticate Remote Commands Implement [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms] to authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined remote commands]. In practice: Remote commands carry a signed request from a known workload identity, so the receiving system can check who sent it; the platform team owns the setup. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationMechanism is usually specific to management protocols. |
Authentication of remote commands commonly relies on signed requests and workload identities. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-18 AC: Access Control | Wireless Access a. Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of wireless access; and b. Authorize each type of wireless access to the system prior to allowing such connections. In practice: The network team sets wireless rules and authorizes each type of access; identity work supplies the directory-backed or certificate-based sign-in that users and devices use. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationWireless configuration is usually owned by network engineering. |
Wireless access authorization is commonly tied to directory-backed or certificate-based device and user authentication. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-18(1) AC: Access Control | Wireless Access | Authentication and Encryption Protect wireless access to the system using authentication of [Selection (one or more): users; devices] and encryption. In practice: Laptops and phones join the wireless network with a certificate or directory login, and traffic is encrypted; identity supplies the credentials, and the network team runs the radios. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationWireless configuration is usually owned by network engineering. |
Authentication for wireless access is commonly implemented with certificate-based or directory-backed 802.1X authentication. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| AC-19 AC: Access Control | Access Control for Mobile Devices a. Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices, to include when such devices are outside of controlled areas; and b. Authorize the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems. In practice: Phones and tablets must be registered and meet device rules before they can reach company apps; the endpoint team sets the rules, and sign-in policy checks them. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationDevice configuration is usually owned by endpoint management. |
Mobile device access is commonly gated by device registration, compliance state and policy-based access rules. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| AC-20 AC: Access Control | Use of External Systems a. [Selection (one or more): establish [Assignment: organization-defined terms and conditions]; identify [Assignment: organization-defined controls asserted to be implemented on external systems]], consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external systems, allowing authorized individuals to: 1. Access the system from external systems; and 2. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external systems; or b. Prohibit the use of [Assignment: organizationally-defined types of external systems]. In practice: Policy decides what people may do from partner networks or personal devices, and identity settings control guest users and unmanaged device access to company apps. |
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Supporting
Why this classificationAgreements and technical limits on external systems extend beyond identity. |
Use of external systems is commonly governed through external identity, cross-organization and unmanaged-device access policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
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Evidence commonly examined
|
| AC-20(3) AC: Access Control | Use of External Systems | Non-organizationally Owned Systems — Restricted Use Restrict the use of non-organizationally owned systems or system components to process, store, or transmit organizational information using [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions]. In practice: From a personal or unmanaged laptop, a user gets limited access, such as browser-only with downloads blocked, based on device-state conditions at sign-in. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationDevice management is usually owned by endpoint engineering. |
Restrictions on non-organizationally owned systems are commonly expressed as device-state conditions and session limits. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-24 AC: Access Control | Access Control Decisions [Selection (one or more): establish procedures; implement mechanisms] to ensure [Assignment: organization-defined access control decisions] are applied to each access request prior to access enforcement. In practice: A central policy decision point in the identity service checks each request's attributes before access is granted; the application owner defines what must be checked. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationDecision logic spans application and platform design. |
Access control decisions are commonly made at a policy decision point that identity tooling operates, using the attributes of the request. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AC-24(1) AC: Access Control | Access Control Decisions | Transmit Access Authorization Information Transmit [Assignment: organization-defined access authorization information] using [Assignment: organization-defined controls] to [Assignment: organization-defined systems] that enforce access control decisions. In practice: After sign-in, the identity service passes signed tokens with the user's roles to the application, which relies on them to decide what the person may open. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationToken consumption is usually application specific. |
Transmission of access authorization information is commonly performed through signed tokens and claims between identity provider and relying party. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| AU-2 AU: Audit and Accountability | Event Logging a. Identify the types of events that the system is capable of logging in support of the audit function: [Assignment: organization-defined event types that the system is capable of logging]; b. Coordinate the event logging function with other organizational entities requiring audit-related information to guide and inform the selection criteria for events to be logged; c. Specify the following event types for logging within the system: [Assignment: organization-defined event types (subset of the event types defined in AU-2a.) along with the frequency of (or situation requiring) logging for each identified event type]; d. Provide a rationale for why the event types selected for logging are deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of incidents; and e. Review and update the event types selected for logging [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. In practice: The security team chooses which events to log; identity contributes sign-ins, authentication method changes, role changes and privileged activations to that list. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationAudit event selection is usually owned by security monitoring. |
Event selection commonly includes identity events: sign-ins, authentication method changes, role changes and privileged activations. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| AU-3 AU: Audit and Accountability | Content of Audit Records Ensure that audit records contain information that establishes the following: a. What type of event occurred; b. When the event occurred; c. Where the event occurred; d. Source of the event; e. Outcome of the event; and f. Identity of any individuals, subjects, or objects/entities associated with the event. In practice: Each identity log entry shows who did what, when, from where and whether it worked, which helps the security team follow an event. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationRecord content is determined by each log source. |
Identity log records commonly carry the user, source, outcome and application of each event. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| AU-6 AU: Audit and Accountability | Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting a. Review and analyze system audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for indications of [Assignment: organization-defined inappropriate or unusual activity] and the potential impact of the inappropriate or unusual activity; b. Report findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; and c. Adjust the level of audit record review, analysis, and reporting within the system when there is a change in risk based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information. In practice: The security team reviews logs on a schedule; identity risk detections and SIEM content for sign-ins and privileged activity point reviewers to what to look at. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationReview and reporting processes are usually owned by security operations. |
Review of identity logs is commonly supported by identity risk detections and SIEM content for authentication and privileged activity. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| AU-9 AU: Audit and Accountability | Protection of Audit Information a. Protect audit information and audit logging tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion; and b. Alert [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] upon detection of unauthorized access, modification, or deletion of audit information. In practice: Only a small group can read or manage identity logs, and administrators who run the identity system are kept separate from those who guard its logs. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationPrimary ownership usually sits with logging platform administration. |
Protection of audit information commonly includes role-based access to identity log stores and administrator separation. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| AU-12 AU: Audit and Accountability | Audit Record Generation a. Provide audit record generation capability for the event types the system is capable of auditing as defined in AU-2a on [Assignment: organization-defined system components]; b. Allow [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to select the event types that are to be logged by specific components of the system; and c. Generate audit records for the event types defined in AU-2c that include the audit record content defined in AU-3. In practice: The identity service, governance platform and privileged access vault each have logging turned on, and their records are routed to the central SIEM. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationGeneration capability is usually a feature of each system. |
Audit record generation commonly depends on enabling identity provider, governance and privileged access logging and routing it to the SIEM. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| AU-14 AU: Audit and Accountability | Session Audit a. Provide and implement the capability for [Assignment: organization-defined users or roles] to [Selection (one or more): record; view; hear; log] the content of a user session under [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances]; and b. Develop, integrate, and use session auditing activities in consultation with legal counsel and in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. In practice: When someone uses a privileged account, the session can be recorded so an authorized reviewer can replay what was done later. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationApplication and platform session capture is usually the primary implementation point. |
Session audit is commonly supported by recorded privileged sessions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-1 IA: Identification and Authentication | Policy and Procedures a. Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]: 1. [Selection (one or more): organization-level; mission/business process-level; system-level] identification and authentication policy that: (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and the associated identification and authentication controls; b. Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current identification and authentication: 1. Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events]; and 2. Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events]. In practice: The security team writes the sign-in policy; identity assessment supplies the inputs, such as which authenticators are in use, what assurance level each app needs and what exceptions exist. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationPolicy documentation is usually owned by the security governance function. |
Identity assessment commonly supplies the identification and authentication policy inputs: authenticator types, assurance levels and exceptions. |
Not mapped | Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-2(12) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Acceptance of PIV Credentials Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compliant credentials. In practice: Where federal-style smart cards are in use, the sign-in service is set up to read and check the card's certificate; the badge office issues the cards. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationApplies to federal PIV deployments. |
Acceptance of PIV credentials is commonly implemented through certificate-based authentication configuration. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-2(13) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Out-of-band Authentication Implement the following out-of-band authentication mechanisms under [Assignment: organization-defined conditions]: [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band authentication]. In practice: A user may confirm a sign-in through a phone notification or call to a registered number, under conditions the organization chooses. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationMechanism choice is usually a system owner decision. |
Out-of-band authentication is commonly provided by push or voice methods registered to the user. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-3 IA: Identification and Authentication | Device Identification and Authentication Uniquely identify and authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined devices and/or types of devices] before establishing a [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection. In practice: Company laptops and devices are registered and carry a certificate, so the network can tell a known device from an unknown one; the endpoint team owns the devices. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationNetwork-layer device authentication is usually owned by network engineering. |
Device identification and authentication is commonly implemented with device registration and certificate-based device identity. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-3(1) IA: Identification and Authentication | Device Identification and Authentication | Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication Authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined devices and/or types of devices] before establishing [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based. In practice: A device and the server it connects to each present a certificate and check the other's, so neither side talks to an impostor; identity supports the certificate setup. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationProtocol implementation is usually owned by network engineering. |
Cryptographic bidirectional authentication of devices is commonly implemented with device certificates. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-3(4) IA: Identification and Authentication | Device Identification and Authentication | Device Attestation Handle device identification and authentication based on attestation by [Assignment: organization-defined configuration management process]. In practice: At sign-in, the identity service checks whether the device's health report comes from the organization's configuration process, and blocks devices that fail. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationAttestation mechanisms are device platform features. |
Device attestation is commonly used in device-state conditions evaluated at sign-in. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
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| IA-4(1) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identifier Management | Prohibit Account Identifiers as Public Identifiers Prohibit the use of system account identifiers that are the same as public identifiers for individual accounts. In practice: A person's login name is kept different from their public email or published name, which is handled in identifier and directory design. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationPublic identifier policy is usually owned by the messaging and communications teams. |
Separating account identifiers from public identifiers is commonly addressed in identifier and directory design. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-4(5) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identifier Management | Dynamic Management Manage individual identifiers dynamically in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined dynamic identifier policy]. In practice: Identifiers for short-lived systems or workloads are issued and retired automatically under a dynamic identifier policy the organization sets. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationApplies mainly to cloud and workload platforms. |
Dynamic identifier management is commonly relevant to ephemeral and workload identities. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-4(6) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identifier Management | Cross-organization Management Coordinate with the following external organizations for cross-organization management of identifiers: [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations]. In practice: When partners need access, the two organizations agree how each other's people are identified, usually set up in federation or external identity configuration. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationRequires agreement with the other organization. |
Cross-organization identifier management is commonly addressed in federation and external identity configuration. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-4(8) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identifier Management | Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifiers Generate pairwise pseudonymous identifiers. In practice: Some applications see a unique, meaningless identifier for each user instead of a shared one, a pairwise option offered by modern sign-in standards. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationPrivacy design decision for the relying party. |
Pairwise pseudonymous identifiers are commonly supported as an OIDC subject identifier option. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-4(9) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identifier Management | Attribute Maintenance and Protection Maintain the attributes for each uniquely identified individual, device, or service in [Assignment: organization-defined protected central storage]. In practice: Each person's attributes, such as title and manager, are kept in one protected authoritative source, with named owners and a change process. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationAttribute policy is usually shared with HR and privacy functions. |
Attribute maintenance and protection are commonly addressed through authoritative-source attribute ownership and change control. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-5(5) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Change Authenticators Prior to Delivery Require developers and installers of system components to provide unique authenticators or change default authenticators prior to delivery and installation. In practice: When a new appliance or platform arrives, the installer changes its default password to a unique one before it goes into service, and the new credential is vaulted. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationProcedural control usually owned by delivery and engineering teams. |
Changing default authenticators before delivery is commonly addressed in credential onboarding for platforms and appliances. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-5(6) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Protection of Authenticators Protect authenticators commensurate with the security category of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access. In practice: Credentials are stored in a vault with limited access, and the more sensitive the system they open, the tighter the controls around them. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationProtection levels depend on the system storing the authenticator. |
Protection of authenticators is commonly supported by vaulting and by access control on credential stores. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-5(8) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Multiple System Accounts Implement [Assignment: organization-defined security controls] to manage the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple systems. In practice: People who hold accounts on many systems sign in once through single sign-on or go passwordless, which lowers the number of passwords that can be lost. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationImplementation depends on the number of independent systems. |
Risk from multiple system accounts is commonly reduced through single sign-on and passwordless methods. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-5(10) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Dynamic Credential Binding Bind identities and authenticators dynamically using the following rules: [Assignment: organization-defined binding rules]. In practice: Short-lived workload credentials and device-bound credentials are tied to their owner by defined rules when issued, then expire. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationPlatform specific. |
Dynamic credential binding is commonly relevant to short-lived workload credentials and device-bound credentials. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-5(13) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Expiration of Cached Authenticators Prohibit the use of cached authenticators after [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. In practice: Cached credentials stop working after a set time, which token lifetime and session policy settings carry out, limiting how long a stolen cache stays useful. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationToken and cache handling is usually application specific. |
Expiration of cached authenticators is commonly addressed through token lifetime and session policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-5(16) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | In-person or Trusted External Party Authenticator Issuance Require that the issuance of [Assignment: organization-defined types of and/or specific authenticators] be conducted [Selection: in person; by a trusted external party] before [Assignment: organization-defined registration authority] with authorization by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]. In practice: For high-trust credentials like hardware security keys, onboarding includes handing the key over in person or through a trusted third party. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationPhysical issuance is usually a human resources and security operations process. |
In-person or trusted external party authenticator issuance is commonly a step in onboarding for credentials such as security keys. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-5(18) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Password Managers (a) Employ [Assignment: organization-defined password managers] to generate and manage passwords; and (b) Protect the passwords using [Assignment: organization-defined controls]. In practice: Staff use an approved enterprise password manager or vault to create and store passwords, with user guidance on how to use it. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationProduct selection is usually an organizational decision. |
Password managers are commonly addressed through an enterprise credential vault and user guidance. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-6 IA: Identification and Authentication | Authentication Feedback Obscure feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation and use by unauthorized individuals. In practice: The sign-in page hides what is typed and gives generic error messages, so it does not reveal whether the username or the password was wrong. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationMostly an application behavior. |
Authentication feedback is commonly governed by sign-in page and error message settings on the identity provider. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-8(1) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users) | Acceptance of PIV Credentials from Other Agencies Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compliant credentials from other federal agencies. In practice: Where agencies share smart cards, the sign-in service trusts their certificates through a configured certificate trust; the card issuer handles the cards. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationApplies to federal deployments. |
Acceptance of PIV credentials from other agencies is commonly implemented through certificate trust configuration. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-8(4) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users) | Use of Defined Profiles Conform to the following profiles for identity management [Assignment: organization-defined identity management profiles]. In practice: Federation with outside parties follows a defined profile, so the claims and formats exchanged are the same for each partner. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationProfiles are defined by the sponsoring program. |
Use of defined profiles is commonly implemented through federation profiles and claim requirements. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-8(5) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users) | Acceptance of PIV-I Credentials Accept and verify federated or PKI credentials that meet [Assignment: organization-defined policy]. In practice: Certificates issued to affiliated or non-government people are accepted only when they meet the organization's stated policy, using configured certificate trust. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationApplies to federal deployments. |
Acceptance of PIV-I credentials is commonly implemented through certificate trust configuration. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-9 IA: Identification and Authentication | Service Identification and Authentication Uniquely identify and authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined system services and applications] before establishing communications with devices, users, or other services or applications. In practice: Applications and services show who they are to each other with workload identities and certificates or tokens before they exchange data. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationService design and protocol choice are usually owned by engineering. |
Service identification and authentication is commonly implemented with workload identities and certificate or token based service authentication. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-12(1) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Proofing | Supervisor Authorization Require that the registration process to receive an account for logical access includes supervisor or sponsor authorization. In practice: A new account request includes a manager or sponsor sign-off step in the onboarding workflow, so someone accountable vouches for the person. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationProcedural step usually owned by human resources. |
Supervisor authorization for identity proofing is commonly implemented as a manager approval step in onboarding. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-12(2) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Proofing | Identity Evidence Require evidence of individual identification be presented to the registration authority. In practice: The onboarding procedure states which identity documents the registration team must see, and the verification tool settings reflect that rule. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationEvidence requirements derive from the proofing policy. |
Identity evidence requirements are commonly set in onboarding procedures and verified-credential settings. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-12(3) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Proofing | Identity Evidence Validation and Verification Require that the presented identity evidence be validated and verified through [Assignment: organizational defined methods of validation and verification]. In practice: The documents a new hire presents are checked for validity, often through a remote verification service, before the registration team issues the account. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationVerification providers and methods are usually a program decision. |
Validation and verification of identity evidence is commonly supported by remote verification services. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-12(6) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Proofing | Accept Externally-proofed Identities Accept externally-proofed identities at [Assignment: organization-defined identity assurance level]. In practice: If a trusted outside provider has already verified someone's identity, the organization accepts that result at the assurance level it has chosen, through federation. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationRequires an agreement and assurance mapping with the provider. |
Acceptance of externally proofed identities is commonly implemented through federation with a trusted proofing provider. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| IA-13(1) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Providers and Authorization Servers | Protection of Cryptographic Keys Cryptographic keys that protect access tokens are generated, managed, and protected from disclosure and misuse. In practice: The certificates that sign tokens are tracked on a calendar, renewed before expiry and stored in protected key storage, with access limited to a few administrators. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationKey protection is usually shared with platform and cryptographic key management teams. |
Protection of identity provider signing keys is commonly addressed through certificate lifecycle management and key storage controls. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PS-3 PS: Personnel Security | Personnel Screening a. Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to the system; and b. Rescreen individuals in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined conditions requiring rescreening and, where rescreening is so indicated, the frequency of rescreening]. In practice: HR finishes background screening first, and the onboarding workflow holds back the new hire's access until the screening is recorded as complete. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationScreening itself is usually performed by human resources and security. |
Personnel screening is commonly implemented as a gate in onboarding that withholds access until screening is recorded complete. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PS-6 PS: Personnel Security | Access Agreements a. Develop and document access agreements for organizational systems; b. Review and update the access agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and c. Verify that individuals requiring access to organizational information and systems: 1. Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and 2. Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational systems when access agreements have been updated or [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. In practice: New hires and contractors acknowledge the rules of use during onboarding or when they request access, and the signed acknowledgment is stored with the request. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationAgreement content is usually owned by legal and human resources. |
Access agreements are commonly tracked as an acknowledgement step in onboarding and in access requests. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| PS-7 PS: Personnel Security | External Personnel Security a. Establish personnel security requirements, including security roles and responsibilities for external providers; b. Require external providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures established by the organization; c. Document personnel security requirements; d. Require external providers to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of any personnel transfers or terminations of external personnel who possess organizational credentials and/or badges, or who have system privileges within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and e. Monitor provider compliance with personnel security requirements. In practice: Contractors and vendor staff have a named sponsor and an end date on their accounts, and their access is reviewed on a schedule; HR and procurement set the terms. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationContract terms and security requirements are usually owned by procurement and security. |
External personnel are commonly managed through contractor lifecycle with sponsors, end dates and access review. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| SC-2 SC: System and Communications Protection | Separation of System and User Functionality Separate user functionality, including user interface services, from system management functionality. In practice: Administrators use a separate account and admin portal, kept apart from the ordinary user interface; the platform team designs that separation. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationTechnical separation is usually a platform design matter. |
Separation of user and system management functionality is commonly supported by separate administrative identities and administrative portal restrictions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| SC-10 SC: System and Communications Protection | Network Disconnect Terminate the network connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity. In practice: Network connections close after a period of inactivity set by the organization, and the identity session timeout is aligned with that period. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationNetwork device configuration is usually the primary implementation point; identity contributes by aligning identity session timeouts with the network inactivity period. |
Network disconnect after inactivity is commonly aligned with session timeout policy. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| SC-12 SC: System and Communications Protection | Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management Establish and manage cryptographic keys when cryptography is employed within the system in accordance with the following key management requirements: [Assignment: organization-defined requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction]. In practice: The keys and certificates that sign identity tokens are generated, stored in a protected place and renewed before they expire; the security team owns key policy. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationCryptographic key management is usually a broader program. |
Key management for identity systems commonly includes signing certificate lifecycle for federation and vaulted keys. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| SC-17 SC: System and Communications Protection | Public Key Infrastructure Certificates a. Issue public key certificates under an [Assignment: organization-defined certificate policy] or obtain public key certificates from an approved service provider; and b. Include only approved trust anchors in trust stores or certificate stores managed by the organization. In practice: Certificates for devices and user sign-in come from an approved certificate authority under the organization's certificate policy, which the security team runs. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationCertificate authority operation is usually owned by PKI administration. |
Public key infrastructure certificates are commonly used for device and certificate-based user authentication. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| SC-23 SC: System and Communications Protection | Session Authenticity Protect the authenticity of communications sessions. In practice: Signed assertions and protected session tokens help show that a session belongs to the user who started it, while the network team secures the connection itself. |
|
Supporting
Why this classificationTransport and application session protection is usually the primary implementation point. |
Session authenticity is commonly supported by protection of session tokens, session binding and signed assertions. |
Platform families that commonly provide relevant capabilities
|
Evidence commonly examined
|
| AC-3(3) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Mandatory Access Control Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined mandatory access control policy] over the set of covered subjects and objects specified in the policy, and where the policy: (a) Is uniformly enforced across the covered subjects and objects within the system; (b) Specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from doing any of the following; (1) Passing the information to unauthorized subjects or objects; (2) Granting its privileges to other subjects; (3) Changing one or more security attributes (specified by the policy) on subjects, objects, the system, or system components; (4) Choosing the security attributes and attribute values (specified by the policy) to be associated with newly created or modified objects; and (5) Changing the rules governing access control; and (c) Specifies that [Assignment: organization-defined subjects] may explicitly be granted [Assignment: organization-defined privileges] such that they are not limited by any defined subset (or all) of the above constraints. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAccess enforcement variant for information and data policy; ownership usually sits with data platform and application design. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-3(4) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Discretionary Access Control Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined discretionary access control policy] over the set of covered subjects and objects specified in the policy, and where the policy specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information can do one or more of the following: (a) Pass the information to any other subjects or objects; (b) Grant its privileges to other subjects; (c) Change security attributes on subjects, objects, the system, or the system’s components; (d) Choose the security attributes to be associated with newly created or revised objects; or (e) Change the rules governing access control. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAccess enforcement variant for information and data policy; ownership usually sits with data platform and application design. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-3(5) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Security-relevant Information Prevent access to [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant information] except during secure, non-operable system states. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAccess enforcement variant for information and data policy; ownership usually sits with data platform and application design. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-3(9) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Controlled Release Release information outside of the system only if: (a) The receiving [Assignment: organization-defined system or system component] provides [Assignment: organization-defined controls]; and (b) [Assignment: organization-defined controls] are used to validate the appropriateness of the information designated for release. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAccess enforcement variant for information and data policy; ownership usually sits with data platform and application design. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-3(11) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Restrict Access to Specific Information Types Restrict access to data repositories containing [Assignment: organization-defined information types]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAccess enforcement variant for information and data policy; ownership usually sits with data platform and application design. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-3(12) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Assert and Enforce Application Access (a) Require applications to assert, as part of the installation process, the access needed to the following system applications and functions: [Assignment: organization-defined system applications and functions]; (b) Provide an enforcement mechanism to prevent unauthorized access; and (c) Approve access changes after initial installation of the application. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInstall-time permission declarations for device and system functions; ownership usually sits with endpoint, mobile and platform engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-3(14) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Individual Access Provide [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms] to enable individuals to have access to the following elements of their personally identifiable information: [Assignment: organization-defined elements]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAccess enforcement variant for information and data policy; ownership usually sits with data platform and application design. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-3(15) AC: Access Control | Access Enforcement | Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control (a) Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined mandatory access control policy] over the set of covered subjects and objects specified in the policy; and (b) Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined discretionary access control policy] over the set of covered subjects and objects specified in the policy. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAccess enforcement variant for information and data policy; ownership usually sits with data platform and application design. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4 AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems based on [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(1) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Object Security and Privacy Attributes Use [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributes] associated with [Assignment: organization-defined information, source, and destination objects] to enforce [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies] as a basis for flow control decisions. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(2) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Processing Domains Use protected processing domains to enforce [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies] as a basis for flow control decisions. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(3) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Dynamic Information Flow Control Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(4) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Flow Control of Encrypted Information Prevent encrypted information from bypassing [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control mechanisms] by [Selection (one or more): decrypting the information; blocking the flow of the encrypted information; terminating communications sessions attempting to pass encrypted information; [Assignment: organization-defined procedure or method]]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(5) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Embedded Data Types Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined limitations] on embedding data types within other data types. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(6) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Metadata Enforce information flow control based on [Assignment: organization-defined metadata]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(7) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | One-way Flow Mechanisms Enforce one-way information flows through hardware-based flow control mechanisms. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(8) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Security and Privacy Policy Filters (a) Enforce information flow control using [Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy filters] as a basis for flow control decisions for [Assignment: organization-defined information flows]; and (b) [Selection (one or more): block; strip; modify; quarantine] data after a filter processing failure in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(9) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Human Reviews Enforce the use of human reviews for [Assignment: organization-defined information flows] under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(10) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Enable and Disable Security or Privacy Policy Filters Provide the capability for privileged administrators to enable and disable [Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy filters] under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(11) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Configuration of Security or Privacy Policy Filters Provide the capability for privileged administrators to configure [Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy filters] to support different security or privacy policies. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(12) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Data Type Identifiers When transferring information between different security domains, use [Assignment: organization-defined data type identifiers] to validate data essential for information flow decisions. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(13) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Decomposition into Policy-relevant Subcomponents When transferring information between different security domains, decompose information into [Assignment: organization-defined policy-relevant subcomponents] for submission to policy enforcement mechanisms. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(14) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Security or Privacy Policy Filter Constraints When transferring information between different security domains, implement [Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy filters] requiring fully enumerated formats that restrict data structure and content. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(15) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Detection of Unsanctioned Information When transferring information between different security domains, examine the information for the presence of [Assignment: organization-defined unsanctioned information] and prohibit the transfer of such information in accordance with the [Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(19) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Validation of Metadata When transferring information between different security domains, implement [Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy filters] on metadata. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(20) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Approved Solutions Employ [Assignment: organization-defined solutions in approved configurations] to control the flow of [Assignment: organization-defined information] across security domains. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(21) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Physical or Logical Separation of Information Flows Separate information flows logically or physically using [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms and/or techniques] to accomplish [Assignment: organization-defined required separations by types of information]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(22) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Access Only Provide access from a single device to computing platforms, applications, or data residing in multiple different security domains, while preventing information flow between the different security domains. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(23) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Modify Non-releasable Information When transferring information between different security domains, modify non-releasable information by implementing [Assignment: organization-defined modification action]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(24) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Internal Normalized Format When transferring information between different security domains, parse incoming data into an internal normalized format and regenerate the data to be consistent with its intended specification. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(25) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Data Sanitization When transferring information between different security domains, sanitize data to minimize [Selection (one or more): delivery of malicious content, command and control of malicious code, malicious code augmentation, and steganography-encoded data; spillage of sensitive information] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined policy]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(26) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Audit Filtering Actions When transferring information between different security domains, record and audit content filtering actions and results for the information being filtered. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(27) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Redundant/Independent Filtering Mechanisms When transferring information between different security domains, implement content filtering solutions that provide redundant and independent filtering mechanisms for each data type. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(28) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Linear Filter Pipelines When transferring information between different security domains, implement a linear content filter pipeline that is enforced with discretionary and mandatory access controls. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(29) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Filter Orchestration Engines When transferring information between different security domains, employ content filter orchestration engines to ensure that: (a) Content filtering mechanisms successfully complete execution without errors; and (b) Content filtering actions occur in the correct order and comply with [Assignment: organization-defined policy]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(30) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Filter Mechanisms Using Multiple Processes When transferring information between different security domains, implement content filtering mechanisms using multiple processes. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(31) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Failed Content Transfer Prevention When transferring information between different security domains, prevent the transfer of failed content to the receiving domain. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-4(32) AC: Access Control | Information Flow Enforcement | Process Requirements for Information Transfer When transferring information between different security domains, the process that transfers information between filter pipelines: (a) Does not filter message content; (b) Validates filtering metadata; (c) Ensures the content associated with the filtering metadata has successfully completed filtering; and (d) Transfers the content to the destination filter pipeline. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation flow enforcement. In GCA's classification, primary implementation usually sits with network and data security architecture; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-6(4) AC: Access Control | Least Privilege | Separate Processing Domains Provide separate processing domains to enable finer-grained allocation of user privileges. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAccess control mechanism detail that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with platform and application owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-7(2) AC: Access Control | Unsuccessful Logon Attempts | Purge or Wipe Mobile Device Purge or wipe information from [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices] based on [Assignment: organization-defined purging or wiping requirements and techniques] after [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive, unsuccessful device logon attempts. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDevice-specific lockout behavior; ownership usually sits with endpoint and mobile device management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-7(3) AC: Access Control | Unsuccessful Logon Attempts | Biometric Attempt Limiting Limit the number of unsuccessful biometric logon attempts to [Assignment: organization-defined number]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDevice and authenticator lockout behavior; ownership usually sits with endpoint and authenticator platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-8 AC: Access Control | System Use Notification a. Display [Assignment: organization-defined system use notification message or banner] to users before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines and state that: 1. Users are accessing a U.S. Government system; 2. System usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit; 3. Unauthorized use of the system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties; and 4. Use of the system indicates consent to monitoring and recording; b. Retain the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the system; and c. For publicly accessible systems: 1. Display system use information [Assignment: organization-defined conditions], before granting further access to the publicly accessible system; 2. Display references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and 3. Include a description of the authorized uses of the system. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationSystem use notification (banner); ownership usually sits with application and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-9 AC: Access Control | Previous Logon Notification Notify the user, upon successful logon to the system, of the date and time of the last logon. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationLogon notification detail; ownership usually sits with application and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-9(1) AC: Access Control | Previous Logon Notification | Unsuccessful Logons Notify the user, upon successful logon, of the number of unsuccessful logon attempts since the last successful logon. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationLogon notification detail; ownership usually sits with application owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-9(2) AC: Access Control | Previous Logon Notification | Successful and Unsuccessful Logons Notify the user, upon successful logon, of the number of [Selection: successful logons; unsuccessful logon attempts; both] during [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationLogon notification detail; ownership usually sits with application owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-9(4) AC: Access Control | Previous Logon Notification | Additional Logon Information Notify the user, upon successful logon, of the following additional information: [Assignment: organization-defined additional information]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationLogon notification detail; ownership usually sits with application owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-11 AC: Access Control | Device Lock a. Prevent further access to the system by [Selection (one or more): initiating a device lock after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity; requiring the user to initiate a device lock before leaving the system unattended]; and b. Retain the device lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDevice lock behavior; ownership usually sits with endpoint management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-11(1) AC: Access Control | Device Lock | Pattern-hiding Displays Conceal, via the device lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationDevice lock behavior; ownership usually sits with endpoint management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-12(2) AC: Access Control | Session Termination | Termination Message Display an explicit logout message to users indicating the termination of authenticated communications sessions. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationSession termination message behavior; ownership usually sits with application owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-12(3) AC: Access Control | Session Termination | Timeout Warning Message Display an explicit message to users indicating that the session will end in [Assignment: organization-defined time until end of session]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationSession termination message behavior; ownership usually sits with application owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-16(1) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Dynamic Attribute Association Dynamically associate security and privacy attributes with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] in accordance with the following security and privacy policies as information is created and combined: [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy policies]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationBinding of security attributes to information objects; ownership usually sits with data and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-16(3) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Maintenance of Attribute Associations by System Maintain the association and integrity of [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributes] to [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationBinding of security attributes to information objects; ownership usually sits with data and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-16(4) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Association of Attributes by Authorized Individuals Provide the capability to associate [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals). |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationBinding of security attributes to information objects; ownership usually sits with data and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-16(5) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Attribute Displays on Objects to Be Output Display security and privacy attributes in human-readable form on each object that the system transmits to output devices to identify [Assignment: organization-defined special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions] using [Assignment: organization-defined human-readable, standard naming conventions]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationBinding of security attributes to information objects; ownership usually sits with data and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-16(6) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Maintenance of Attribute Association Require personnel to associate and maintain the association of [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy policies]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationBinding of security attributes to information objects; ownership usually sits with data and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-16(7) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Consistent Attribute Interpretation Provide a consistent interpretation of security and privacy attributes transmitted between distributed system components. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationBinding of security attributes to information objects; ownership usually sits with data and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-16(8) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Association Techniques and Technologies Implement [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and technologies] in associating security and privacy attributes to information. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationBinding of security attributes to information objects; ownership usually sits with data and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-16(9) AC: Access Control | Security and Privacy Attributes | Attribute Reassignment — Regrading Mechanisms Change security and privacy attributes associated with information only via regrading mechanisms validated using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or procedures]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationBinding of security attributes to information objects; ownership usually sits with data and platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-17(2) AC: Access Control | Remote Access | Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRemote access cryptography and network control points; ownership usually sits with network engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-17(3) AC: Access Control | Remote Access | Managed Access Control Points Route remote accesses through authorized and managed network access control points. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationRemote access cryptography and network control points; ownership usually sits with network engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-17(6) AC: Access Control | Remote Access | Protection of Mechanism Information Protect information about remote access mechanisms from unauthorized use and disclosure. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProtection of information about remote access mechanisms; ownership usually sits with network engineering and security operations. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-18(3) AC: Access Control | Wireless Access | Disable Wireless Networking Disable, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities embedded within system components prior to issuance and deployment. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationWireless configuration; ownership usually sits with network engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-18(4) AC: Access Control | Wireless Access | Restrict Configurations by Users Identify and explicitly authorize users allowed to independently configure wireless networking capabilities. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationWireless configuration; ownership usually sits with network engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-18(5) AC: Access Control | Wireless Access | Antennas and Transmission Power Levels Select radio antennas and calibrate transmission power levels to reduce the probability that signals from wireless access points can be received outside of organization-controlled boundaries. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationWireless configuration; ownership usually sits with network engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-19(4) AC: Access Control | Access Control for Mobile Devices | Restrictions for Classified Information (a) Prohibit the use of unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information unless specifically permitted by the authorizing official; and (b) Enforce the following restrictions on individuals permitted by the authorizing official to use unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information: (1) Connection of unclassified mobile devices to classified systems is prohibited; (2) Connection of unclassified mobile devices to unclassified systems requires approval from the authorizing official; (3) Use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces within the unclassified mobile devices is prohibited; and (4) Unclassified mobile devices and the information stored on those devices are subject to random reviews and inspections by [Assignment: organization-defined security officials], and if classified information is found, the incident handling policy is followed. (c) Restrict the connection of classified mobile devices to classified systems in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationMobile device configuration; ownership usually sits with endpoint management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-19(5) AC: Access Control | Access Control for Mobile Devices | Full Device or Container-based Encryption Employ [Selection: full-device encryption; container-based encryption] to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationMobile device configuration; ownership usually sits with endpoint management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-20(1) AC: Access Control | Use of External Systems | Limits on Authorized Use Permit authorized individuals to use an external system to access the system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only after: (a) Verification of the implementation of controls on the external system as specified in the organization’s security and privacy policies and security and privacy plans; or (b) Retention of approved system connection or processing agreements with the organizational entity hosting the external system. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationVerification of controls on external systems and connection or processing agreements; ownership usually sits with security assessment, procurement and system owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-20(2) AC: Access Control | Use of External Systems | Portable Storage Devices — Restricted Use Restrict the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external systems using [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationPortable and network storage limits on external systems; ownership usually sits with endpoint and data protection teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-20(4) AC: Access Control | Use of External Systems | Network Accessible Storage Devices — Prohibited Use Prohibit the use of [Assignment: organization-defined network accessible storage devices] in external systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationPortable and network storage limits on external systems; ownership usually sits with endpoint and data protection teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-20(5) AC: Access Control | Use of External Systems | Portable Storage Devices — Prohibited Use Prohibit the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external systems. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationPortable and network storage limits on external systems; ownership usually sits with endpoint and data protection teams. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-21 AC: Access Control | Information Sharing a. Enable authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to a sharing partner match the information’s access and use restrictions for [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing circumstances where user discretion is required]; and b. Employ [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms or manual processes] to assist users in making information sharing and collaboration decisions. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation sharing decisions; ownership usually sits with data owners and records management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-21(1) AC: Access Control | Information Sharing | Automated Decision Support Employ [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms] to enforce information-sharing decisions by authorized users based on access authorizations of sharing partners and access restrictions on information to be shared. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation sharing decisions; ownership usually sits with data owners and records management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-21(2) AC: Access Control | Information Sharing | Information Search and Retrieval Implement information search and retrieval services that enforce [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing restrictions]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationInformation sharing decisions; ownership usually sits with data owners and records management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-22 AC: Access Control | Publicly Accessible Content a. Designate individuals authorized to make information publicly accessible; b. Train authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain nonpublic information; c. Review the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and d. Review the content on the publicly accessible system for nonpublic information [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and remove such information, if discovered. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationPublicly accessible content review; ownership usually sits with communications and web owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-23 AC: Access Control | Data Mining Protection Employ [Assignment: organization-defined data mining prevention and detection techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined data storage objects] to detect and protect against unauthorized data mining. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationData mining protection; ownership usually sits with data platform owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-24(2) AC: Access Control | Access Control Decisions | No User or Process Identity Enforce access control decisions based on [Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy attributes] that do not include the identity of the user or process acting on behalf of the user. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAccess control decision detail; ownership usually sits with application design. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| AC-25 AC: Access Control | Reference Monitor Implement a reference monitor for [Assignment: organization-defined access control policies] that is tamperproof, always invoked, and small enough to be subject to analysis and testing, the completeness of which can be assured. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationReference monitor design; ownership usually sits with platform and operating system engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| IA-3(3) IA: Identification and Authentication | Device Identification and Authentication | Dynamic Address Allocation (a) Where addresses are allocated dynamically, standardize dynamic address allocation lease information and the lease duration assigned to devices in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined lease information and lease duration]; and (b) Audit lease information when assigned to a device. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationNetwork address allocation for device identification; ownership usually sits with network engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| IA-5(12) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Biometric Authentication Performance For biometric-based authentication, employ mechanisms that satisfy the following biometric quality requirements [Assignment: organization-defined biometric quality requirements]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAuthenticator property that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with platform, cryptographic and biometric program owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| IA-5(14) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Managing Content of PKI Trust Stores For PKI-based authentication, employ an organization-wide methodology for managing the content of PKI trust stores installed across all platforms, including networks, operating systems, browsers, and applications. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, management of PKI trust store content usually sits with PKI administration and platform owners; no identity contribution is typical. Certificate-based authentication is covered under SC-17. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| IA-5(15) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | GSA-approved Products and Services Use only General Services Administration-approved products and services for identity, credential, and access management. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationFederal procurement requirement that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with agency acquisition and the ICAM program office. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| IA-5(17) IA: Identification and Authentication | Authenticator Management | Presentation Attack Detection for Biometric Authenticators Employ presentation attack detection mechanisms for biometric-based authentication. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationAuthenticator property that GCA classifies as outside identity scope; ownership usually sits with platform, cryptographic and biometric program owners. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| IA-7 IA: Identification and Authentication | Cryptographic Module Authentication Implement mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines for such authentication. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationCryptographic module authentication; ownership usually sits with cryptographic engineering. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| IA-8(6) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users) | Disassociability Implement the following measures to disassociate user attributes or identifier assertion relationships among individuals, credential service providers, and relying parties: [Assignment: organization-defined measures]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationFederal acceptance profile detail; ownership usually sits with the sponsoring federal program. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| IA-12(4) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Proofing | In-person Validation and Verification Require that the validation and verification of identity evidence be conducted in person before a designated registration authority. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProofing method detail (in-person or address based); ownership usually sits with human resources and the proofing provider. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| IA-12(5) IA: Identification and Authentication | Identity Proofing | Address Confirmation Require that a [Selection: registration code; notice of proofing] be delivered through an out-of-band channel to verify the users address (physical or digital) of record. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationProofing method detail (in-person or address based); ownership usually sits with human resources and the proofing provider. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PS-2 PS: Personnel Security | Position Risk Designation a. Assign a risk designation to all organizational positions; b. Establish screening criteria for individuals filling those positions; and c. Review and update position risk designations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationIn GCA's classification, position risk designation usually sits with human resources and the security program; no identity contribution is typical. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| PS-8 PS: Personnel Security | Personnel Sanctions a. Employ a formal sanctions process for individuals failing to comply with established information security and privacy policies and procedures; and b. Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated, identifying the individual sanctioned and the reason for the sanction. |
|
Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
Why this classificationPersonnel sanctions are usually a human resources process; ownership usually sits with human resources and management. |
Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
No requirements match the current filters.
Summary
- Primary
- 49
- Identity platforms or processes are typically the principal means of implementing the requirement.
- Supporting
- 72
- Another discipline owns the requirement. Identity configuration or evidence contributes.
- Outside identity scope (GCA classification)
- 88
- Listed for completeness, with a one-line note on what the requirement is.
How to read the matrix
- Control type
- Base control, or control enhancement, as numbered by NIST (for example AC-2 and AC-2(1)). Withdrawn controls and enhancements are omitted.
- FedRAMP Rev 5 baseline
- The lowest FedRAMP Rev 5 baseline whose published control list includes this control or enhancement. In the published lists every Low control is also in Moderate and High, and every Moderate control is also in High. The value none means the control is in none of the three lists. Inclusion reflects FedRAMP's selection and says nothing about the authorization status of any cloud service.
- SP 800-53B baseline
- The lowest NIST SP 800-53B security control baseline (Low, Moderate or High) that includes this control or enhancement, from the NIST OSCAL baseline profiles for Rev 5. The value none means it is in none of the three baselines. Baselines are a starting point that organizations tailor.
- Identity relevance
Identity relevance is a GCA classification of whether identity capabilities are typically the principal means of implementing a requirement (Primary), contribute to a requirement owned by another discipline (Supporting), or usually sit outside identity work (Outside identity scope (GCA classification)).
It describes where primary implementation ownership usually sits. It is not a statement about whether identity configuration could be relevant to a particular incident, finding or environment. Every "Outside identity scope (GCA classification)" classification carries a rationale, and other classifications show one where GCA has recorded it, under "Why this classification" beside the label.
- Platform families
- Product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped a platform family to the requirement. It does not mean a product lacks a capability.
- Evidence
- Examples of artifacts commonly examined. The list is not complete, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Sources
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 control catalog in OSCAL, release 5.2.0 NIST
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations (publication page; release 5.2.0 issued August 27, 2025) NIST
- NIST CPRT: SP 800-53 Release 5.2.0 NIST
- NIST release note: SP 800-53 Release 5.2.0 NIST
- NIST SP 800-53B, Control Baselines for Information Systems and Organizations (OSCAL baseline profiles) NIST
- FedRAMP Security Controls Baseline (Rev 5 High, Moderate and Low baseline control lists; FedRAMP legacy documentation), workbook retrieved 2026-10-16. Baseline membership only; FedRAMP's Consolidated Rules for 2026 remove most FedRAMP-assigned parameter values and FedRAMP-specific guidance. FedRAMP (U.S. General Services Administration)
Important notice
Purpose. This NIST 800-53 Rev 5 identity traceability matrix is general educational reference material, written by Robert Ivey and published by GCA Technology Services ("GCA") to help organizations plan identity and access management work. It is not legal, audit, accounting or compliance advice, and it is not a substitute for advice from qualified professionals who know your environment.
No compliance determination. Whether an organization meets a requirement is decided by the applicable assessor, auditor, certifying body or regulator, applying the governing requirements to that organization's actual systems, policies and evidence. Nothing in this matrix states or implies that any organization, product, service or configuration meets or complies with any requirement, or that any assessment, audit, examination or certification will have any particular outcome.
Classifications are practice opinion. Relevance classifications, offering mappings, platform mappings and evidence examples are the author's professional judgment as of the date shown. They are not regulatory classifications and are not statements of the standard of care. Other qualified practitioners may reasonably classify requirements differently, and the right answer for a given environment depends on its facts.
Evidence examples are illustrative. Evidence listed is an example of artifacts commonly examined. It is not a complete list, and it is not a statement that any artifact is sufficient. Assessors determine sufficiency.
Source text controls. Requirement text and references come from the sources listed on this page. Where this matrix differs from a source, the source controls. Regulations, guidance and assessment methods change, so confirm current requirements with the issuing authority before relying on them.
Products and services. Platform names identify product families that commonly provide capabilities relevant to a requirement. A blank cell means GCA has not mapped that platform family to the requirement. It does not mean the product lacks a capability. GCA makes no representation about any third party's products, features, roadmaps or government authorization status, including FedRAMP, DoD Impact Levels and similar programs. Confirm capabilities with the vendor and authorization status with the authorizing program.
GCA services. Offering descriptions identify the type of GCA service that addresses an area. The scope, deliverables, terms and outcomes of any GCA engagement are defined only by a signed agreement and Statement of Work, and this page does not change those terms.
No relationship; no reliance. Reading or using this matrix does not create a client, advisory or other relationship with GCA or the author. To the fullest extent permitted by law, this material is provided "as is," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and GCA is not liable for any decision made or action taken in reliance on it.
No client data. This matrix contains no client data. Any example organization is fictitious.
FedRAMP baselines. FedRAMP is a program of the U.S. General Services Administration. FedRAMP baseline lists are shown for reference only, and this page does not describe any cloud service or GCA engagement as holding a FedRAMP designation.
Version 1 · Prepared · Last reviewed · Reviewed every 90 days · View changelog
© 2026 Quasius Investment Corp. d/b/a GCA Technology Services. The selection, arrangement, classifications and annotations in this matrix are GCA's original work. You may use this matrix within your organization for planning and may quote short portions with attribution to GCA and a link to this page. Republishing the matrix in whole or in substantial part requires GCA's written permission. Requirement text quoted on this page comes from the National Institute of Standards and Technology and is reproduced with attribution. It is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright in the United States (17 U.S.C. 105). The source publication controls, and its publisher does not endorse this page.
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Changelog
- Version 1: First publication.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does this page show that a system is FedRAMP authorized?
No. The FedRAMP facet shows which controls appear in the published Rev 5 Low, Moderate and High baseline lists. That membership says nothing about the authorization status of any cloud service or any GCA engagement. Authorization decisions are made by the authorizing official of a sponsoring agency or through the FedRAMP program, based on an assessment of the specific system.
Why does the matrix cover the AC and IA families in full?
Those families cover account lifecycle, least privilege, session control and authenticator management, which identity teams run day to day. The AU, PS and SC rows are limited to 18 base controls and one enhancement, PS-4(2), where identity work commonly contributes.
Which release is this matrix based on?
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, release 5.2.0, dated August 27, 2025. Confirm current control text with NIST before you rely on it, because NIST revises its publications.
Does a 'contributes to' classification mean a control is met?
No. It means identity work is typically the primary implementation, or a supporting input to a control owned by another discipline. Whether a system meets a control is decided by the assessor who examines that system and its evidence.